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Abstract 
 
In order to scale, entrepreneurial ventures (younger, growth oriented and innovative firms) often 
have to change the market they operate in. For example, going from an early scientific market to 
a mainstream one. These different markets work with different logics; what is valuable to the early 
market is not as valuable to the mainstream one and vice versa. When scaling up, the venture can 
encounter institutional complexity, that is when it faces both logics at the same time. This thesis 
investigates how a scaling venture encounters this institutional complexity. The thesis focuses on 
how these macro-level changes affect the internal processes and outcomes on the micro-level in 
the venture.  
The thesis consists of four papers. The first paper reviews the core theoretical literature of 
institutional logics that the thesis builds upon. The second and third paper rely on the longitudinal, 
qualitative data collected from a venture. The second paper investigates how a new logic is 
adopted on the micro-level and the consequence for the venture. The third follows this paper in 
time and investigates how the firm’s strategy of catering to two different logics incurred a trade-
off in accessing resources and legitimacy from both sources and having internal coherence, as the 
logics was used by each group differently and thus two sets of beliefs, ways of working and rules 
were present. The fourth paper builds a theoretical argument on how organizations respond to 
institutional change. This paper argues that working in peripheral organizations incurs that 
managers have more unencumbered ways of thinking and therefore are more able to embrace 
institutional change compared to managers in embedded organizations.  
The overarching contribution of this thesis is to illustrate and analyze how competing logics 
influence and hinder the scale-up of entrepreneurial ventures. This analysis contributes to the 
institutional logics literature, especially the one on hybrid organizations and institutional 
complexity, by providing insights into the micro-level mechanisms of the logics, which has been 
lacking in development in some areas. The findings provide practical insights into the challenges 
that ventures face in their internal organization as they scale. Thereby, thesis seeks to help out on 
this societal important issue of boosting the growth of, and in, new and innovative firms.  
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Resume 
 
For at skalere må venturevirksomheder (yngre, vækstorienterede og innovative virksomheder) 
ofte ændre det marked de opererer på. For eksempel må de gå fra et tidligt videnskabeligt 
teknologimarked til et mainstreammarked. Disse markeder opererer ofte med forskellige logikker; 
hvad der er værdifuldt på det tidlige marked, er ikke lige så værdifuldt på mainstreammarkedet 
og vice versa. Når ventures skalerer op, så de kan de møde institutionel kompleksitet, det er når 
de står overfor begge logikker på samme tid. Denne afhandling undersøger hvordan en 
venturevirksomhed der skalerer møder denne institutionelle kompleksitet. Afhandlingen 
fokuserer på hvordan disse makroniveau ændringer påvirker de indre processer og resultater på 
mikroniveau inden i virksomheden.  
Afhandlingen består af fire artikler. Den første artikel gennemgår den kernelitteratur om 
institutional logics som afhandlingen bygger på. Den anden og tredje artikel bygger på et 
længerevarende, kvalitativ data indsamlet i en venturevirksomhed. Den anden artikel undersøger 
hvordan en ny logik bliver inkorporeret på mikroniveau og hvad konsekvensen er for 
virksomheden. Den tredje artikel følger den foregående artikel i tid og undersøger hvordan 
virksomhedens strategi med at imødekomme begge logikker skabte et trade-off mellem at få 
adgang til resurser og legitimitet fra begge kilder og have intern sammenhæng, fordi logikkerne 
blev brugt af hver gruppe forskellige, og derved opstod der to tankesæt, to måder at arbejde på og 
to spilleregler. Den fjerde artikel bygger et teoretisk argument om hvordan organisationer 
modsvarer institutionelle forandringer. Artiklen argumenterer at arbejde i perifere organisationer 
gør at lederne har mere frie måder at tænke på og derfor er bedre til at imødegå institutionelle 
forandringer, sammenlignet med leder i forankrede organisationer.  
Denne afhandlings hovedbidrag er at illustrere og analysere hvordan modstridende logikker 
influerer og hindrer skalering af venturevirksomheder. Denne analyse bidrager til litteraturen om 
institutional logics, særligt den om hybridorganisationer og institutionel kompleksitet, ved at 
bidrage med indsigt om de mikroniveau mekanismer som de her logikker indeholder og influerer, 
et felt som mangler udvikling på visse områder. Afhandlingen giver praktisk indsigt i de 
udfordringer som venturevirksomheder har i deres interne organisation når de skalerer. Derved, 
søger afhandlingen at afhjælpe på dette samfundsmæssige vigtige områder om at øge væksten af, 
og i, nye og innovative virksomheder.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
This thesis primarily analyzes the dynamics of institutional logics in organizations with an 
empirical focus on entrepreneurial ventures1 during scale-up. The core interest of this thesis is 
how and why different socially constructed macro-level patterns of action, beliefs, values, rules, 
and norms—what scholars call “institutional logics” (Thornton et al. 2012)—affect micro-level 
processes and outcomes, mainly in entrepreneurial ventures, but also extendable to other 
organizations. These processes and outcomes are framing, collaboration, use of structures and 
practices, conflict, and decision-making. The thesis will focus on how different institutional logics 
impact within the organization, which has not received too much attention (Greenwood et al., 
2014).  I will argue that encountering different logics is particularly an issue for entrepreneurial 
ventures that during scale-up would often face the need to cater to new and different demands, 
such as increasing profitability and bringing in people who fit the preconception of what it takes 
requires to grow these ventures further (Fisher et al., 2016). These changes result in dual 
institutional logics that compete in forming organizational action, processes, and structures. This 
competition may provide barriers to organizational performance and success (Besharov & Smith, 
2014).  
Entrepreneurial ventures are often founded on a logic that differs from larger corporations’ logic. 
For example, ventures may often be founded as a result of applied science (Powell & Sandholtz, 
2012). Powell and Sandholtz (2012) found that such ventures often were tightly knitted to 
academia and graft important ideas on about how to organize from here. However, in a scale-up 
process from startup to corporation, ventures will naturally run into a market and corporate logic. 
Ventures face demands to accommodate this logic by changing personnel and structures; however, 
in this phase, organizational culture and structures may become contested between founders and 
joiners, which could instigate repercussions for the venture (Desantola & Gulati; 2017 Sutton & 
                                                 
1 An entrepreneurial venture is a young, growth-oriented company engaging in innovative behavior (Desantola & 
Gulati, 2017 p. 640). 
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Rao, 2014). This thesis therefore investigates: “How do multiple institutional logics influence 
successful scaling of entrepreneurial ventures?”  
This line of research is crucial because the ventures often fail during the scale-up stage (Desantola 
& Gulati, 2017; Sutton & Rao, 2014). Scale-up is seen as a “black art,” and little is known about 
internal organization during this scale-up phase (Desantola & Gulati, 2017 p. 641). While the 
scholarship on entrepreneurs is increasing rapidly, there is a lack of research on how the internal 
organization is affected by growth (Desantola & Gulati, 2017; McMullen & Dimov, 2013; Wright 
& Stigliani, 2012).  This absence poses a problem, because internal organization is crucial to the 
scaling endeavor (Desantola & Gulati, 2017). Moreover, economists have found that scaling is 
lagging behind, despite the increased number of high-potential start-ups that exist (Guzman & 
Stern, 2016). Simply put; creative ventures with potential are flourishing, but the fulfillment of 
their potential is not. Guzman and Stern (2016 p. 40) state:” 
“While the supply of new high-potential-growth startups appears to be growing, the ability of 
U.S. high-growth-potential startups to commercialize and scale seems to be facing continuing 
stagnation.” 
 
The lack of new ventures scaling-up is not just a problem in the US but is a fundamental issue 
globally. It is also a problem in Denmark, where, according to a report by the Danish business 
agency (“Erhvervsstyrelsen”), scaling is correspondingly sluggish. Although many barriers to 
scale-up may stem from economic institutions, a shortage of skilled people, and a lack of 
dynamism in markets, etc. And, while these barriers deserve attention, this thesis merely focuses 
on the barriers regarding the internal organization as it is affected by multiple institutional logics. 
It concentrates on internal organization because that factor is likely affected by a venture’s 
pluralistic environment, which induces changes to organizational identity and overall goals 
(Fisher et al., 2016).  
The thesis consists of four papers, a review on the relevant institutional logics literature that the 
thesis draws upon. A second paper, the first empirical one, deals with how new logics are adopted 
by the organization and its members as a new cognitive frame that come to clash with the existing 
one over time. The third paper, and second empirical paper, builds on the first by looking at why 
such frames would exist, why individuals motivated are to retain conflicting logics, and how they 
avoid blending logics, while the venture is seeking to become hybrid. The final part of the thesis 
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comprises a theoretical paper on how organizational position and history affects managers’ ability 
to respond to changes in logics. The papers hereby produce both theoretical and practical 
contributions that I will list and discuss in the section on contributions.   
The introduction to thesis continues as follows; first, I will shortly introduce the basis of the 
research design and context.  
Second, I will discuss this thesis placement in the institutional logics literature on hybrid 
organizations and institutional complexity, which is the sub-field of the institutional logics 
literature that this thesis directly contributes to.  
Third, I will discuss the deeper theoretical placement in institutional theory, this is done because 
the thesis places itself closer to ideas from economics, similar to the work of James Coleman, than 
most work on institutional logics.  
I will discuss where this fits in, why it does, and why my perspective can bridge schools of 
thought. My thesis places itself in economic sociology, where I am focusing on economic action 
but emphasize social and culture concerns rather than the neoclassical economical concerns 
(Granovetter, 2017). I engage the philosophical background of this thesis and it relates to the 
institutional logics perspective. This is done because this thesis takes a micro-foundational 
approach in which individuals create institutions, carry their logics in mind, and are the drivers 
behind change, not the institutions themselves enact this work. As such, the thesis takes a different 
approach than many institutionalists, who focus on the collective constructs of institutions as 
drivers of change. I therefore contend that a micro-foundational perspective is necessary and how 
it may participate in prevailing institutional literature.  
Fourth, I will discuss the contributions that each paper makes to the literature on institutional 
logics, especially in regards to the literature on hybrid organizations, institutional complexity, and 
broader entrepreneurship literature. I will also tie the papers together to demonstrate that they 
cover different aspects to form a whole thesis.  
Research design and context  
The thesis mainly consists of a longitudinal ethnographic case study of an entrepreneurial venture 
during its crucial scale-up phase as the company grew from 120 employees in Denmark to over 
300 employees across several countries, a result of both organic and inorganic scale-up. I visited 
the company regularly over a two-year period and conducted participant observations, interviews, 
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and relied on archival data. The case company, to which I hereinafter refer pseudonymously as 
“Supertech,” operates in the photonics industry. This industry is optimal for studying how a 
venture faces scale-up challenges because the market is very complex. From IT to windmill 
sensing and medical instruments, the market is spread over many different sectors and uses. It is 
also characterized by a lot of different players, mostly smaller start-ups, but a few are major firms. 
Finally, according to a report by the German Ministry of Education and Research, the market will 
nearly double in size between 2011–2020: from €350 billion to €615 billion. Supertech was not a 
start-up when the study began: it had already reached a mature market and made over €40 million 
in revenue. Yet, it was not a mature corporation because it did not make a profit.  
The research context therefore pertains to many small- and medium-sized firms that seek to scale-
up to make money for investors and owners. This context is especially interesting because young 
high-growth firms are increasingly rare (Decker et al., 2016). Research has shown that the scale-
up of ventures, which occurs primarily in job creation, is declining (Decker et al., 2016; 
Haltiwanger et al., 2017; Guzman & Stern, 2016). Therefore, looking inside a venture as it scales 
is instructive. What are the reasons that the scaling process is so difficult and seemingly often 
fails? Here, the context is also interesting because Supertech is a firm with a high level of research: 
it operates in a fast-growing market and enjoys backing from an owner. Thus, Supertech had the 
foundations that is normally assumed to be crucial for venture growth, such as venture capital, 
high level of technology and a fast-growing market. Therefore, it is interesting to see the influence 
of competing logics; could they derail such a high potential venture? 
The research design is an inductive case study. It relies on a broad set of qualitative data coded 
according to grounded theory methods, which have become the “boilerplate” of qualitative data 
handling in management research. As I began collecting data immediately after commencing my 
PhD, data were initially gathered without a literature-based research question. The overall 
research question and sub-questions for each paper emerged from initial data collection and 
analysis. These questions then provided a research design focused on capturing institutional logics 
and their interplay at the micro-level, which centered on capturing how employees framed their 
role and actions in the organization.  
The in-depth discussion of methods and analysis strategy are found in both empirical papers; 
therefore, this introduction will not repeat it.  
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Placement in theory: Institutional Complexity and hybrid organizations 
The main theoretical stream of this thesis is institutional logics. The core idea of this stream is 
that institutions have a certain logic: a set of practices, beliefs, norms, and values (Friedland & 
Alford, 1991; Thornton et al., 2012). For example, the court system has a certain logic on what a 
fair trial is, such as having a trained lawyer and what constitutes evidence. For example, a forced 
confession was for a very long time considered valid evidence, but not anymore.   
This thesis’s papers contribute to the institutional logics literature, and, more precisely, the sub-
field that focuses on institutional complexity and hybrid organizations. Here, I especially 
concentrate on the micro-level to expand our understanding of the micro-foundations within this 
literature.  
The idea of institutional complexity goes back to Friedland and Alford’s (1991) original 
conceptualization of logics, where they argue that the main logics of the West—state, religion, 
democracy, and family—often overlap and carry contradictions that individuals may exploit for 
change. This foundational paper has led to a large stream of literature focusing on how (mostly) 
organizations experience and cope with this complexity. Greenwood et al. (2011 p. 318), in their 
review, describe the literature in the following way: 
“Organizations face institutional complexity whenever they confront incompatible prescriptions 
from multiple institutional logics. Institutional logics are overarching sets of principles that 
prescribe how to interpret organizational reality, what constitutes appropriate behaviour, and 
how to succeed.” 
Market and profession commonly intersect in this clash of incompatible prescriptions; studies in 
healthcare, for example, show this occurrence (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Another clash arises 
between science and care in medical education (Dunn & Jones, 2010). The largest stream of 
literature is possibly found on social enterprises, which must couple a community or professional 
social work logic with a market logic (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Pache 
& Santos, 2013b).  
Recent literature has provided a new perspective on institutional complexity; instead of being 
incompatible prescriptions that invariably clash, scholarship has increasingly focused on 
organizations that successfully blend these prescriptions, the so-called hybrid organizations 
(Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Battilana & Lee, 2014; Pache & Santos, 2013b; Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013; Smets et al., 2015; Smith & Besharov, 2017). This writing originated in the 
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study of social enterprises, but, lately, scholars have argued that all organizations are essentially 
hybrids that have successfully settled these incompatible logics (Ocasio & Radoynovska, 2016; 
Schildt & Perkmann, 2017). The ways this is accomplished is often based on strategic 
organizational responses (Ocasio & Radoynovska, 2016; Oliver, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2010). 
For example, fitting business and governance models to the complexity can settle incompatible 
logics (Ocasio & Radoynovska, 2016). Managers, who are able to handle the paradox, can 
establish “guardrails” among formal structures and stakeholder relationships, thereby similarly 
mitigating possible conflicts (Smith & Besharov, 2017). From a perspective where institutional 
complexity was a hindrance and threat, researchers are now more likely to view such complexity 
as an opportunity to act strategically to secure organizational success and survival (Ocasio & 
Radoynovska, 2016; Vermeulen et al., 2016).  
This development is where it becomes interesting for entrepreneurial ventures, because these 
ventures often confront two logics: a science one and a business one (Powell & Sandholtz, 2012).2 
How ventures thus respond to this complexity, and whether they can incorporate it as hybrids, is 
likely crucial to their survival and success (Schildt & Perkmann, 2017). Responses are decisive 
because stretching across fields allows the venture to obtain resources from multiple sources (e.g., 
funding for scientific endeavors as well as funding from venture capitalists).  
An issue with the literature is that it often focuses on the external fit (how the organization’s 
activities fit the environment) and less on the internal fit (the fit between internal activities) 
(Siggelkow, 2001). To many institutional scholars this imbalance is quite natural, because—since 
Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) seminal paper—they have argued that ceremonial performances for 
an external audience are crucial in a way that real efficiency and effectiveness is not. However, 
the institutional logics perspective does not share this bleaker view of organizations and it has (a 
recent) stronger emphasis on micro-foundations, hence how people join practices, identities and 
goals from different logic on the “coalface” is crucial for achieving hybridity (Barley, 2008, 
Thornton et al. 2012). Most research, however, has focused on organizational-level dynamics 
(Smith & Besharov, 2017), which has left the micro-level underdeveloped (Jarvis, 2017; Pache & 
Santos, 2013a; Schilke, 2017; Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013; Voronov & Yorks, 2015).  
                                                 
2 Annoyingly scholars tend to call the logic for business, market or corporate. They are essentially all the same; 
firms that focus on increasing profits and share price, which is the way businesses gain legitimacy. “The business of 
business is business” as Milton Friedman saw it.  
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We know little about how complexity arises in an organization like a venture: how does it first 
experience the need for hybridity and are managers even aware of the change? Moreover, what is 
the consequence of suddenly having to adopt a new logic? These questions are important for 
understanding how logics come into an organization, and the status of those logics is crucial for 
how they are handled (Pache & Santos, 2010). This lacuna I strive to fill in the first empirical 
paper, where I analyze how the adoption of a new logic takes the form of new frame of action on 
the micro-level.  
A second element is that, because the literature has moved away from seeing logics as 
incompatible, studies nearly always show successful integration of logics, and has led some 
scholars to talk about “institutional ambidexterity” (Jarzabkowski et al. 2013). Here, researchers 
have focused on hybridity as a strategy (Durand et al. 2013, Greenwood et al. 2011), where the 
organization deliberately tries to access a greater set of resources and legitimacy by catering to a 
complex set of stakeholders. This stream of literature has received generous attention recently 
(e.g. Ocasio & Radoynovska, 2016, Pache & Santos, 2013b, Schildt & Perkmann, 2017, Smith & 
Besharov, 2017). However, an important gap in the idea that organizations can be “ambidextrous” 
and pursue legitimacy across the board is that it does not explain why employees, embedded 
within each logic, would follow such a hybrid strategy and blend their logics. The second 
empirical paper investigates this trade-off between a hybrid strategy that allows for a broader set 
of resources and legitimacy while having employees who may not buy into this strategy. It tracks 
employees who, instead, use the ambiguous nature of the environment to form their own frame 
and disrupt the organization using different processes and structures that are legitimate exactly 
because the complex environment allows for competing processes and structures. 
Finally, I deal with the notion of strategic organizational responses to institutional change 
complexity in the fourth paper, which is conceptual. The notion of organizational responses to 
institutional change, especially in regards to the rise of competing logics (“institutional 
complexity”) has developed into a wealth of literature (Greenwood et al., 2011) that explains 
many nuances of the issues that organizations face when dealing with a changing and complex 
environment. Yet, the literature rarely looks at the managers in charge to explain organizational 
responses. In short, the micro-foundations of an organization’s decision-making have not been 
scrutinized. Managers must differ across organizations because there would be no difference in 
responses otherwise, and we know from the behavioral theory literature that managers differ in 
their decision-making (Gavetti, 2012). Here, I apply the micro-foundations of institutional logics 
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from Thornton et al. (2012) to managerial decision making to analyze how organizational 
responses differ.  
 
 
Phenomenon Literature Gaps in the literature Research objective  
Hybrid organizations Well-developed 
literature on the 
possible conflicts of 
hybrids (Battilana & 
Dorado, 2010), the 
benefits of hybrids 
(Jay, 2013), and how 
complexity is made to 
work in practice 
(Smets et al., 2015).  
Briefly, the research 
has focused on how 
hybrid organizations 
successfully persist 
and gain resources 
across complex 
stakeholders. Most 
research has shown 
that organizations are 
successful in this 
endeavor.   
The literature has 
almost exclusively 
dealt with 
organizations that are 
facing complex 
logics and must be 
hybrid to survive, 
such as social 
enterprises. Research 
on how organizations 
act when they enter 
into a complex field 
has not received the 
same attention, 
despite the notion 
that most 
organizations will 
enter a complex field 
at some point 
(Schildt & 
Perkmann, 2017). 
Another issue is that 
the literature has not 
explained the nature 
of conflict, for 
example how do 
conflicts affect 
collaborations and 
organizational 
performance? 
The first empirical 
paper seeks to amend 
these gaps by asking 
how logics are 
adopted by an 
organization and 
what its 
consequences are.  
Hybrid Strategy Literature has 
increasingly argued 
that organizations can 
strategically seek out 
multiple stakeholder 
or use the complexity 
in their environment 
(Durand et al. 2013; 
Jarzabkowski et al., 
2013; Ocasio & 
The literature has 
almost exclusively 
focused on the 
organizational level, 
on managers who 
formulate different 
strategies to pursue 
hybridity. Few 
publications focus on 
how organizations 
The second empirical 
paper investigates the 
barriers on the micro-
level in pursuing a 
hybrid strategy. For 
example, are 
employees motivated 
to implement the 
strategy? How might 
they disrupt this 
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Radoynovska; 2016, 
Pache & Santos, 
2013b).  
 
become hybrid in 
daily practice on the 
ground floor of the 
organization. How 
does a hybrid 
strategy translate into 
actual action? 
strategy if they are 
unmotivated? 
Organizational 
responses to 
institutional change 
and complexity 
A well-developed 
literature has focused 
on how organizations 
respond to 
institutional change 
and complexity 
(Greenwood et al., 
2011). For example, 
organizations could 
choose an offensive 
strategy, such as 
mixing logics or 
embracing change 
wholeheartedly, or 
they could choose a 
more defensive 
response (Oliver, 
1991, Pache & 
Santos, 2010).  
While this literature 
is well established it 
rarely focuses on the 
micro-foundations of 
institutional logics; 
how do logics shape 
decision-making? 
This is crucial to 
understand how 
organizations 
respond. If we want 
to understand 
responses we need to 
understand how 
decisions are shaped 
by the logics to 
which they are 
responding.  
Another possibility 
here is to link 
institutional logics 
with the behavioral 
theory of the firm 
(Gavetti et al. 2012).  
My conceptual paper 
develops 
propositions on how 
decision makers are 
shaped by the 
organization in 
which they are 
employed. For 
example, embedded 
and central 
organizations would 
likely have a 
different set of 
decision-makers than 
an organization 
working on the 
fringes of fields.  
The paper here also 
tries to link macro-
determinants of 
decision-making, 
such as institutional 
logics with the 
micro-determinants 
of the behavioral 
theory of the firm as 
suggested by Gavetti 
et al. (2012).  
Table 1 Overview over current literature, gaps and contributions 
As my first paper is a review paper that goes more in depth with the literature, I will not conduct 
a classic literature review in the introduction. Instead, I will take a look at the deeper theoretical 
placement, because the views the thesis takes are somewhat different than current institutional 
lenses. I will explain the reasons and how they fit with the literature.  
Placement and perspective in accordance to the overall new institutional perspective 
 
Placement within the new institutional literature 
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Institutions and their norms, rules, values, and practices have long been seen as crucial for 
economic processes and outcomes (Hayek, 1948; Granovetter, 2017; Smith, 2003). However, in 
the study of economics and economic organizations this view has taken a backseat to other 
explanations. Economists have increasingly relied on the notion of bounded rationality 
(Kahneman, 2003, Simon, 1947). This trend has spilled over to the study of economic 
organization, where assumptions often rely on bounded rationality and opportunism, which 
relegates institutions to the role of enforcing co-operation (Williamson, 1981, 2000). The common 
economic organization perspective lacks a desire to explain economic organization from a broad 
institutional perspective, where institutions are “thick” and consist of norms and values 
(Granovetter, 2017). On the other side, sociologists have placed great emphasis on institutions 
and their roles when explaining the form of organizations (most well-known are DiMaggio and 
Powell in 1983 and Meyer and Rowan in 1977). Yet, sociologists often eschew studying economic 
process and outcomes in favor of comparative, historical, and macro-level explanations that 
seldom explore the individual level of economic action (Granovetter, 2017). From the viewpoint 
of the most social constructivist side of the so-called new institutionalism, economic action is 
nothing more than social construction, because there is no objective reality, only rationalized 
myths (Bromley & Powell, 2015, Edelman et al. 1999; Meyer, 2010, Meyer & Rowan, 1977). 
Each side naturally blames the other for being unscientific or narrow-minded, as nature would 
have it with academics with similar interests but different worldviews3  
As a result of this hostility, we often see very large differences in perspectives and interests. Most 
institutional sociologists are not very interested in organizations per se (Greenwood et al. 2014); 
they are interested in how institutions evolve and shape individual and societal action.  
Sociological interests lie in the evolution of institutions and logics, and not in how they shape 
economic outcomes and processes; the latter is the domain of classically oriented economists 
(Boettke & Candela, 2015; Hayek, 1948; Smith, 2003). As mentioned, the literature on economic 
organization disregards broader and informal institutional impacts (Granovetter, 2017). This 
thesis places itself in a bit of a gap in the literature, because most institutional sociologists 
overlook economic organization and performance. For example, I realized in my review of the 
literature that few scholars deal with for-profit organization, which is insight others have also 
                                                 
3 Jepperson and Meyer’s publication (2011) is a particular aggressive example. They ascribe the other side’s view 
and focus on micro-foundations as a result of “liberal folk theories,” not honest intellectual endeavors. Jepperson 
and Meyer (2011) claim their work offers a “more robust” view in contrast to the other side, which, for them, offers 
an ideological blind doctrine.  
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noted (Greenwood et al., 2014). Moreover, sociologists rarely mention economic performance. 
On the other hand, organizational economists seldom work with socially constructed and informal 
institutions (Granovetter, 2017). Their interest, rather, is how institutions curb opportunism 
(Williamson, 1993). And, if the scholars in question are institutional economists like Acemoglu 
and Robinson (2012), they will likely care about curbing opportunism on a societal level (i.e., 
investigating how institutions make sure most people can be involved in economic activity 
without being exploited by powerful political and economic actors). If one is an organizational 
economist, one’s attention is with how contracts are upheld to minimize opportunism and hold-
ups (Williamson, 1985, 1993). Whether institutions are socially constructed and have a “thick” 
and nuanced impact on people, organizations, and society is not interesting to organizational 
economists (Williamson, 2000).  
The interest of this thesis is explaining institutional impacts inside organizations, which is often 
ignored by the institutional literature (Greenwood, Hinings & Whetten, 2014). Scholars have 
given more and more focus to the notion that institutions are not holistic devices, but there are 
different institutions at play with competing logics (Friedland & Alford, 1991). This theoretical 
notion has not found pervasive application to the organizational level and the micro-level of 
individuals and groups inside an organization (Greenwood et al., 2014). Moreover, most research 
eschews for-profit organizations (Greenwood et al., 2014). This situation means that we do not 
know much about individual firms from this perspective, including how a firm handles its 
changing environment on the micro-level.  
This thesis provides a new lens on the well-known phenomenon of firm growth as it forays into 
new markets. Most technology-based firms at some point change from creating radical technology 
to more incremental innovation for a mainstream market, but the literature is thin on the nature of 
this transition and its challenges (Truelove & Kellogg, 2016). I apply the institutional logics lens 
to flesh out this transition as a change between logics: a professional science-based logic and a 
market-and-corporation-based logic. By scrutinizing the micro-level, I try to explain why high-
tech entrepreneurial ventures may succeed and fail in their scale-up stage. I will argue that the 
competition between the science that founded the venture and the new demands of the market, 
together with the new employees hired to cater to the new market, may in some circumstances 
severely hamper the organization. Other factors play into the success or failure of a venture (e.g., 
willing investors or a particularly lucrative market), but I believe that the competition between 
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new and old ideas is crucial to how well an organization’s scale-up unfolds, whether it reaches 
adequate size, and if it becomes sustainable over time.  
Why Institutions and logics? 
 
I focus on the notion of institutional logics: the idea that institutions have a central logic that 
consists of socially constructed values, practices, rules, and norms (Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012). Institutional logics not as much reward and punish, as 
they provide repertoires of behavior and justification (Thornton et al., 2012). In other words, they 
shape behavior into coherent and meaningful forms. Logics help fallible individuals create social 
processes that provide their particular part of the world with meaning and value (Boltanski & 
Thévenot, 2006; Granovetter, 2017; Thornton et al., 2012). Logics affect economic processes and 
outcomes by shaping processes according to legitimate practices and results toward certain worlds 
of worth (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006). They form the way organizations create value and for 
whom they create value. Therefore, Institutional logics is an interesting perspective to apply to 
the micro-level of economic processes, because most studies focus on the macro-level 
(Granovetter, 2017; Jarvis, 2017).  
This is where institutional logics appears useful, as the logics take institutions from high above 
and into the micro-level of how behavior is shaped and carried out (DiMaggio, 1997; Thornton et 
al., 2012). Logics are not purely macro-level but may take different forms at different levels 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991; Pache & Santos, 2013a). The logics perspective enables me to analyze 
deeper and closer how norms, values, and practices shape economic processes like collaboration, 
transactions, and decision-making (processes which, in turn, effect economic and social 
outcomes). As such my thesis places itself in the mainline school of economic thought, where 
institutional filters are seen as crucial (Boettke & Candela, 2015), I amend its focus away from 
institutions as mere upholders of law to attend to the ways institutions enact “softer” sets of norms 
and values that shape cognition (DiMaggio, 1997). As such the mix of sociology and focus on 
economic outcomes positions the thesis in economic sociology.  
 
Placement within New Institutionalism 
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John Meyer articulates a typology of the different theories in new institutionalism, which I will 
use to locate my thesis within the literature. Meyer, who ignited the new institutional paradigm, 
divides the literature into the following box,4 which I adapt slightly. Meyer places a “red line” 
between what he considers the social constructivist (or “phenomenological” in his words) and the 
more realist (or positivist) oriented scholars.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 I witnessed John Meyer presenting his views and this box during my stay at Stanford University.  
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Figure 1. Meyer’s “Institutional box,” adopted with some additions. 
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Figure 2 Macro and micro link both perspectives adapted from John Meyer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Constructivist/Phenomenological 
View
Institutional Level:
”Thick”, socially constructed institutions. E.g. logic or myth 
of a profession
Individual Level:
Socially constructed actor with high levels of internalization. 
“Reflexive Behavior”
Realist/Positivist view
Institutional Level:
”Thin”, rationally constructed institutions. E.g. property 
rights
Individual Level:
Rational Choice agent, acting under institutional 
constraints.
“Purposeful behavior”
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The view in this thesis 
 
 
Figure 3 Macro and micro link in this thesis 
 
The view established in Figure 3 may raise some red flags for organizational sociologists and new 
institutionalists, because it signals methodological individualism. Institutional sociologists often 
disregard (and dislike) methodological individualism (Jepperson & Meyer, 2011). Some 
institutionalists may fear that the position for which I am arguing will reduce individuals to 
rational actors in accordance with neoclassical economic models. On the other hand, some 
economists may fear that the position will embrace radical constructivism. Neither is the case. 
Figure 3 illustrates a reasonable perspective that includes purposeful agents—which is a mainstay 
in many institutionalist accounts (e.g., Coleman, 1990; Swidler, 1986, 2001)—as well as a social 
constructivist account of institutions that one would be able to find in economics (e.g., 
Williamson, 2000). The perspective interprets the institutional logics perspective by building on 
its core ideas while approaching them from an angle that is more James Coleman than John Meyer. 
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Other institutional literature often takes the opposite perspective, but both can be found within the 
institutional logics perspective. The next section outlines the view adopted in this thesis.  
 
The view of institutions and individuals in this thesis 
 
The perspective I lay forward follows the definition of institutional logics: “the socially 
constructed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and space, 
and provide meaning to their social reality” (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008, p.4). Importantly, this 
definition puts the individual very much in focus and gives her or him the ability to change and 
affect institutions and their logics (Thornton et al., 2012). An important interpretation of logics 
that Thornton et al. (2012) use is that logics are a cultural toolkit (Swidler, 1986). Using this 
terminology naturally demands purposeful individuals, because tools are something people use, 
not the other way around.  
This individual perspective bears several consequences. First, the notion of “logics” and the link 
between culture and cognition exposes how institutions do not exist outside of the minds of 
people. People possess logics: the buildings of a judicial system, for example, do not have logics. 
This acknowledgement is important and represents a crucial difference between Durkheim and 
other new institutionalists who place institutions outside of the mind of people as social facts that 
order people (Searle, 2006).  
Second, the focus on individuals as the producers of institutional logics brings about the question 
of why they are created. John Searle (2010 p.105–106) explains: “Some social theorists have seen 
institutional facts as essentially constraining. That is a very big mistake. There is indeed an 
element of constraint in social institutions. For example, you cannot be president unless you get 
elected, you cannot spend money you do not have, and in baseball, you cannot have four strikes. 
But the very institutions of money and baseball increase our powers.”  
The reason for the production of logics is therefore simple: it is in an individual’s interest to create 
institutional facts (as Searle calls them) or logics (as sociologists call them). For example, why 
have individuals created professional associations, such as the ones in academia? Is it not because 
these associations order relations, purposes, and practices? While individuals create institutions 
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and their logics, it does not necessarily follow that an individual or group can change these 
institutional logics. For example, many academics are probably quite displeased with the for-
profit journal and peer-review systems, but that does not mean these systems are easily 
transformable. A young academic is likely dependent on his or her supervisors’ good graces, as a 
deluge of horror stories on the wide web demonstrates. Individuals and groups are therefore not 
at liberty to behave as they please or change systems at will. They are embedded within social 
relations and cultural norms that shape their future and they behavior. Overall, this thesis sees 
institutions as socially constructed through human action by individuals, which entails the use of 
speech to assign status functions that then create institutional facts that differ from brute facts5 
(Searle, 1995, 2010). Because institutions are “logical” and do not consist of brute facts, they only 
exist in the mind of individuals (Searle, 1995, 2010). Institutions mostly enable individuals to 
pursue their goals and order their social world, but they do contain an element of constraint.  
 
Embedded agency 
A key term in economic sociology and institutional logics is that of embedded agency. Thornton 
et al. (2012 p.4) define it as follows: 
“…institutional logics shape individual preferences, organizational interests, and the categories 
and repertoires of actions to attain those interests and preferences. Dominant institutional logics 
become taken for granted (Zucker 1977), not by providing specific scripts for action, à la 
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1991) position, but by establishing core principles for organizing 
activities and channeling interests. This view of how institutional logics shape action has become 
known as embedded agency, or social action that is culturally embedded in institutional logics.” 
 
The above definition reveals that individual preferences and interests are not identical. It is widely 
recognized that institutions shape preferences, even when one takes a similar view to Oliver 
Williamson (where institutions—especially on contract-level—enforce certain behavior). For 
example, even if one’s employees are self-interested it is possible to guide their behavior away 
from this self-interest using contracts that change their behavior from fitting their own end to fit 
that of the firm. From an institutional logics perspective, being embedded shapes preferences 
because agents cannot perform actions outside of social, political, and cultural structures. For 
                                                 
5 Brute fact: there is a landmass we call the United States of America. Institutional fact: that landmass is a set of 
united states governed by a representative democracy and a president (Searle, 1995).  
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example, an academic inclined person undertaking a PhD would likely have his or her preferences 
geared toward publishing in a very narrowly specified set of journals because of a desire for 
professional recognition and secure employment.  
 
The example does not determine that action is scripted, individuals are aware of the repertoires of 
action upon which they behave. The point is not that they cannot see alternatives and are socialized 
into taken-for-granted beliefs but that acquiring and using cultural toolkits are important to 
individuals (Swidler, 2008). For example, if one learns advanced statistical methods during PhD 
training, she or he would disfavor an innovation or turn in their scientific field that excludes her 
or his expertise because of the sense of lost years spent learning those methods. Here, Oliver 
(1997) points out that we face a cognitive sunk cost fallacy. 
 
In any scenario, one uses only a portion of available tools. We engage with much less culture than 
what we could know (DiMaggio, 1997; Swidler, 1986). The reason for this is cognitive 
limitations. We cannot grasp all kinds of culture, but, instead, learn to deploy a carefully curated 
set (Swidler, 2008). Hence, agents may follow institutional logics for two reasons: it may be in 
one’s continued interest to do so, or one may feel the cognitive cost already invested is too great 
to abandon. As Oliver (1997) succinctly points out, in institutional theory the cost is cognitive. It 
is difficult and costly to give up learned skills, since it takes time and effort to acquire new skills 
and habits that make one operational in a new field (Swidler, 2008). Simply put, the reason why 
people keep following a logic that may not be in their best interest is the same reason that people 
do not get divorced: abandoning ingrained habits and modes of being is too costly, and people 
possess limited willpower and cognitive resources to attempt it. The term “bounded intentionality” 
describes how individuals rely on a frame of action and belief that tends to eliminate information 
(Thornton et al., 2012). To make the world meaningful, individuals must have these bounds in 
identities and goals: it is impossible to process all possibilities and all information (Thornton et 
al., 2012). Here Thornton et al (2012) tie into the growing literature on cultural-cognitive 
sociology (Cerulo, 2010; DiMaggio, 1997; Levi-Martin 2009; Vaisey, 2009). Because culture is 
so complex and interwoven, it cannot simultaneously script people. As Levi-Martin (2009 p. 229) 
writes: “If one wants to define culture as something complex, then it is not going to be inside of 
people (see Swidler, 2000), because people are extremely simple.” The macro-cosmos of culture 
simply does not fit into our (pin)heads. If we view culture as complex and clashing, then we should 
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work with the assumption that individuals pick out and have picked up cultural elements to help 
provide meaning to everyday life.  
 
In this broader theoretical and philosophical placement, I have discussed two elements important 
to my thesis: cognition and self-interest. The cognition element elucidates how individuals are 
reliant on frames that help provide meaning and a repertoire of everyday action. These frames 
differ in strengths of availability, accessibility, and activation (Pache & Santos, 2013a). Papers 
two and four in this thesis especially draw on the cultural-cognitive link. The second element is 
self-interest. In my view we need a better understanding of self-interest or, more broadly, 
“motivations,” as modern scholars use it (Gottschlag & Zollo, 2007). If individuals pursuing their 
interests produce institutions, then we need to understand such interests and how they operate in 
institutional environments. I am especially concerned with “motivations” in my third paper. 
However, I do not go into how individuals build new institutions, only how they shape their own 
organization. Thornton et al. (2012) produce a set of micro-foundations, where the macro-macro 
link is between institutional logics and organizational practices and identity; hence, we need to 
apprehend how these organizational elements manifest and aggregate across organizations if we 
want to understand these micro-foundations. This is what I strive to contribute to by focusing on 
the context of an entrepreneurial venture trying to achieve hybridity.  
 
 
Contributions to the institutional logics literature 
 
All of my papers focus on a subfield of institutional logics, namely institutional complexity and 
hybrid organizations.  
The thesis starts with a literature review, “Institutional logics as an organization and management 
theory: a review of empirical research and future directions,” which contributes by creating an 
overview of the institutional logics literature and by arguing for new possibilities and research 
directions that could enrich the literature. The literature review aims to carve out new research 
directions in management and organization theory, where institutional logics are often used but 
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(according to recent critiques of new institutional theory) still lacks a clearer focus on the micro-
foundations and explaining processes in an organization. In my review, I find that while recent 
scholarship has gone more into the micro-level some elements are still lacking, especially with 
regard to the organizations studied and explanations of organizational features and design. The 
logics perspective could be enriched by coupling it to other theories and broadening its scope. 
Lastly, the micro-foundations that have received an increasing amount of theoretical focus lack 
empirical grounding. The paper therefore suggests four elements to enrich the perspective: 1) the 
sample of organizations studied, 2) organizational features such as design and performance, 3) 
coupling to other organizational theories, and 4) stronger empirical grounding of the micro-
foundations.  
The second paper, “Adoption of logics in entrepreneurial ventures: how logics are brought in, 
activated and conflict inside the organization,” focuses on how a new logic enters an 
entrepreneurial venture. In this study, I find that logics are first adopted as a result of external 
demands on the organization to be more effective from owners and customers (i.e., that it can 
mimic the lean practices of its largest customer). At first the new market/corporation logic fit with 
the existing logic of professional science, which was still dominant and able to pick out the 
elements useful for the objectives of the scientists, such as securing more consistent quality of 
products. However, this adoption was not static: as the joiners activated their frame more clearly 
and put it into practice and the market increasingly viewed the company as a real firm and not as 
a science start-up. As it gained power from the outside, the joiners were able to challenge the 
existing frame, leading to a frame conflict that made it difficult for the parties to collaborate.  
The paper contributes to the literature on organizational responses to institutional complexity 
(Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013b; Smith & Besharov, 2017). It strives to shift discussion from a 
focus on how managers control logics around and in an organization by using structures (Smith 
& Tracey, 2016) toward a focus on adoption as an iterative process between micro-level 
interactions and actions that tie into macro-level changes occurring during scale-up. This process 
means that logics are dynamic and not fully in the hands of managers, who can be surprised by 
the change “beneath them.” I show that the adoption process is not in the hands of managers, who 
underestimate the consequence on organizational processes and performance of new hires’ 
infusing some change into an organization.   
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The third paper, “Getting the best of both worlds: the hybridity challenge of entrepreneurial 
ventures during scale-up,” takes off where the second paper (first empirical paper) ends. I analyze 
why the two different frames discussed in the previous paper persist: why do individuals maintain 
differences, what is their motivation, and how do they do it? I investigate the barriers to hybridity: 
why is a firm unable to solve the incompatibility so many other papers have found? While my 
paper uses the same data, it takes a different approach and perspective on the data. I look to why 
individuals stick to incompatible frames and maintain conflict over long periods of time. I find 
that individuals have different motivations to use logics. For example, scientists gained freedom 
and impact by adhering to a science logic. In essence, they sought the reproduction of this 
institutional logic in the organization because it fitted their intrinsic motivation. Reciprocally, the 
production engineers were motivated by organization and order, cleaning up waste, and setting 
up a lean regime. Moreover, they had a different extrinsic motivation than the scientists (who 
received professional recognition for their skill when the firm operated according to a science 
logic, for example by participating in awards). Changing to a market/corporation logic seemed to 
threaten this, as a corporation logic focusing on reducing waste and increasing profits, was likely 
to move the power and status to the operations members. Motivations to change the organization 
to fit a particular logic was thus different in each group. Because of this, R&D grafted in practices 
from academia and sought to enforce them, while operations took in practices and structures from 
nearby corporations.  
The paper contributes to the hybrid organization literature by looking at individuals’ motivation 
to pursue or to not pursue hybridity. Although hybridity is often a beneficial strategy for a venture 
trying to maximize resources and legitimacy, I show that it may not be a motivation that 
employees share: instead, they may go with either side.  
The fourth and final paper is a theoretical paper, “Seeing Institutional Change as a Strategic 
Opportunity: linking managerial decisions with institutional logics.” In this paper, I seek to link 
institutional logics, as a macro-determinant, with decision making on the micro-level. The 
argument is this: decision makers in organizations are shaped by the field in which they operate 
their organization. When working in an organization that is central and embedded, managers come 
to see current arrangements as conventional and taken-for-granted because the logics in the field 
shape their schemata, their informational representational and processing mechanisms. 
Conversely, managers in peripheral organizations, and/or organizations that bridge to other fields, 
are freer and less encumbered because they are not as tied to conventional wisdom. Repercussions 
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follow when the field faces an institutional change. Because one group—managers in the 
embedded and central organization—have schemata more tightly coupled to the existing (or now 
past) arrangements, they are likelier to frame change in a negative light and choose a defensive 
response, seeking to maintain the status quo. Managers in peripheral organizations are less tightly 
coupled and are more likely to see the change as an opportunity to unseat an incumbent. Thus, 
organizational responses are not just dependent on institutional conditions, such as the amount of 
pressure, as others have argued, but also on differences in decision-makers. By linking logics to 
schemata from the macro to the micro level, I also include Behavioral Theory of the Firm 
considerations—such as individual cognitive abilities and group level dynamics—to explain 
organizational responses. The paper expands on the explanatory power we possess to describe 
these responses. This paper does not explicitly deal with ventures, as the mechanisms are not 
limited to them. But the arguments are relevant to ventures because they are liable to face 
institutional change and complexity. Understanding the prerequisites for their responses to such 
processes are crucial.  
 
Contributions to the literature on entrepreneurial ventures 
 
Although not much literature exists concerning scale-up of entrepreneurial ventures, a recent 
review by Desantola & Gulati (2017) mentions two overarching narratives about ventures (and 
similar organizations). The first is an endurance narrative, where the organizational design, 
employees, and culture created by the founders of the venture remains. The second is a change 
narrative, where the same elements undergo a significant transformation. I point out a middle 
ground between these two narratives, where a part of the organization may follow the endurance 
narrative and another part follows the change narrative. Therefore, it is not an orderly process of 
either or, but a messy process where the outcome balances between these two outcomes. 
Organizations may initially change before the endurance perspective reinforces itself. The venture 
may swing between looking backwards and maintaining their original DNA, and drastic change 
towards new frontiers.  
The overall longitudinal story of the thesis contributes to our understanding of the internal 
development of entrepreneurial ventures during scale-up, which is poorly understood at present 
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(Desantola & Gulati, 2017). The thesis especially points out that logics take forms of incompatible 
frames, which makes collaborations and transactions more challenging. A related problem is that 
individuals’ framing—their interpretation of the environment—is remarkably stable: individuals 
are motivated to retain their logic and use structures and processes to do so. However, the fallout 
is that the organization is disrupted because of the multiple sources from which structures and 
processes arrive, and because managers lack control of these structures and processes.  
While contemporary literature addresses the macro-level of how organizational forms arise in 
venturing industries (see Pahnke et al., 2015; Powell & Sandholtz, 2012), we know little about 
this on the micro-level. We know that “amphibious scientists”—scientists who bring academic 
logics to business—are one important type of venture creation (Powell & Sandholtz, 2012). But 
we do not know how this works in practice; how does one organizational form (e.g., the scientific) 
arise when there are other alternatives, e.g. the “science for business” form (Powell & Sandholtz, 
2012)? We know that these forms exist, but not why one arises over the other when looking 
internally on the organization. Here I demonstrate that an internal conflict shapes the organization 
and much of its internal power. Interestingly, the firm did not change to a clear “science for 
business” form by letting finance or production people run the company, instead, it acquired 
smaller firms and “talked the talk” in external communication. This allowed it to appear as a 
“science for business” firm to outsiders but still be run by amphibious scientists. Given that any 
organization may face internal issues while needing to put up the right façade, this behavior is 
quite rational.  
 
Practical and managerial implications 
 
Increasing the number of entrepreneurial ventures is socially important and strongly in the interest 
of the managers running these ventures. This overlap in interest has led to several recent books 
and articles that target the practitioners in charge of these ventures (e.g., Gulati & Desantola, 
2016; Sutton & Rao, 2014). The key message of these works is that a venture must sustain its 
culture and spread that mindset across the organization as it scales (Gulati & Desantola, 2016; 
Sutton & Rao, 2014). This thesis challenges this assumption. First, the power of a new culture 
brought in by new people hired to cater to changing external demands is not a stable entity. In my 
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study, I found that the influx of new culture initially complemented the existing culture because 
it was brought in to solve a problem and was subservient to the existing culture. Problems arise 
when the continuous change of the market favors the new culture and this culture’s activation in 
the organization. Managers who expect immediate problems are caught inattentive to the slower 
development of troubles.  
Second, both the practical management and the institutional logics literature suffers from a belief 
in managers’ ability to carve up responses to the competing external demands without giving 
much thought to the members of the organizations and their desires. A major problem for the 
technology and science-based venture is finding the right internal mixture between science or 
business practices, where fault lines may emerge between groups promoting one view. Not only 
do managers have to pay attention and chose the right strategy to cater to external demands, but 
they also have to focus on their organization.  
A practitioner’s classic in entrepreneurial marketing is Geoffrey Moore’s “Crossing the Chasm” 
(Moore, 1991). Moore portrays a chasm between an early market and a mainstream market, a 
notion that has become accepted wisdom for entrepreneurs in my case. It makes good sense to 
heed the market and work hard to break through; however, another chasm may arise in the 
organization as it transitions from its early market to a mature one. Here, there is much less 
attention and knowledge about how to handle this rift.  
Attending to the market-transition chasm is important because ventures are often loosely 
organized with few formal structures, and its employees may be in close contact with the 
environment (e.g., through open innovation and by customizing orders). Individuals and groups 
with differing interpretations of what the company should be like can prove detrimental, especially 
when the firm is dependent on these groups working together. Here, the thesis contributes to 
understanding the development and nature of these conflicts, which I find to be based in different 
“cultural framings” (ways to see the world based on one’s experience). Different framings make 
it difficult to collaborate and transact because they create costly misunderstandings over, for 
example, what it means that a product is mature, complex, or is “short time to market.” Such 
categories may have different meanings to a development engineer and to a production engineer.  
These different interpretations lead employees to “meddle” with organizational structures and to 
create their own goals for the organization, often legitimized by the institutional logics of the 
customer demands (e.g., “we need basic research to solve this customers problem” or “we need 
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an ISO certificate to sell to this customer”). A disjointed goal motivation results within the firm. 
In short, people pursue individual or group goals, not organizational ones.  
The thesis does not offer a direct toolkit to solve these issues, but there are tools to alleviate the 
issues found in my study. The job of the managers is not just to pick a strategy but also to secure 
buy-in among employees. Buy-in is crucial because ventures are often driven by highly trained 
and valuable employees upon which they depend; for example, in my case many of the employees 
pursued their own projects and held patents. Buy-in can be created by a team and task design that 
fits the desires of the employees (Lindenberg & Foss, 2011). Furthermore, employee inclusion in 
strategy formulation and settling incompatible interpretations before they become rampant in 
everyday life should improve the internal organization and advance the scale-up process.  
It is crucial for managers to focus on the internal organization and the daily work on the floor. 
Changing people who are embedded into a certain set of logics is difficult, but the literature does 
suggest that socialization can move people (Battilana & Dorado, 2010; Pache & Santos, 2013a). 
Similarly, Glaser et al. (2016) argue that cues can change behavior. Managers likely face a 
challenge to manage their symbolic and recognition-based management systems to send out such 
cues and to secure socialization, for example by encouraging people from opposite logics to meet 
and interact. I cannot demonstrate that this works, but can only speculate, given the literature, that 
this could be a way forward.  
 
Conclusion on introduction 
 
My thesis sets out to expand our knowledge about the scale-up of entrepreneurial ventures by 
utilizing an institutional logics approach as a tool to understand the competing mindsets that arise 
in an organization. The thesis contributes to (currently lacking) empirical knowledge of how 
institutional complexity can make or break scale-up. In my papers, I find that complexity is more 
subtle and harder to manage than previously expected. First, complexity is slowly adopted by an 
organization as a competing frame: rather than bursting in, it is adopted to solve problems for 
incumbents encountered from market changes. Therefore, managers who may fear an immediate 
reaction can find themselves blindsided when they suddenly face a framing conflict inside the 
organization. Second, the literature has not thoroughly explained the different motivations 
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individuals may have: why should one want to blend logics even when beneficial for the venture? 
For example, scientists deem research sacred, and will not surrender it to a corporation logic 
without persuasion or a fight. Such conflict could threaten to derail the venture in its scale-up 
phase. As Sutton and Rao (2014 p. 7) claim, shared convictions are key to effective scaling. 
Institutional complexity may spoil shared convictions and, as a result, scaling. The thesis provides 
insight into how internal problems occur in a venture during scaling, the nature of the conflict, 
and the drivers behind it. As literature is still nascent on this topic, the thesis contributes by 
specifying a problem. Future research is needed to clarify possible solutions and to assess how 
ventures survive complexity.  
I hope that by identifying a hitherto undeveloped issue—how ventures face complex logics 
internally during scale-up—future research will concentrate on the organization of ventures and 
provide insight into how high-potential ventures secure scale-up.  
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Chapter 2 
 Institutional logics as an organization and management theory: a review of 
empirical research and future directions 
 
Abstract 
Institutional logics have grown from a subfield of institutional theory to a recognized domain in 
organizational theory. Despite this growth, no review has been dedicated to this burgeoning field. 
This paper proposes to review the nature of the empirical literature of this field. It analyzes 76 
studies from top journals in management. Based on usual critique levied at institutional theory, 
the paper divides the publications into levels and field of study to investigate whether the logics 
perspective suffers from similar issues. Despite a richness and depth both in method and quality 
of these studies, the paper does find underdeveloped areas for expansion. Institutional logics has 
predominantly focused on the field level, neglecting the individual and organizational level; 
similarly, it prefers public and social service organizations to corporations. The paper therefore 
suggests four elements where the perspective could be enriched: 1) the sample of organizations 
studied, 2) organizational features such as design and performance, 3) coupling to other 
organizational theories, and 4) a stronger empirical grounding of micro-foundations. These 
recommendations could usher a sturdier organizational perspective into the institutional logics 
literature.  
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Introduction 
New institutional theory (NIT) is one of the dominant perspectives in organizational theory 
(Lounsbury 2008). Several offshoots of this theory have appeared, such as institutional 
entrepreneurship and institutional work (Greenwood & Suddaby 2006; Lawrence & Suddaby 
2008). The institutional logics perspective is likely the largest, which grew as an independent field 
of thought from NIT during the late 1990s and early 2000s. Institutional logics represent a new 
perspective that is progressively growing in influence in NIT. Institutional logics are defined as 
“socially constructed sets of material practices, assumptions, values, and beliefs that shape 
cognition and behavior” (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury 2012 p. 51). The theory of institutional 
logics provides a different institutional perspective, because it moves away from isomorphism to 
focus more on the pluralism, contestation, and complementarity that shape logics as tools for 
institutional transformation (Glynn 2013). Although Thornton, Ocasio, and Lounsbury’s book on 
the subject, “The Institutional Logics Perspective,” has garnered over 1,500 citations in just over 
five years, a theoretical review summing up the empirical developments or possible paths forward 
remains absent. The closest relative is Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, and Lounsbury’s 
(2011) review of institutional complexity, which, albeit not strictly concerning logics, primarily 
reviews papers that contain logics. Because the goal of that review was not institutional logics, it 
cannot be used to assess the institutional logics literature per se.     
The popularity of institutional logics warrants an overview of research uncovering its strengths, 
weaknesses, and possible ways forward in order to develop its use in organization and 
management studies. My paper contributes by reviewing recent empirical studies of institutional 
logics in top management journals, such as Academy of Management Journal, Administrative 
Science Quarterly, Organization Science, Organization Studies, Human Relations, and Journal 
of Management Studies. This review resulted in 76 publications mostly coalescing in the period 
2012–2017 but reaching back to Thornton (2002). This chapter does not perform a full 
bibliometric search, but focuses instead on the quality outlets of institutional logics research where 
empirical studies are most likely advance the theory. In order to investigate possible gaps, I divide 
these 76 papers according to the level on which each one focuses as well as by the type of 
organization studied. Subsequent analysis reveals gaps in the empirical literature on institutional 
logics and possibilities for future research. Because this paper investigates avenues for 
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organizational and management theory, it focuses on the logics in an organization and less on 
field-level developments.  
This is chosen because new institutional theory, which institutional logics is a part of, have 
received a critique for ignoring the life inside organizations. This is curious since the 
institutional logics perspective is more popular in organization and management theory rather 
than sociology or political science6. Hence, looking at institutional logics as an organization and 
management theory is warranted in order to analyze the strengths, weaknesses and new 
directions going forward in using the institutional logics perspective in organization and 
management theory.    
 
New institutional theory is a dominant line of research in organizational theory as well as in 
strategic management, international business, and several other fields. Because of NIT’s sheer 
size, several subfields have emerged, such institutional work, institutional complexity, and 
institutional logics. The logics perspective is most dominant and is also used throughout the other 
subfields. Although research is often of high quality, elements appear to be missing. Suddaby, 
Elsbach, Greenwood, Meyer, and Zilber (2010), for example, point out that “actorhood” (i.e., how 
actors think and behave) is not well understood, that scholars often treat organizations as an 
unexplained dependent variable, and that some types of organizations, primarily corporations, are 
ignored. Others have echoed these claims: Greenwood, Hinings, and Whetten (2014) scold 
institutional theory for ignoring organizations, and they call for putting the organization back in 
focus. Finally, several recent theory papers have argued that the understanding of agency and 
individual emotions in institutional contexts are underdeveloped and not well understood (Jarvis 
2017; Voronov & Yorks 2015). Many of these claims are directed at institutional theory in 
general; therefore, this paper asks whether these claims are fairly directed at the institutional logics 
literature. The question is relevant, because institutional logics is often seen as a realm of theory 
that offers remedy to the difficulties of understanding the link between agents’ cognition and 
culture (DiMaggio 1997) and to the study of organizations (Greenwood et al. 2014). Have 
institutional logics fulfilled such aspirations, or can research be developed further to meet them?  
This paper evaluates whether the mentioned challenges are relevant for the growing subfield of 
institutional logics. The goal of this review is to provide an overview and status of the research 
                                                 
6 The most cited papers using the institutional logics perspective the last 5 years are predominantly in organization 
theory, a few in political science journals and none in sociology journals.  
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on some overall levels. The paper therefore analyzes the levels studied in the 76 empirical papers, 
as well as the organizations they study. The measurements chosen do not reveal the overall depth 
and breadth of the research but do orientate its tendencies and possible blind spots. Tracking the 
levels and organizations these publications studied provides contrast with existing critiques and 
theoretical developments, and offers new paths of research from an empirical point of view. This 
analysis brings in relevant theoretical perspectives from institutional logics and other literature to 
argue for possible empirical areas requiring research (either to nourish the theory or to highlight 
societal trends it might assist). Furthermore, I argue for new theoretical perspectives to pursue and 
for new combinations empirically assessable that may build novel theory and knowledge. The 
main contribution of this paper is not to exhibit the institutional perspective archive but to locate 
new directions where scholars could expand and enrich it. I propose that institutional logics could 
develop and refine its focus on the individual (micro) level as well as on the structures and design 
of organizations. Achieving these improvements would enable scholars to link the theory with 
other perspectives and, overall, to bring focus back on the organization.  
Background story of the institutional logics perspective 
The institutional logics perspective originates from the NIT paradigm, which kicked off by Meyer 
and Rowan’s (1977) and DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) seminal papers on organizational 
rationality and isomorphism sparked. New institutional theory began as an American 
phenomenon, originating in Thorstein Veblen’s works on institutionalism (Veblen 2007). Veblen 
was the first to argue that rationalized myths, or ceremonies, affected economic behavior, which 
represents the key turn in NIT when compared to the dominant economics approach to 
organizations. Institutional logics developed from Friedland and Alford’s 1991 paper, which 
reflected a different approach, perhaps more European in tradition than the American heritage of 
NIT. The logics perspective promotes an inter-institutional system of state, market, family, 
religion, and profession (Friedland & Alford 1991; Thornton et al. 2012). Friedland and Alford 
(1991) argued that these core institutions shape individual preferences and organizational 
interests, and that provide a repertoire of behavior. For example, doctors are shaped by logics of 
their profession like the Hippocratic Oath. On the other hand, corporate managers are seen as 
adhering to a market logic. The most popular are the market and the profession logics, which have 
been elaborated and manipulated to fit many different contexts: from insurance underwriting in 
an institution like Lloyd’s (Smets, Jarzabowski, Burke & Spee 2015) to healthcare (Reay & 
Hinings 2009). The dominant theme in institutional logics research is the clash between different 
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logics (e.g., Reay and Hinings’s (2009) study of the clash between medicine as a profession 
carried out by physicians and healthcare as a public service operating on market conditions). 
Institutional logics are an analytical tool to understand frictions between different cultural 
understandings, proclivities, and actions. Scholars have used this tool to understand how macro 
determinants affect individual action. For example, how does the membership of professions 
shape action? Or, conversely, how does the demand for shareholder value shape managerial 
action? Scholars have also turned the tool around and delved into how individual practices 
constitute a field (e.g., Smets, Morris & Greenwood 2012).  
For all its beneficial applications, the institutional logics perspective and NIT have received 
criticism: unclear actorhood/agency7 (Jarvis 2017; Suddaby et al. 2010), a lack of focus on 
organizations (Greenwood et al. 2014, Schilke, 2017, Suddaby et al. 2010), and for privileging 
particular types of organizations over others (Suddaby et al. 2010). This critique was levied 
against NIT in general and not institutional logics in particular; however, because of their 
relationship and the idea that institutional logics should solve the issues mentioned, it is important 
to determine whether the logics perspective overcomes these deficits. To provide a foundation for 
exercise, I analyzed papers in top management journals where institutional logics are prominent.  
Methodology 
The purview of the literature review involves empirical studies in top management journals where 
institutional logics are the main theoretical construct. I focused on empirical papers because the 
critique levied against NIT targets the empirical material in the literature and not the theory per 
se. Therefore, the crucial analytical task is to ascertain whether institutional logics literature 
overcomes the previously mentioned lacunae empirically. This literature review is based on 
searches in Academy of Management Journal, Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of 
Management Studies, Organization Studies, Organization Science, and Human Relations. These 
journals were chosen based on the ABS ranking system and the FT 50. To narrow the search, only 
4- and 4*-ranked journals were selected. This criterion was introduced because a journal’s impact 
factor alone may fluctuate too greatly over time, which risks rendering attempts to measure quality 
                                                 
7 Some scholars, especially John Meyer, use the term “actor”; others, such as Thornton et al. (2012), use “agent” 
and “embedded agency.” There are some underlying ontological reasons for this terminological disparity, such as 
how much persons are shaped and constrained by institutions. Fully analyzing these differences is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  
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somewhat inconsistent.8 Ranking reflects impact factor but also takes into consideration a 
journal’s history and standing in the field. Paper impact factor, too, was disregarded out of a desire 
to include new papers, which naturally have fewer citations.  
Pouring over Journal of Management and Strategic Management Journal, I found only two papers 
mentioning institutional logics. I excluded these papers because they did not focus on institutional 
logics as a central theoretical construct. Given that neither Journal of Management and Strategic 
Management Journal are more driven by strategic management theories, my exclusions are not 
surprising. An organization theory like institutional logics does not enjoy much editorial focus in 
these journals or interest with its readership. The journals I selected are natural outlets for scholars 
wishing to publish high-quality work in the institutional logics field, because they are “big tent” 
journals focusing on organization and management theories in a broader perspective.  
Keywords and assessments of whether institutional logics primarily drove theoretical concerns 
informed determinations about each paper’s inclusion in this analysis. Searching through these 
five journals using the criteria mentioned yielded a list of 76 papers from 2002–2017. Most were 
recent publications: 39 papers were published after 2011, nine in 2016, and seven in 2017.  
In order to test the criticism of institutional theory and the logics perspective—that it tends to 
disregard individual and organizational levels and fails to focus on particular types of 
organizations—I divided the papers by level: field (macro), organizational (meso), and individual 
(micro). Topic and method informed this judgment (e.g., large quantitative analysis is often on 
the field level, case studies are often organizational, and use of personal interviews and 
observations is often micro). The most important criteria for determining the level to which a 
study belonged were its views on agency and who acted in the studies. Sometimes, studies claim 
to be about actors but actually “black box” actorhood and focus instead on the developments of 
institutional elements (Suddaby et al. 2010). Such papers are in my review seen as field level 
because what they seek to explain is not individual behavior but more so evolution in institutional 
arrangements and logics.  
I also divided the papers by organization studied: public/social service,9 service, manufacturing, 
hybrid, and other/non-organizational. I use the term manufacturing to describe anything from the 
                                                 
8 For example, Organization Science is considered a premier organization theory journal; however, its impact factor 
for 2017 is just 2.691.  
9 I conjoined this category to solve the fact that scholars may study organizations that are public in one country, a 
private service in another, or, even more confusingly, both at the same time (e.g., education in the US). I was not 
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classic corporation to an SME, and the term covers whether a physical good was produced. Hybrid 
organizations are a mix of organizations doing community work while also seeking a profit (e.g., 
several microfinance organizations) (Battilana & Dorado 2010). Other/non-organizational refers 
to when the study does not clearly deal with an organization; for example, it may deal with 
stakeholders or investors (e.g., Joseph, Ocasio & McDonnell 2014).  
These two divisions are shown in following tables: 
 
Table 1.1 Level of study.  
 
                                                 
interested in this divide and since the organizations essentially produce the same service they go into the same 
category.  
45
11
20
Field Individual Organization
Level of study
29
17
9 9
13
Public /social
service
Service Manufacturing Hybrid Non/other
Type of organization studied
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Table 2.1 Type of organization studied. 
 
 
To add to this empirical review, I also looked through the theoretical literature (only on 
institutional logics) in these journals. Four pieces in Academy of Management Review, three 
pieces in Organization Studies, and one in Human Relations deal primarily with the multi-level 
issues in institutional logics (Besharov & Smith 2014; Ocasio, Loewenstein & Nigam 2015), 
and especially the micro-level (Delbridge & Edwards 2013; Friedland 2017; Jarvis 2017). Both 
the numbers of papers at each level and the theoretical contemplations demonstrate that greater 
analytical focus on multiple levels and on the micro-level is warranted.  
Status and strengths in the literature 
The breadth and depth of much of the research in institutional logics is impressive, which explains 
why the theory often shows up in top management journals. Research methods range from 
longitudinal archival methods, such as Thornton (2002), to going deep into a chosen organization 
and scouring the qualitative capturing logics at play, such as Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis (2011). 
The knowledge of how public/social service and hybrid organizations experience different logics 
is well developed. Numerous papers have undertaken in-depth studies to investigate this 
experiential difference. They ask, for example, how micro-finance serves both a commercial and 
a community logic (Battilana & Dorado 2010), or how social enterprises connect welfare for the 
unemployed poor with a market logic (Pache & Santos 2013b). Researchers have also covered 
how actors experience and handle logics in their everyday life. In this vein, Smets and 
Jarzabkowski (2013) provided an interesting study of how employees in a multinational law firm 
experienced institutional complexity. On the macro-level, we have studies of market changes 
(Thornton 2002) and of how state logics affect whole industries (Greve & Zhang 2017). An 
important development is papers that strive to move between levels; here, Smets et al. (2012) is 
exemplary. In their paper, Smets et al. (2012) built a multilevel model from the level of practices 
all the way to the institutional level. A few recent papers strive for a similar approach and build 
individual practices or emotions into macro-level logics. For example, Kyratsis et al. (2017) 
looked at how post-Soviet Union physicians had to reconstruct their identity as their logic changed 
from one type of state-driven professional logic to another as the Soviet Union crashed and 
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professional identities tied to the state transformed. The physicians’ reconstruction of their 
identity and reframing of their work played an important role in the change of logics. Even though 
the dramatic institutional change naturally forced an adjustment, the resulting alteration still relied 
on the acceptance and cooperation of the physicians.  
The institutional logics perspective has become pervasive. Scholars have identified it across the 
board from hospitals (Reay & Hinings 2009) to religious movements (Quattrone 2015). Hybrid 
organizations—i.e., organizations that work by combining logics—have drawn particular interest 
in recent years (Battilana & Lee 2014). Tracey, Phillips, and Jarvis (2011) showed how hybrid 
organizations emerge through a special kind of institutional work. In their study, they combined 
institutional logics with institutional entrepreneurship to demonstrate how agents can create a 
hybrid organization by drawing on aspects from already established logics. A particular strength 
of literature exists here, as the logics perspective has provided new insights into the duality of 
organizations with regard to managing different demands, prescriptions for actions, and identities 
(Smith & Besharov 2017). As organizations are increasingly seen as burdened with dualistic 
elements, this strain of research is extremely relevant theoretically and practically.  
Research in hybrid organizations has provided some influential papers. For example, Pache and 
Santos’s (2013b) paper on social enterprises showed that organizations do not necessarily 
decouple or deceive when facing competing logics; instead, agents in the organization 
strategically combined elements to gain legitimacy. Moreover, Pache and Santos (2013b) also 
found that organizations not embedded in the social welfare logic overcompensated to negate 
perceptions of illegitimacy. This finding is noteworthy because it shows that agents do not 
mindlessly following logics, they are not ends, but tools to achieve goals. Organizations can act 
very flexibly and use logics as cultural toolkits to achieve goals (Pache & Santos 2013b); 
therefore, more often than previously thought, organizations will incorporate multiple logics in 
order to serve different stakeholders. As a result, institutional pluralism may not be a fleeting 
instance but a permanent feature of many organizations (Pache & Santos 2013b; Schildt & 
Perkmann 2017).  
The notion that organizations (nearly) always consist of competing and complementary logics has 
inspired an intriguing new line of research on how an organization accomplishes combining them. 
Battilana and Dorado’s (2010) study of microfinance illustrated that opposing logics can 
apparently be combined. The community logic of caring for one’s community and making money 
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through a market logic found co-existence (Battilana & Dorado 2010). In this vein, Smets et al. 
(2015) provided an in-depth study of underwriters in Lloyd’s. Their study indicates that 
individuals ensure the combination of competing logics by employing three strategies: 
demarcating, segmenting, and bridging. Smets et al. (2015) showed that competing logics persist 
because agents adjust their practices to cope. Mangen and Brivot (2015) nuanced this perspective 
by arguing that agents may face institutional threats to their identity and that institutional logics 
challenge power relations in an organization. Other studies have contributed to how organizations 
and individuals inhabit multiple logics, here Currie and Spyronidis (2016) showed that agents 
could interpret multiple logics and use them to consolidate their status.  
Further papers have revealed that institutional agency may be very free and tactical. McPherson 
and Sauder (2013) showed, in their analysis of drug courts, that agents might pick up or play 
around with logics to achieve their goals. McPherson and Sauder’s (2013) study is an excellent 
representation of the toolkit approach to institutional logics (Thornton et al. 2012). There, logics 
were not values themselves but ways of action and justification that enabled an agent to reach a 
goal (Swidler 1986). In McPherson and Sauder’s (2013) case, agents may draw on the logics of 
criminal punishment to incarcerate someone, or, alternatively, draw on the logic of rehabilitation 
to reduce a sentence. Their study expresses how logics are not necessarily internalized structures 
of behavior but may form uses of reflexive discourse. It inspires one to ask: what are agents’ 
connections to logics? Friedland (2012, 2017) argued that connections are not solely cognitive 
links but emotional associations as well. In other words, meaning and emotional wellbeing drive 
people to use and to identify with logics.  
Toubiana and Zietsma (2017) provided relevant insights into how emotions play into the dynamics 
of institutional complexity. In their study of a medical non-profit supporting people with a 
degenerative disease, they found that an organization often incurred angry backslash from social 
media when an it provided rational research-based responses, because the public expected to 
encounter caring and emotionally oriented responses. Their paper provides understanding of the 
dynamics of social media outrage that many organizations fall into. Here Toubiana and Zietsma’s 
(2017) key findings are both practical and theoretical. The practical finding for organizations is 
to understand their stakeholder’s logics and tailor their responses. For scholars, it pressures the 
existing cognitive understanding of institutional complexity: Toubiana and Zietsma (2017) show 
that the emotions in play drive such complexity. This study exposes that the nature of complexity 
when caring for victims and relatives while also possessing a rational medical focus was extremely 
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difficult because the disease awakened strong emotions in victims and relatives, who sometimes 
felt that the only logic that mattered was care. The emotions threatened to destabilize the 
organization, as stakeholders would shame and shun them, when relatives felt that the 
organization did not live up to their expectation of compassion (Toubiana & Zietsma 2017). The 
notion of emotions has received more attention lately. For example, Tracey (2016) presented a 
study of how agents are persuaded to convert to certain logics. Tracey (2016) was also one of few 
papers that focused solely on the micro-level, and it illuminates interesting micro-foundations 
about how logics are communicated with passion on the individual level.  
These papers display thoughtful scholarship about how individuals and organizations handle 
competing reasons for action and ways of thinking and justifying those actions. Even so, the 
institutional logics perspective contains weaknesses. First, the empirical literature tends to only 
focus on particular organizations, which limits the sample and its generalizability. The 
institutional logics literature also rarely connects to other organizational theories, which threatens 
to isolate the theory of institutional logics. Furthermore, the understanding of individual agency 
is seldom elaborated in depth; for example, we do not understand exactly why people use logics 
as tools in one instance while maintaining stability in others. There is a schism in the literature 
between the argument that individuals can freely pick up logics—such as with McPherson and 
Sauder’s (2013) study, while others such as Battilana & Dorado (2010) propose socialization as 
an explanation, i.e. individuals act because they are socialized into a specific logic that drives their 
action. Essentially a “Parsonian” view, where logics are values and motivate action, and the view 
that logics are tools that do not motivate action divides the logics perspective. On top of this 
division, the micro-level perspective also faces critique for solely relying on cognitive elements 
(such as attention) as explanatory of action (rather than emotions) (Friedland 2012, 2017; 
Toubiana & Zietsma 2017). Despite the significant focus on institutional logics and the many 
influential papers published about it, much potential is still untapped, clarity in constructs and 
terminology are to be settled, and a deeper understanding the role of logics in organizations can 
be achieved.  
 
Gaps identified in the review 
Table 1.1. displays a clear dominance of field-level studies, accounting for 61% of all analyses 
and more than twice than the number of studies focusing on the organizational level. Even worse, 
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few studies deal with individual responses to institutional pressures. This scarcity is not surprising 
given that micro-foundations are a newer addition (Thornton et al. 2012). Moreover, the 
supremacy of field-level studies institutional logics and NIT in general is receiving more and more 
critique (Jarvis 2017). It is quite clear that the individual level is under-researched. One exception 
is Smets et al.’s (2015) paper on how individuals work through institutional complexity. Yet, this 
paper, like several others, draws on practice theory, which is neither an individualistic approach 
nor a completely holistic one but rather an attempt to dissolve the distinction. Since micro-
foundations do include such a distinction, practice-theory studies cannot really be considered 
micro-foundations given the different assumptions about individuals and aggregation. For this 
reason, these studies do not help us construct micro-foundations despite a micro-level approach.  
The micro-foundations perspective, which Thornton et al. (2012) argues for, is seldom 
operationalized in empirical work. Few papers draw explicitly on micro-foundations. This results 
in conflicting views about how and why agents use particular logics. For example, Pache and 
Santos (2013a) promote a view where agents are often in conflict, whereas Schildt and Perkmann 
(2017) argue that settlement is much more prevalent than conflict. The second table exposes a 
glut of studies on public organizations, with healthcare and academia most popular. Another 
popular type of organization is the hybrid organization, where micro-finance and organizations 
mix social service with profit being of interest (Battilana & Dorado 2010; Pache & Santos 2013b). 
Hybrid organizations resemble public/social service firms, and existing research deals with that 
topic: it asks how community or professional logics clash or fit together with market logics. 
Examples are Reay and Hinings’s (2009) work on hospitals and Pache and Santos’s (2013b) piece 
on work enterprises. Another stream is “non-organizational,” meaning scholarship does not focus 
on particular types of organizations but on groups of unorganized agents, such as shareholders, or 
on institutions not necessarily shaped by the clear boundaries of organizations.  
The non-organizational stream deals with elements like stakeholder perception, such as Joseph et 
al. (2014), or how activities affect firms (Zhung & Luo 2013). Organizations less researched are 
corporations and manufacturing firms, hence echoing Suddaby et al.’s (2010) critique of NIT as 
too focused on public- and service-type firms. In fact, I did not come across a single study 
dedicated to studying a corporation or manufacturing firm on the organizational or individual 
level (i.e., few researchers have been “inside” such organizations using an institutional 
perspective). Whereas my review does show an increased interest in the organizational level, 
Greenwood et al.’s (2014) critique of ignoring organizational differences appears poignant when 
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taking into consideration the homophily of organization types researchers choose to study. 
Because of this homophily, organizational differences in structures, practices, management, and 
so on is seldom brought up. This leaves a gap in the theory, because institutional logics are made 
up by a set of organizations working in a similar manner. If scholars do not differentiate and 
compare organizations, it proves difficult to differentiate fields (Greenwood et al. 2014). In their 
critical review, Greenwood et al. (2014) noted that institutional theory sometimes does not count 
as an organizational theory because it solely spotlights the institutional level. Field-level analysis 
tends to leave out characteristics of the organization, such as its management, its design, and so 
on. While some theoretical papers have strived to overcome this deficiency, such as Ocasio and 
Radoynovska (2016), few papers go into management and organizational design’s impact on 
logics. This leaves organizations with very little agency, as the logics perspective does not account 
for the ways an organization can act.  
My review exposes simple gaps, such as a too-narrow sample of the organizations researched; 
however, deeper gaps also emerge, especially in the form of explaining organizational differences 
in structures, management, and outcomes. Moreover, few papers have a strong connection to other 
organizational theories, which is an omission that could explain how competing logics affect 
organizations and how they handle it. Finally, the micro-foundations do not contain a strong 
empirical basis. The following list summarizes the gap identified: 
1. The sample of organizations researched.  
2. Features of the organization design and structures, performance, management, and 
governance.  
3. Coupling to other organizational theories to explain organizational differences in unison 
with institutional logics. 
4. Constructing micro-foundations that include both cognition and affection.  
 
Future research directions 
The sample researched 
My review reveals the particularity of organizations of interest to scholars. Smets et al. (2015 p. 
966) write on the nature of work and organizations as seen from an institutional logics perspective:  
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“We therefore argue that our model is particularly apt for organizations that employ highly 
autonomous individuals who have to balance competing logics in an ad hoc way due to 
unpredictable work demands or volatile institutional contexts…We contend that many of the 
organizations identified as institutionally complex, such as hospitals, universities, public service 
organizations, or professional service firms, fit this description.” 
 
In other words, they identify a specific sample of organizations of special interest to institutional 
logics scholars. Not surprisingly, I find that these organizations are clearly the ones who have 
received most attention from researchers.   
Fixation impedes what we know about different types of organizations. Corporations differ from 
universities or social enterprises. The question remains: how might they differ and to what extent? 
Often, institutional logics scholars argue that the market logic acts as a “master principle” (Smets 
et al. 2015 p. 934). Therefore, studying corporations is uninteresting, as they are simply governed 
by a rational-choice-maximizing algorithm aimed at economic outcomes. Ocasio and 
Radoynovska (2016) argued that this might not be the case: for-profit organizations might also 
mix different types of logics. While scholars on the fringe of the institutional logics perspective 
have analyzed firms as they mix market or agency logics with CSR (Ioannou & Serafeim 2015), 
this has not been of interest to many institutional logics scholars. A promising path of research 
could investigate how firms handle the dualism between a market and society that, on one hand, 
demands profitable practices, but, on the other hand, demands social responsibility and “good 
behavior” from firms. Understanding how that might play out is an important topic for managers 
and broader society, yet we know little about the ways by which agents inside firms interpret these 
institutions. The literature is quite clear from the outside, but no studies have been conducted 
inside of the walls of a firm as it experiences these demands.  
It is also not well known if corporations differ. Nearly all major corporations contain CSR 
departments that promote societal values and HR departments that promote diversity. However, 
some may carry out these practices with great conviction and endeavor, while other firms may 
simply use departments as politically correct window-dressing. If corporations differ is something 
we can only find out by in-depth qualitative studies of how firms enact CSR.   
Analysis of the different stages of firm development represents another topic for comparative 
studies. It is well known in organizational theory that firms change, face different environments, 
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and develop new structures to cope. For example, Abernathy and Utterback (1978) advise a stage 
model of development, where the organization and market changes; likewise, Rogers (2003) 
proposes shifts in market categories. Thornton (2002) recommends that such market changes also 
affects firms, but how this process takes shape and actors understand it is unknown. Studying and 
comparing organizations as different stages of development could shed light on how changes in 
logics affect a firm and how, correspondingly, organizational structures adapt to these changes. 
Here, longitudinal studies of firms could especially provide new knowledge.  
Features of the organization 
New institutional theory and institutional logics promote a different and compelling view of 
organizations and their design and structure: organizations are not only designed to fit 
technological contingencies, but socio-cultural norms, values, practices, and ideas also affect 
organizations’ design. Even so, the focus on organizational structures and design has been limited. 
Greenwood et al. (2014) found in their review on NIT that very few papers, including institutional 
logics ones, touched upon the subject with any depth:   
“Though often fundamentally insightful and theoretically important for the way that they nuance 
our understanding of diffusion processes, these studies usually lean towards showing and 
explaining the occurrence and nature of institutional processes, rather than to explaining how 
organizations are actually designed and managed. Although they touch on organizational design 
and management, they do so lightly and are intentionally narrow in focus.” (Greenwood et al. 
2014 p. 1209)  
In my review, I seldom came across allusions to organizational design and structures. The quote 
from Smets et al. (2015) I mentioned earlier is one of the few references about contingencies 
caused by organizational structures and design. 
Organizational design and the use of logics 
Thornton et al. (2012) propose: “Overall, from our theoretical perspective, organizational design 
is important because it filters how institutional logics reach an organization and shapes whether 
pressures and motivations associated with different logics become encoded in diverse coalitions 
within an organization, creating or inhibiting conflict over goals and strategies.” Very few papers 
have dealt with this call for future research. The reason may result from the epistemological 
differences between a sociological approach in institutional logics and a “cooler” economic 
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approach found in the organizational design literature, a divide going back to Granovetter’s (1985) 
critique. Institutional scholars would probably avoid classic organizational economics, because 
they tend to agree with Granovetter and disagree with the fundamental tenets of organizational 
economics. Newer organizational design literature, however, could be of interest.    
Institutional logics shape what and how events, problems, and solutions receive attention 
(Thornton et al. 2012). However, organizational design also matters for how attention is shaped 
(Thornton et al. 2012). Elements, such as forms (e.g., M or U form of organizing), rewards, and 
promotion systems, could be found to play a role. Several scholars have argued that attention 
matters for organizational decisions and outcomes (Ocasio 1997); for example, Foss and Weber 
(2016) argue that different organizational forms shape how attention is fashioned toward different 
problems and solutions. The idea is that different hierarchical structures affect attention-based 
decision-making. M, U, and project forms affect cognitive loads and one’s attention to problems 
and solutions (Foss & Weber 2016). These contingencies of design could affect the filtering of 
logics, as Thornton et al. (2012) propose.  
Another research topic that follows from design contingencies is how logics require different 
design in the form of rewards. This goes back to Thompson’s (1967) classic distinction between 
intensive technology, which is profession-based, and long-linked technology based on being 
organized. Thompson (1967) argues that each technology requires different types of rewards: for 
example, intensive technology is more interested in occupational prestige. This insight is not 
unknown to institutional logics scholars; it is well understood that professions seek personal 
prestige, whereas actors following the market logics focus on status within hierarchy (Thornton 
et al. 2012). In this regard, organizational design may promote or demote certain logics.  
Institutional logics literature rarely discusses how performance systems are institutional in nature 
and institutionalized through use. Performance and reward systems are likely to influence 
behavior and serve as material practices and symbols of logics. A recent example is the Wells 
Fargo scandal where personal bankers forged signatures and opened accounts without client 
knowledge. The scam illustrates a behavior driven by a performance rule that compelled every 
banker to sell eight products to each customer. How such behavior is institutionalized when the 
market logic hits overdrive is deeply relevant for society; yet, without understanding of the role 
of organizational design, the institutional logics perspective is limited in helping us to understand 
such phenomena inside organizations. 
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Finally, research has pointed to the importance of formal structures (Smith & Besharov 2017), but 
this remains underdeveloped. The design of formal structures and how this affects the ability to 
incorporate dual elements is key, and it requires research to improve and broaden our knowledge 
of how hybridity is institutionalized through such structures in and across organizations.  
 
 
Performance 
While not a particularly popular topic with organizational sociologists, performance is a crucial 
concept of organization studies. In essence, organizations exist because of their better efficiency 
and performance than non-organized activities, such as the spontaneous order of the market. Yet, 
information about how institutional logics affect performance is difficult to uncover. The reason 
is likely to be the focus on external stakeholders. Siggelkow (2001) terms this the external fit, 
which defines how well an organization’s activities fit its external stakeholders’ wants and 
perceptions of the organization. An internal fit of activities may also be affected by external 
changes. Siggelkow (2001) determines internal fit as a coherence of how choices are made and 
action carried out. Since logics carry different attention-shaping mechanisms and rationale for 
choice and action, it is likely that institutional complexity inside an organization hinders 
coherence. As internal fit is often considered important for organizational performance 
(Siggelkow 2001), the rise of new logics inside a firm could negatively affect its performance. 
Even though many studies find that logics are being fruitfully combined, these studies do not 
mention organizational performance. An exception is Pache and Santos (2013b), who assert that 
the combination of logics may increase performance, but their analysis is based on external fit. 
Furthermore, Pache and Santos (2013b) argue for in-depth studies that exactly focus on 
performance, and their study is limited in this regard.  
Pache and Santos (2013b) propose that hybrid organizations outperform mono-logical 
organizations. This finding may, however, be contingent on the characteristics of the organization 
with regard to how well it combines the logics. Smets et al. (2015) propose that flexible 
organizations with large degrees of individual freedom can achieve this outperformance, but less 
so for tightly coupled and rigid organizations.  
Corporate governance and management 
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Westphal and Zajac (2013) have already outlined a corporate governance research agenda drawing 
on the idea of socially constituted agency. Westphal and Zajac (2013) draw on institutional logics 
in their research on corporate governance. Their example is agency prescriptions, which proclaim 
that certain incentive schemes should be implemented, such as stock options for CEOs. According 
to this prescription, incentives make corporate executives behave more “rationally” in regard to 
utilizing corporate resources and increasing shareholder value. While this rationality may increase 
legitimacy in the financial community, it may not in fact increase organizational efficiency 
(Westphal & Zajac 2013). A few papers in my review use the corporate governance angle in 
connection with institutional logics (e.g., Joseph et al. 2014), but, overall, the angle is not popular. 
This is surprising, given the clear opening for logics scholars. The cross-fertilization only seems 
to go one way: from logics to corporate governance and not vice versa. Given rising inequality, 
especially in the USA, and the ever-widening wage gap between executives and white- and blue-
collar workers, ought to render this issue critical. How CEO power rises and how executive 
salaries are legitimized reflect interesting and relevant topics of study. Yet, without taking 
corporate governance into account, institutional logics scholars, who otherwise are interested in 
this societal shift, are left without tools to understand why and how wage gaps are legitimized 
inside firms, thereby driving the societal shift.  
While Westphal, Zajac, and likeminded scholars in corporate governance have formed an 
interesting research agenda, they rarely look at the societal impact, which has great interest for 
institutional scholars. In this regard, it is also interesting to witness the corporate response to 
public outcry over executive salaries. Despite popular outcry, CEO compensation has not fallen. 
Future research could dig into how firms can (apparently) decouple institutional demands to level 
CEO pay from overall developments in wages. Management scholars are looking at micro-
determinants of action, such as organizational design or cognitive limitations detached from an 
overall environmental context (Gavetti 2012; Gavetti, Greve Levinthal & Ocasio 2012). These 
scholars are quite open to exchanging ideas with logics (Gavetti et al. 2012; Powell, Lovallo & 
Fox 2011), and scholars in the behavioral paradigm call out for a contextual approach to furnish 
their singular approach on cognition. Gavetti et al. (2012 p. 24) suggest: 
“The potential for a fruitful exchange of ideas between the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and 
institutional theory seems especially high in the new and growing area of work on complex 
institutional environments (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lounsbury, 2011)…In 
such environments, the mapping of the structure of the institutional field onto organizational 
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structures and behaviors is a result of organizational factors such as identity, governance, and 
structure Greenwood et al., (2011)., which in turn influence political processes of the kind 
suggested by Cyert and March (1963).”  
 
Gavetti et al. articulate that political processes—negotiation of CEO salary and other CEO 
behavior, for example—are influenced by institutional elements. However, I failed to find any 
papers utilizing such an exchange of ideas, which is discomforting because of the potential for 
linking ideas like CEO pay and power inside an organization and the greater societal impact. Here, 
scholars would likely have to draw on elements from both the Behavioral Theory of the Firm and 
the institutional logics/theory.  
More disconcerting, I also failed to find many exchanges with other organizational theories.  
Coupling to other organizational theories 
Even though scholars in other fields have proposed exchanges between institutional logics and 
their own theoretical field—for example, linking the Behavioral Theory of the Firm with logics—
I did not find many instances where studies coupled logics to other organizational theories.  
Without cross-fertilization, the institutional logics perspective may become barren. Scholars have 
merged NIT with other perspectives, such as the resource-based view (Oliver 1997), transaction-
costs economics (Martinez & Dacin 1999), and resource dependency theory (Oliver 1991; Pfeffer 
& Salancik 1978). These cross-fertilizations allow for explanations about the previously 
mentioned organizational features. I propose that institutional logics will gain from similar cross-
fertilization to expand the theory and to contribute to related theories, and to let those related 
theories contribute to the institutional logics perspective.  
 
Contingency theory 
Smets et al. (2015) is one of the few papers that attempt to connect the institutional logics 
perspective with other organizational theories when they draw on Thompson’s (1967) notion of 
interdependence. Thompson’s (1967) work has been influential for organizational and 
institutional theories, yet the perspective has slipped out of consciousness. Newer iterations of 
contingency theory focus on how organizations evolve their internal activities to fit the 
environment (Siggelkow 2001). Whether organizations respond to external changes depends on 
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the functioning of their internal fit. Siggelkow (2001) argues that organizations may ignore 
external demands when internal activities are not affected by external changes. This perspective 
suggests that organizations can close off from their environment, which, from an institutional 
logics perspective, is an intriguing idea. One could imagine organizations that act differently in 
the same field as they each chose different strategies—dependent on their internal 
characteristics—to deal with external demands, which builds on existing theoretical ideas in 
institutional theory (Oliver 1991; Pache & Santos 2010).  
Contingency theory is interesting because it proposes an inherent trade-off between organizations 
being institutional or technological (Lynn 2005; Thompson 1967). Thompson’s (1967) 
propositions that organizations either try to buffer environmental inputs or level them out is crucial 
to understand how institutional logics affect organizations. Future research could delve into how 
organizations balance their structures to either buffer out logics or incorporate them. Moreover, 
the contingencies of how organizations react and succeed in institutional environments are crucial 
in order to bring the organization back in (Greenwood et al. 2014). How organizations’ reactions 
differ and what they do is essential to grasp how logics both constrain and create opportunities for 
change.  
 
Resource Dependency 
Resource dependency in all its simplicity suggests that external forces control organizations 
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978). In this view, it is not just efficiency or rationality that guides action, 
but power. When organizations are dependent on another organization or institution they enjoy 
less autonomy and must abide. But this power dynamic is two-fold: the one holding power is 
dependent on another entity to control. Resource dependency furnishes propositions concerning 
how organizations should act to maximize their autonomy. Although some papers have dealt with 
how organizations manipulate the template of logics, few are concerned with an organization’s 
power relation with another organization/institution.  
From an institutional logics perspective, power, resources, and legitimacy matter. For example, a 
buyer may force a supplier into actions that she or he conceives as legitimate, or that buyer may 
possibly purchase a supplier in order to discipline the supplier into following her or his 
institutional prescriptions. Large medical firms relying on a supplier located in a different industry 
demonstrate this point: a medical firm needs a supplier to act legitimately in accordance with the 
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logics of medicine, but, if the supplier’s firm is in another industry and wants to focus more on 
logics, it may be reasonable for the medical firm to integrate the supplier in order to discipline it 
to follow the logics of the medical sector.  
The resource dependence perspective provides a crucial mix to NIT, where Oliver (1991) used it 
to open it for up for strategic responses to institutions by relying on Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) 
models. However, the massive influence of Oliver’s (1991) framework has displaced resource 
dependency, which is a shame because it offers more than a framework for how organizations 
respond to external control. For example, the notion of how the environment is known and 
organizational attention to it (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978) has been under-utilized. Crucially, Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) argue that dependency is based on perception: in other words, organizations 
may not recognize their dependencies. From a logics perspective, it is an intriguing prospect that 
organizations may not know demands well enough to abide by them. This idea has been argued 
on the individual level (Pache & Santos 2013a), but it can be expanded to the organizational level. 
Organizations may not perceive dependencies because they are in opposition to existing logics. 
Corporations driven by market logics, for example, may not acknowledge dependencies on 
societal forces, such as demands for CSR. This perspective is well suited to the attention-based 
view that resides within the institutional logics perspective.  
Overall, some of Pfeffer and Salancik’s (1978) arguments have found successful use in NIT, but 
they are by no means exhausted: there may be many ways to detail and strengthen institutional 
logics scholarship by drawing on ideas from this line of organizational theory.    
Micro-foundations of institutional logics 
Micro-foundations are by nature foreign to NIT. The idea behind micro-foundations is that 
individual choice shapes outcomes (Agassi 1975; Coleman 1990), whereas NIT argues for non-
choice behavior like isomorphism10 (Oliver 1991). Since institutional logics builds on Coleman’s 
model of micro-foundations, they must include purposeful behavior by individual agents as the 
foundation of institutional logics.  
                                                 
10 Insight into this debate can be found in the exchange between Jepperson and Meyer (2011) and Abell, Felin, and 
Foss (2014). My paper will not go into this debate, but I will point to that micro-foundations need to encompass 
individual choice based on individual intentionality and institutions and their logics as a result of such choices, in 
order to fit the definition of micro-foundations (Abell, Felin & Foss 2014; Agassi 1975; Coleman 1990). 
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Relatively few papers deal with the micro-foundations of institutional logics. Furthermore, those 
papers that do focus on a micro-level often takes a practice theory approach that blurs the line 
between individual and collective levels (e.g., Smets et al. 2012, Smets et al. 2015). This is an 
issue from the micro-foundations perspective, because Coleman’s (1990) method requires 
methodological individualism and the practice perspective disregards an individual perspective 
altogether (Schatzki 2006). Hence, practice-theory-based papers can never be micro-foundational, 
because they dispose of the individual agent. Those studies may be micro- and/or multi-level, but 
they cannot be interpreted as connecting the levels Coleman (1990) intended and outlined in his 
bathtub model. Crucially, Thornton et al. (2012) rely on the micro-foundational model. The 
crucial point is whether studies attribute a purposeful agency to agents, and not where agency 
resides in institutional arrangements.  
This leaves only some theoretical works that explicitly deal with micro-foundations, where Pache 
and Santos’s (2013a) paper on individual responses to the institutional environment is one 
example. Other papers touch upon micro-foundations, but few explicitly mention that fact or argue 
its contribution to micro-foundational knowledge.11 The gap in the current literature is noticeable, 
even as Thornton et al. (2012) dedicate space to how they perceive the micro-foundations of 
institutional logics. Furthermore, a growing number of theoretical papers provide challenges to 
empirical research, such as Voronov and Yorks (2015) and Jarvis (2017). Both papers argue for 
the role of emotions in how logics are seen and used. Friedland (2017) lays out the gaps by mainly 
relying on an overtly cognitive view of micro-foundations, which eschews the emotional 
connection to logics as the driver that makes agents act and use logics.  
I will outline this debate, the possibility of a future research agenda, and some thoughts on how 
this reflects in study methodology. 
Cognition and affection in institutional logics 
Friedland (2017 p.1) surveys the following gap in the micro-foundations of institutional logics:  
“Institutional theory, and the institutional logics approach in particular, lacks feeling, the 
passions and fears that produce, sustain and disrupt institutional practice (Friedland, Mohr, 
Roose, & Gardinali, 2014b; Voronov, 2014; Voronov & Vince, 2012). This is due in part to 
rational, instrumental understandings of the individual in practice, and in part to the cognitive 
                                                 
11 A search on Scopus revealed that a mere six papers mention institutional logics and micro-foundations. None in 
my target journals does so.  
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and linguistic understanding of that practice, sustained by classification, qualification and 
belief.” 
 
Friedland (2017) comments on the view that Thornton et al. (2012) use to build their micro-
foundations. The view is too cognitive according to Friedland, because Thornton et al. (2012) 
focus too much on how logics shape attention and condition our cognition instead of how we are 
emotionally tied to logics. Rather than seeing people driven only by how institutional logics 
condition their cognition, Friedland (2017) draws on Boltanski and Thévenot’s work in order to 
argue that interest and motivation of the self-forms the driving force: 
“Interest is thus their real motivation, the property of their self that makes them be themselves by 
wanting to obtain satisfaction. One succeeds through the strength of this desire, because one 
loves. Real life is what people want to acquire.” (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006 p. 197) 
 
By resourcing Boltanski and Thévenot, Friedland (2017) opens up more agency than most 
institutional (logics) scholars normally attribute to agents (Cloutier & Langley 2013). This is an 
important point for future research; while we have previously seen studies attributing considerable 
agency to individuals (e.g., McPherson & Sauder 2013, Pache & Santos 2013b), we are not quite 
sure why. The notion of an authenticity seeking and autonomous self lends itself to self-
determination theory as a mode of explanation (Ryan & Deci 2000). The connection to a theory 
of self-determination is natural if we see individuals as autonomous beings in search of an 
authentic self (Friedland 2017). That is, individuals use logics to “determine themselves,” which 
Friedland (2017) seems to suggest is the case.  
 
Recently, NIT has seen conceptual papers arguing for a stronger focus on the emotional side 
(Voronov & Weber 2016; Voronov & Yorks 2015). For example, Voronov and Yorks (2015) 
argue from a cognitive development perspective that agents may not respond to institutional 
complexity because they have emotionally tethered themselves to a particular logic. Agents can 
be socialized into institutions, or it could be that their identity is tied to an institution. Jarvis (2017) 
proposes that agents can have feigned and felt emotions in relation to logics, meaning that 
sometimes logics invoke deep feelings in people and sometimes people may fake emotions to 
appear legitimate in light of dominant logics. Future research could draw on what drives agents’ 
motivations and emotional ties to logics; currently, only a few and very recent papers exist (e.g., 
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Tracey 2016). If emotional ties matter for agents even as those ties may be complex (as with 
feigned emotions), then the question of how data can capture those connections remains open to 
investigation.  
 
Capturing emotions 
Vaisey (2008, 2009, 2014) argues that interviews are insufficient to locate the true emotions of 
people, because agents may be moved in certain directions without being able to narrate why. 
Vaisey (2014) notes that scholars have reached a consensus that dual processes are at play. For 
Vaisey, two analytically distinct ways explain how agents embody culture: a propositional, 
discursive level (system 2), and an intuitive, practical level (system 1) (Vaisey 2009 2014). For 
this reason, Vaisey (2009) separates knowing culture—where the agent may have a deep 
knowledge—from caring and use culture, where the agent may only care for the small parts that 
help him or her express and reach his or her desires and interests. Because of this separation 
between the discursive and the practical self, Vaisey (2014 p. 5) is critical of interviews: 
“I maintain, however, that interviewing is something like being a ‘sketch artist.’ Sketch artists 
must use their particular skills to translate one kind of information (verbal) to another (visual) 
just as interviewers must use their skills to move from one kind of content (explicit talk) to another 
(implicit cultural content).” 
In its place, Vaisey (2009 p. 1688) suggests forced-choice surveys as a better way to capture the 
culture-action link. This approach has provoked responses. Pugh (2013) argues that interviews 
can go deep, beyond feigned discursive responses and into the visceral self. The important part 
we can take from this debate concerns fitting our methodology to the particular question and field 
(Lamont & Swidler 2014). Institutional logics scholars have often relied on interpretive 
approaches (e.g., Currie & Spyronidis 2016) and ethnographic approaches (e.g., Jay 2013). And 
while no studies have applied the dual process method and its forced-survey response method, 
institutional logics represents a cultural cognitive theory that ought to fit such method.  
In order to capture emotions and ties to logics, scholars can rely on two methods: the in-depth 
interview and the forced-choice survey. The in-depth interpretive interview is well known, but it 
comes with the caveat that agents may feign emotions (Jarvis 2017). As a result, it is important 
for a researcher to stay in the field longer and to return to interviewees to ensure that the interviews 
go beyond “honorable” displays (Pugh 2013). Second, the forced-choice survey method proposes 
a new line of research in institutional logics, and, as a new method, could inspire new findings.  
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Conclusion     
Institutional logics is a burgeoning field of compelling research. The theoretical perspective has 
the potential to fill out lacunae in NIT, especially with regard to allowing for agency- and choice-
driven behavior. This review was motivated to find out how institutional logics was getting along 
in this endeavor. I therefore drew on the critique levied at NIT (Greenwood et al. 2014; Suddaby 
et al. 2010) to determine whether institutional logics shares the same lacunae, and conducted my 
review in top journals that publish high-quality institutional logics literature. While institutional 
logics could possess a strong micro-focus, the amount of individual-level studies was few (11 out 
of 76). This deficiency underscores the need for more empirical research at this level, especially 
given the active theoretical debate on how agents connect to logics. I did find that the logics 
literature gave somewhat stronger attention to the organizational level, whereas NIT has been 
criticized for shunning this level altogether (Greenwood et al. 2014). I also found few papers that 
dealt with elements like organizational design and performance, despite calls for focusing on (at 
least) organizational design (Thornton et al. 2012). Missing pieces to the theory, especially on the 
contingency that organizational structures bring to the ways an organization uses logics, were 
evident. Moreover, I discovered a tendency to focus on particular types of organizations (service 
and non-profit, in particular). As a result, some of the gaps found in NIT remained present in 
institutional logics literature. A particular issue was the often-missing connection to other 
organizational theories that could help us to understand the motives behind certain structures and 
contingencies of organizational design. The absence of such links rendered the meso-level of the 
organization vague. Furthermore, I deduced that a lack of cross-fertilization might reduce the 
impact and prosperity of the institutional logics perspective.  
In terms of future research directions, I advocated for expanding the sample of organizations 
studied in order to compare their differences. I also proposed more focus on organizational 
elements like performance and design, because these elements are shaped by logics. As NIT has 
already done, drawing in other organizational theories might help. Last, I recommended a sharper 
attention to the micro-foundations to explain these links. In existing studies, the agent’s 
connections and use of logics was debated theoretically but it lacked empirical grounding. To 
achieve empirical support, I suggested looking at the cultural cognitive debate occurring in 
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sociology. That debate points to how we should use interpretive, qualitative measures as well as 
quantitative metrics. Overall, this review opened new paths for scholars embedded or interested 
in the institutional logics field.  
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Chapter 3 
Adoption of logics in entrepreneurial ventures: how competing 
logics are brought in, activated, and conflict inside the organization 
 
 
 
Abstract 
Drawing on a 24-month ethnographic study of an entrepreneurial venture, I investigate how 
agents in the venture develop, defend and conflict over frames derived from macro-level 
institutional logics. Literature has argued that managers on the organizational level control 
which and how logics operate in their organization by using efficient structures. This paper 
strives to change the discussion to a focus on how logics are adopted through an iterative micro-
level process that interacts with macro-level changes. The paper provides evidence from a 
venture that moved from an early innovators market to a mature mainstream market during a 
scale-up process, thereby entering an institutional complex environment. The paper investigates 
how a new logic is brought in and activated as a frame by newcomers over time in an iterative 
process with the changing environment. This prompts incumbents to defend their logic and the 
related framing. In this process, these logical frames may be initially compatible, but then due to 
differences in legitimacy, internal power, and activation develop into incompatible frames, 
which induce costly evaluation- and interpretation-based conflicts that compromise 
organizational processes and performance.  
Keywords: Institutional logics, organizational change, entrepreneurial ventures, frame-based 
conflicts, qualitative case study 
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Introduction 
 
The growth of entrepreneurial ventures is a key concern for a well-functioning economy (Guzman 
& Stern, 2016). However, the scale-up of ventures lags behind the formation of high potential 
start-ups (Guzman & Stern, 2016). We know surprisingly little about the challenges to the internal 
organization during scale-up, for example why this organization may be compromised and cause 
scale-up failures (Ambos & Birkinshaw, 2010, Desantola & Gulati 2017, McMullen & Dimov, 
2013). One crucial issue is that ventures face competing demands when scaling up (Desantola & 
Gulati, 2017, Fisher, Kotha & Lahiri, 2016). Organizations may have to address competing 
external logics that pressure different modes of action (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micellota 
& Lounsbury, 2011). Importantly, these external pressures also “seep” inside the organization and 
become different frames of action (Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013a). While researchers have paid a 
great deal of attention to institutional complex situations and organizations that try to function in 
fields of such nature (Greenwood et al. 2011, Pache & Santos, 2013b, Smets, Jarzabkowski, 
Burke, Bednarek & Spee 2015), there is less understanding of how logics play out inside 
organizations (Besharov & Smith, 2014, Pache & Santos, 2013a, Schilke, 2017). This is important 
for entrepreneurial ventures, as they must manage this type of logics change when they scale-up 
(Desantola & Gulati, 2017, Fisher et al. 2016). At present, it is not clear how this change process 
unfolds or why this change may harm a venture. Therefore, this paper asks: How does the process 
of adopting a new logic unfold in an entrepreneurial venture? and What is the consequence of 
adopting new logics on important organizational processes and performance? To investigate 
these questions, this paper presents an in-depth case study of an entrepreneurial venture during 
scale-up. 
This investigation ties into general concerns on how organizations respond to complex logics 
(Greenwood et al. 2011, Pache & Santos, 2010). Here a dominant stream proposes that managers 
have the agency and foresight to choose the best strategy, such as whether the organization should 
comply with, avoid or even defy external demands (Oliver, 1991, Pache & Santos, 2010, 2013b). 
The issue with this view is that is puts a lot of weight on managerial agency and rationality; it 
contends that managers are the agents devising strategy and tasked with the responsibility of 
guiding the organization through the complex environment (Smith & Besharov, 2017, Smith & 
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Tracey, 2016). This is problematic because logics are not solely top-down governance structures, 
but also tools of action on the micro-level (McPherson & Sauder, 2013). Logics as function as 
micro-level entities between groups, the ability to manage logics is an ongoing micro-level 
phenomenon, not solely an organization level strategy (Smets et al. 2015). Therefore, this paper 
seeks to change the view of organizational adoption of logic from a focus on strategic responses 
to an iterative micro-level process shaped by macro-level changes. 
It can be difficult to assess whether conflicting logics are detrimental to performance. While some 
argue that they are in fact beneficial (e.g. Jay, 2013), in general there is not a direct link between 
conflict of logics and organization performance. The reason why is that organizational 
consequences often take a backseat compared to the interest in institutional change and 
consequences (Greenwood, Hinings & Whetten, 2014). While there is merit in this focus, 
understanding organizational outcomes such as performance is practically important. For 
example, despite numerous studies in healthcare (e.g. Currie & Spyronidis 2016, Pouthier, Steele 
& Ocasio 2013, Reay & Hinings 2005, 2009), we know little on how competing logics affect 
performance in healthcare. Scholars talk about conflict, but why conflicts should affect 
performance is not directly linked. The paper seeks to add a link here, for two reasons, first; it is 
increasingly important for institutional theory to tie into organizational concerns (Greenwood et 
al. 2014). Second, if there is no link between the state of logics and performance, it has little 
practical relevance for managers.  
By conducting a longitudinal study of an entrepreneurial venture12 during scale-up, I show that 
the emergence of competing logics inside the organization is a micro-level process, where they 
first may seem as compatible frames, because the old logic and its frame is the most powerful. 
This then changes over time, making them into incompatible frames that create conflicts and have 
a negative impact on performance, which in this case study affects the process of new product 
introduction.  
The study augments our knowledge of the micro-level interplay of competing logics by tying them 
to internal organizational processes and outcomes. Thereby, the paper contributes to two core 
elements of institutional theory as well as the under-researched phenomenon of venture scaling. 
First, the paper investigates the process of changing logics inside the organization. Here the paper 
                                                 
12 An entrepreneurial venture is defined as a young growth-oriented firm engaging in innovative behavior 
(Desantola & Gulati 2017). 
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draws on the burgeoning connection between micro-level framing and macro-level logics 
(Cornelissen & Werner, 2014, Grady, Ansari & Purdy, 2015). By analyzing the process of 
adoption, the paper provides some new insights into the connection between macro and micro 
level changes. This process provides some challenges to the literature on organizational responses 
to institutional complexity (e.g. Pache & Santos, 2010), because it shows that logics change from 
compatible to incompatible. Finally, the paper shows that following institutional demands to 
change and adopting a new logic, which frames things differently, can harm important processes, 
such as collaboration between R&D and operations in new product introduction. This provides 
some insights into why scaling of ventures may fail, i.e. that this is a result of internal problems 
rather than the external “liability of newness” that has hitherto been seen as the main cause of 
venture scale-up failure (Fisher et al. 2016).  
 
Theoretical framework 
 
The form of institutional logics 
Institutional logics are usually defined as: “socially constructed sets of material practices, 
assumptions, values, and beliefs that shape cognition and behavior” (Thornton, Ocasio, 
Lounsbury 2012 p. 51). Logics are belief systems that supply guidelines for practical actions 
(Friedland & Alford, 1991). At the micro-level, they are frames of action that allow individuals 
to categorize themselves, but they also function at the macro-level as immaterial governance 
structures of how to act in a field (Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003). Institutional logics exist both 
in people’s minds, as internalized dispositions and frames (DiMaggio, 1997), and as external 
norms, contexts and organized practices (Thornton et al. 2012). While logics are multifaceted 
and multi-level, this paper uses the idea of logics on the micro-level where they are 
conceptualized as frames (Glaser, Fast, Harmon & Green, 2016). 
Individuals use frames to interpret the world around them by locating, perceiving, identifying and 
labeling events and situations (Goffman, 1974).  Glaser et al. (2016) argue that an institutional 
frame, derived from an institutional logic, affect how individuals justify and describe actions. It 
is a cognitive frame that shape attention to problems and solutions. For example, a frame derived 
from market logics makes an individual act more self-interested than one derived from family 
logics (Glaser et al. 2016). Therefore, agents drawing on different logics could frame things 
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differently. These cognitive frames are formed by three different elements: availability (how much 
the individual knows of the logic), accessibility (how much the knowledge comes to mind) and 
activation (how much it is used in practice at a given moment) (Pache & Santos, 2013a p.11). 
These three elements are crucial because agents may carry round logics that they know, and which 
come to mind to them, but which are not currently active in daily use. It may also mean that they 
frame things differently, irrespective of the changes in logics externally, one individual, or groups, 
frame is still strongly available and accessible to them. At present, this process is purely 
theoretical, and we know little about how this process would unfold empirically. 
The link between inner mental states and external elements may not always be clear or fixed 
because culture is complex and varied in meaning. This is especially the case with institutional 
complexity where there are diverse and competing external elements at play. Here, meaning of 
action is essentially contested, as institutions intersect and conflicting frames and modes of 
justification can be used (Granovetter, 2017, Gray et al. 2015). 
A frequent clash of logics occurs between professional and market logics, which frame things 
differently.  A common example is conflict between medical professionals and managers in 
healthcare as the sector becomes increasingly marketized (Reay & Hinings, 2009). The logics 
carry different frames of how to classify problems and act in the world. A doctor works with 
personal knowledge and focuses on fixing a specific problem for a patient utilizing personal skill. 
In contrast, an economics-oriented business manager focuses on standardizing processes and 
creating routines that reduce cost and increase efficiency. These two logics provide different 
framings in the form of what an agent should do, according to values and norms that justifies 
action. Another example is pharmaceutical and medicinal research. Here, professional logic 
focuses on the newness and possible impact of developing a new drug. This logic is likely justified 
by an academic norm of truth and discovery. In contrast, market logic would ask whether this new 
drug is profitable. It is irrelevant to this logic if the drug is radical and new if only a hundred 
people in the world suffer from the disease. Justification here is aligned with profitability, but also 
with whether this is the most efficient use of resources. These two views are likely to clash because 
they essentially frame things differently. This conflict is moderated by how much power agents 
have (Mangen & Brivot, 2015). Logics emphasize different forms of expertise, and for this reason 
incumbents want to keep newcomers out and newcomers want to try to demonstrate the 
inadequacy of existing logics, thereby creating institutional gaps (Mangen & Brivot, 2015, Rao et 
al. 2003).  
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This leads to an interesting question – if you have an organization where one logic and its frame 
dominates, why would this organization allow a new logic to enter? Here the literature has 
primarily argued that it is the leaders of the organization who have to handle the competing logics 
in the form of external demands (Pache & Santos, 2010, Smith & Tracey, 2016). The idea is that 
the leaders weigh of the pros and cons of acquiescence to the demands (adoption) or avoidance 
(Pache & Santos, 2010). Logics are seen as demands that leaders cater to externally and manage 
internally through the use of structures (Smith & Tracey, 2016). This is problematized because 
logics unfold on the micro-level and are unstable; they are left to individuals and groups to change 
and expand upon (Thornton et al. 2012). Hence, managers are not the only actors responsible for 
adopting or avoiding logics, nor can they be seen as being in full control. This implies that their 
ability to choose correctly and control an adoption process is not certain. If logics are frames on 
the micro-level, then it is important to determine how they emerge and evolve within an 
organization and how and when they may cause framing conflicts that can derail organizational 
performance. This line of research has not been developed, as the literature has thus far focused 
more on managers and their frames (e.g. Smith & Besharov, 2017).   
 
Compatible and incompatible frames and costly conflicts 
 
Beginning with performance, it has recently been argued that not only opportunism, but also 
different cognitive frames create costly conflicts within an organization (Foss & Weber, 2016 p. 
62). Different cognitive frames can result in different types of conflict, such as conflict that is 
interpretation-, role- and evaluation-based. These conflicts are primarily driven by frames being 
incompatible, but compatible frames may also engender conflicts, especially role-based ones 
(Foss & Weber, 2016). This paper focuses on incompatible frames because competing logics 
should reasonably result in incompatible frames. These conflicts are interpretation-based, in 
which agents misunderstand each other, and evaluation-based, in which agents evaluate each 
other’s work with different biases, hence creating conflict around who contributed and who is 
therefore responsible (Foss & Weber 2016). These conflicts are costly and have a substantive 
negative impact on firm performance (Foss & Weber 2016).  
It is reasonable to expect that competing logics always result in incompatible frames (Gray et al. 
2015), which must then be negotiated so that conflicts can be avoided (Weber & Mayer 2014). 
However, there is one important caveat with regard to this assumption, which is that competing 
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logics and their frames may differ in strength (Besharov & Smith 2014, Pache & Santos 2013a). 
Sometimes, one logic is very strong and the other is less so, with the result that the first logic and 
its frame dominate the second logic. This a result of the fact that a logic’s legitimacy varies outside 
of a particular organization, or that organizational practices such as hiring and firing, or individual 
characteristics may vary as well (Besharov & Smith 2014, Pache & Santos 2013a). If one logic 
has more devoted followers within an organization and higher legitimacy outside of it, then its 
framing has more legitimacy and credibility. In a contest of framing, this dominant logic defines 
the acceptable elements from the competing frame and determines what should be transmitted 
(Weber & Mayer 2014). In the case of power differences, where one logic is the dominant, then 
two frame that would be otherwise incompatible may be perceived as compatible, because the 
dominant logic suppresses the conflicting elements of the competing logic (Besharov & Smith 
2014). Problems can arise if the field changes so that the two logics become equal in legitimacy 
and importance for the organization. This allows agents to activate the previously less powerful 
framing more forcibly and thereby create costly conflicts (Besharov & Smith 2014, Foss & Weber 
2016). Despite its potential as a source for real conflict, we do know much about such a change 
in framing, as most frameworks are theoretical and set in fixed matrixes.   
Recently, research in micro-institutionalism and institutional logics has placed more attention on 
cognitive processes and framing (e.g. Schilke 2017). While this research is promising, some 
crucial gaps remain, including the question of how frames enter and evolve in an organization and 
the consequence of this entrance and evolution for organizational processes and performance. It 
is these gaps that this paper seeks to address. To achieve this goal, this paper considers the current 
view, that managers are in charge of how logics unfold in an organization, and provides an 
alternative view, that managers are not in control and logics instead play out according to how 
individuals adhere to and use them, which is defined more by their everyday actions and the nature 
of their field. 
Research settings and methods 
 
Research context of entrepreneurial venture and high-tech industry 
I have chosen to follow an entrepreneurial venture in the photonics industry. The reason for this 
choice is that the industry is fast growing and quite complex. This industry is a subcategory of the 
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lasers and optics and existed since the 1960s. It is a fast-growing and changing industry. A report 
from the German Ministry of Education and Research on the industry outlined a near doubling in 
market size between 2011-2020 from 350 billion euro to 615 billion euro,13 and is projected even 
further in the following years.14 The most profitable market is photonics-enabled products and 
services, such as internet streaming and cloud storage, with large technology corporations buying 
photonics equipment to run their services and deliver their products. The most profitable market 
segment is pure photonics products, such as optical scanners and advanced manufacturing 
systems, while photonics components are the least profitable.15 The photonics industry is still 
discovering new applications and discontinuing others as markets change. Photonics technology 
has a wide array of possible uses, from bio-imaging in medicine to material processing in 
semiconductors, which has resulted in a diversity of firms populating the industry and a large 
number of start-ups. At present, only a few major players have solidified their footing in the 
industry. 
The photonics industry is very suitable for studying scaling ventures facing complexity because 
it is fast growing and both university researchers and large corporations are members of the 
industry. Because both an important academic market and community and powerful corporations 
are involved in the photonics industry, there are different ideas about how organizations should 
behave in order to be perceived as legitimate. The case study therefore serves as revelatory 
regarding what goes on inside a venture as it scales up in a complex industry.  
 
Methodology and data. 
I used an explorative single case study design in order to build theory (Eisenhardt 1989, Nag, 
Corley & Gioia 2007) because I wanted explorative richness in order to add to a theory with little 
empirical research regarding this type of organization. Here a grounded, interpretive approach 
was appropriate (Nag et al. 2007).  
I have made the case firm, Supertech, anonymous in order to protect the identity of the firm and 
its employees. The firm is a very high-tech manufacturing firm that began as a spin-off from a 
technical university, but who gradually left that background and become more like a corporation. 
                                                 
13 Industry Report 2013 from German Federal Ministry of Education and Research.  
14 International Society for Optics and Photonics (SPIE) 2014 report.  
15 SPIE 2014 report.  
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While I was at the firm it changed from having approximately 120 employees in one country, to 
having around 300 employees in four different countries.  
 
Data collection and method 
 I visited the firm regularly in a two-year long period, logging well over 100 hours of observations 
of meetings and daily work. During the first year I had my own desk and visited the company 
weekly. I interacted informally with the employees to build rapport and an informal knowledge 
of the daily workings of the firm. I also participated in the team building day with the firm’s entire 
R&D group. To complement my notes, I photographed the Kanban and other types of boards that 
employees used for organizing their work. Comparing the different boards and their elements gave 
good clues about practices and motives. I noted when the boards changed, whether deadlines were 
rigid or flexible and whether this was consistent across units. However, this study was not truly 
ethnographic, because I could not observe some of the crucial work of producing the lasers, which 
took place in closed labs where participant observations were unwelcome and dangerous due to 
laser radiation. I noted key events (Van de Ven, 2007) and used my observations to derive 
questions for the interviews. I systematized my observations into a diary/case study. The reason 
for this choice was that I was particularly interested in the organizational development over time. 
During this time, I conducted 37 interviews with 23 informants. I sampled informants across a 
range of positions and I also chose to re-interview key informants to secure a process perspective. 
Interviews centered around employees’ personal history, collaborations across the firm and their 
perspectives on issues. The interviews were transcribed verbatim, except for those that could not 
be recorded, where I instead took notes. To complement the interviews, I also relied on internal 
documents. These were particularly rich as they included project data containing over 2,500 files 
with presentations and notes from stage-gate meetings, which I especially focused on. I also used 
external archival data. Table 1 provides an overview of the data.  
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Table 1. Data Overview 
 
Research methodology and data coding 
I used the different sets of data to create triangulation (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2012). I used 
the first period of study for observations and locating overarching themes, which was particularly 
useful for grounded theory, where such themes are sometimes lost (Suddaby, 2006). This first 
period was utilized to write down an overarching case story covering different time-periods (see 
table 2)  
I relied on building a case story over the changes. I determined how the logics changed over time 
according to informants, allowing me to code the development according to a timeline. This 
timeline and initial overview of the case led me to the institutional logics perspective as informants 
used the terms “mindsets” and cultures to describe their differences. This led me to use Reay and 
Jones’ (2016) method of pattern matching to identify the two logics at play, i.e. the professional 
science/academia logic and the market logic, that the employees in R&D and operations adhered 
to respectively.  Table 2 provides an overview of the timeline and different periods that I worked 
with. The timeline emerged out of different sources as listed.  
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“Good old days” 
ca. 2000-ca. 2012 
2013-2014: 
Changing years: 
adoption phase 
Late 2014-late 
2015: Breaking 
up phase, debate 
over identity 
Late 2015-2016: 
Conflict phase 
Data:  
Archives; 
Retrospective 
statements from 
long tenured 
employees, 
mostly R&D.  
Data: 
Archives; 
Interviews, both 
in real time and 
retrospectively 
Data:  
Archives; 
Interviews; 
Observations 
Data: 
Archives; 
Interviews; 
Observations 
Supertech was at 
this  point a set of 
pure research 
facilities..  
Employees with 
longer tenure 
would often 
reminisce about 
this time, when 
research was all 
that mattered. 
Supertech begins 
bringing in new 
people who are to 
help Supertech 
gain legitimacy 
and secure orders 
from large 
corporations.  
Conflict over the 
dominant logic 
that should frame 
action emerges. 
This includes 
identity and 
goals.  
Increasing debate 
over where the 
company should 
go; the CEO is let 
go. 
Full conflict over 
cultural framing 
and how and why 
to do things. 
 
 
Dominant logic: 
Pure research, a 
pure professional 
logic.  
Dominant logic: 
Professional, 
where the market 
is seen as a 
necessary 
supplement. 
Dominant logic: 
Debate and 
conflict arise over 
which direction 
to go in.  
Dominant logic: 
Conflict between 
two logics in near 
equal strength.  
Table 2 Timeline 
Using the case study as a background and lynchpin of the coding, I relied on the “Gioia 
methodology” (Gioia et al. 2012). First, I gathered open codes from interviews, observations and 
archival data. After creating an overview of statements and recurring themes, I used axial coding 
across statements to collapse the codes into themes. For example, the conflict phases were drawn 
from statements across informants in different units. The axial coding resulted in higher level 
themes. Here the coding entered the theoretical realm in order to explain my phenomena (Gioia 
et al. 2012), what Klag and Langley (2013) term making “theoretical leaps”. Having identified 
the professional science logic and the market/corporation logic at play, I started to focus on 
literature that dealt with organizations that had to incorporate two different logics. I took my 
themes and compared them to the literature on institutional complexity and hybrid organizations. 
At this point, I realized that the process of organizations entering a situation with complex 
demands and having to become hybrid was not very well researched, as most studies focused on 
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fields and organizations that are inherently complex and (often) hybrid in nature (e.g. micro-
finance or other social enterprises), despite recent developments arguing that plural logics exist in 
all organizations (see Schildt & Perkmann, 2017). I also realized that the focus placed on what 
managers were doing was much stronger than the focus on individuals and sub-groups.  
Using the case story and the codes and themes I derived, the theoretical dimensions emerged as 
part of the adoption process. These dimensions represented certain time periods and how the 
logics played out at each point. The different stages of the process illuminate the dynamics and 
intricacies of how institutional complexity influence organizations internally. This resulted in the 
development of overall data structures that guided my findings. My data structure is a 
“boilerplate” Gioia-style structure, however I have attempted to include a process perspective, i.e. 
indicating that the themes occur over time to avoid presenting a static picture, thereby infusing 
some necessary vibrancy into the structure (Gioia et al. 2012). Importantly, I report consequences 
of the process, which, while not unheard of, goes somewhat against the interpretivist leanings of 
the Gioia methodology. In a similar research context, Gioia as a co-author describes how a process 
resulted in strategic change failure (Nag et al. 2007).  
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Data structure 
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Figure 1 Data structure 
 
 
 
 
Second order themes & First order categories Representative Quotes 
Overarching dimension: Adoption of New 
Institutional Logic 
 
Changing towards being more market oriented 
 
A. The organization starts to take in new 
logics by hiring new people and trying to 
implement a new mindset.  
A1. “The new COO is the most recent change, I 
have made in senior management. It was not 
because the previous was bad. But we have 
reached a stage, where lean and cost focus is 
important. They have to be much more salient. We 
need to implement risk and supply chain 
management – the works.”  
 (CEO 1) 
 
  
 
A2. “…It’s going to be more of an evolution into 
being more market focused as opposed to 
technology focused. So, there is technology focus, 
but we are doing things that are market focused. 
We are looking at the end application, but 
everything has to fit in with what we are good at 
with technology.” (CEO 2) 
 
 
 
The firm change practices 
 
A new frame on how to do things becomes 
present 
B1. “R&D was very happy with the 
implementation of the project management boards 
[i.e. white boards with project data]. It really 
helped them prioritize tasks. The resource 
management board is the most important one in 
the whole organization.” (External consultant).  
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B2. “For the business it is life or death to create 
standards, quality and performance measurements. 
We need to create the same product over and over 
again…But it is a huge challenge to get that 
“quality mindset”. We in quality live and die for 
quality, but this mindset is lacking overall in the 
company. It is a huge challenge” (Quality manager 
1).  
 
 
 
 
Overarching Dimension: Useful Integration: 
 
Informants state that the new logics are 
compatible at first and helps them improve the 
company 
 
 
 
 
 
C.1 “In a high-tech firm you need R &D close to 
operations. It is a mirage to believe you can 
develop to a high level without it.” (CTO) 
 
 
C2. “What have we chosen to do? We have 
invested heavily in Lean. Lean training for 
everyone. And not operations-lean, company 
lean… We have had every single employee back 
in school… It is an investment that kicks ass” 
(CEO 1) 
The new logics improve daily workings in the 
firm 
 
D.1 “Organizationally, the mindset, it is a huge 
mindset change. R & D cannot, even if they 
believe it, do it all themselves... That’s how it was 
when I joined the company, there was a huge silo 
between R & D and manufacturing. (COO) 
 
D2. “You had labs all around… so we could not 
coordinate. One of the first things, I wanted done 
was tearing down the walls. Thereby we got a 
completely different flow” (Production manager) 
 
Overarching Dimension: The Breaking up 
phase 
 
 
Conflicts between cultures and goals starts to 
arise 
 
Employees note that their goals and culture do not 
match anymore and that this creates problems.  
 
 
 
 
E1. “We have two completely different cultures 
and that creates clashes. My own personal opinion 
is, that is would be really good to have more 
engineers in operations, which could act as go 
between. Because right now, we have really, really 
many engineers in R&D and really few in 
operations. It is because they wanted this really 
lean operations line with few people and very low 
costs and high volume” (Department head, R&D)  
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E2: “You can set it so that goals do not fit with 
best for the company. If individual goals do not 
harmonize, then you drive people in different 
directions. Operations has the goal of 
streamlining, so they do that. R&D has the goal of 
collecting all kinds of weird OEM and then try to 
make something out of it…” (Head of 
Manufacturing Engineering department) 
 
 
 
The units start to move out of sync 
 
The units act much on their own not in 
conjunction with the other 
F1. R&D unit takes on their own team-building 
day, where they discuss the vision for the whole 
firm, leaving the operations unit back home (Obs.) 
 
F2. R&D starts to neglect some of the previous 
Lean training and systems, e.g. hiding the boards 
in the corner. Operations become even more 
focused on using the boards and other systems, 
e.g. making their own ERP (Enterprise resource 
planning) system. (Obs.):  
Overarching Dimension: One-sided adoption 
and counter-framing 
 
Counter-framing  
 
Employees note that silos have been rebuilt and 
that they face critical issues 
 
G1. “But I can see that the silo is being rebuilt. R 
& D wants to build their own infrastructure and do 
things themselves ... and it's value destruction. 
That means they do things in parallel ... it cannot 
be done. If you ask the engineers on the floor then 
they also think it's strange.” (COO) 
 
 
G2. “We are facing a burning platform here…if 
we do not solve this [conflict], we will not have 
operations… and then we won’t have R&D 
either…” (CTO)  
 
Conflicts and conflicting understandings H1. “There are obviously some challenges. But 
there are also historically been the case that they 
had a certain mentality there and a certain 
mentality here.” (Quality Manager 2)  
 
 
H2. “There is a feeling that the central core is 
being pulled apart…Some [employees in different 
units] do not understand why they do as they do, 
and some do not understand why they prioritize as 
they do – , why something gets done and why 
something else doesn’t get done. It is because 
some [people] are pulling in one direction and 
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others are pulling in the opposite direction.” 
(Technology Manager, R&D)  
 
  
Overarching Dimension: Costly conflict due 
to different logics and frames 
 
Evaluation based conflict 
 
Conflicts over different expectations and goals 
in collaborations 
 
I1. “It is in the last 10 % [of the process] where 
the chain breaks, and it is because of goals. I think 
operations are moving towards completely 
different goals than R&D. It is clear that there are 
different expectations of one another. Operations 
has an expectation that we are becoming a high-
volume factory and that the dear R&D people 
should fall in line with that.” 
 (Department head, manufacturing engineering) 
 
I2. “But then you use 2500 hours in the pilot phase 
[of production]…and you just go ‘what the f’ck!?’ 
What did we spend that time on?” (Project 
Manager 1) 
 
Interpretation- based conflict 
 
Conflict over different understandings when 
collaborating 
J1. “I think we could come a long way if we had a 
process for how to transfer. In my experience, you 
correct the project afterwards… I do not know 
what it takes to transfer things” (Production Lead)  
 
 
J2. “Well we do plan our projects, but everyone 
does their own way…we don’t have a joint model 
we use” (Project Manager 3) 
 
 
 
 
Table 2 Representative quotes for the data structure 
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Findings 
 
 Defining the logics and change in Supertech 
 
 Supertech16  is an entrepreneurial venture in a continuous scale-up phase. During my research 
period the company went from 120 employees to over 300. Supertech began primarily as a 
research and development site for promising technology in a specific area of fiber and lasers based 
on technology spun out of basic research conducted at a nearby technical university. Supertech’s 
main customers were researchers who sought out the newest technology in order to break records 
and find new applications for optical laser technology. As the different associated R&D firms 
began to develop laser and fiber technologies that had wider applications, they were merged into 
one firm, BIG Supertech, owned by the conglomerate BIG, which invested heavily in developing 
the intellectual property base into a profitable high-tech business. The CTO described their early 
approach to the markets: “At the time we ran after everyone who was interested. So, we had the 
luxury that people were interested. It is not more than two years ago, we became focused on what 
markets we want to prioritize”. In order to be profitable, Supertech moved from a pure product 
development focused on an innovative market of researchers towards an OEM market.  
Before the change towards the OEM market of large “blue chip” corporations, informants would 
define the firm as a “garage shop” who conducted a “shotgun approach” to their markets. In 
essence, Supertech was a “skunkwork” in the conglomerate, it was given resources and freedom 
to conduct basic research and more radical innovation. In the early years, the procedure was that 
customers would contact, or be contacted by, Supertech, who would solve their specific problem 
using their intensive, expertise knowledge. This customer group consisted of research scientists 
at prestigious universities, who used Supertech’s technology for experiments in a wide array of 
applications from bio-imaging to windmill sensors. Informants referred to this market as a general 
“scientific” market. These lead users shared many characteristics with the engineers at Supertech; 
they had PhDs in their respective fields, focused on development and highly technology focused. 
The go to market approach was highly based on shared occupational field, the PhDs in Supertech’s 
R & D and sales department understood and respected the researchers they sold to highly and the 
researchers respected the craft of Supertech. The strategy was to capitalize on gaining reputation 
                                                 
16 I have anonymized the firm and its owning conglomerate for the sake of protecting the identity of the informants.  
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in the innovators market and obtain testimonials from innovators that would interest large 
corporations that might see a potential in the technology and utilize it for the mainstream market. 
The COO described the change as follows:  
“We went from being a small company to a bigger one and this just changes expectations from 
your customers. Before, you could produce some crap, but scientific customers liked it because it 
was just what they needed—for the next 20 hours…Now, we need to ship a product that clears 
10,000 hours and has field service capability and a built-in self-test. This is where we are going.” 
The COO himself and several members from his team were hired by the company between 2013 
and 2015 because of the influx of OEM customers. These employees differed from the R&D 
personnel because they did not hold a PhD in fiber and laser technology and instead were mostly 
production engineers. Also, they were separated by having had a different background. While it 
was not uncommon for R&D personnel to have been in the firm since its inception or only have 
worked in the laser industry, the personnel in operations and quality management had diverse 
experience, working in manufacturing firms in the phone, automobile and electronics industry. 
The skunkwork status of Supertech ended and the organization had to incorporate practices and 
organizational structures that would make them more efficient and create larger scale production 
through selling to the OEMs, who ordered much larger series of a single product. Supertech’s 
2013 annual report stated that: 
“In 2013 an increased number of Supertech’s products and solutions proved their maturity, being 
implemented in an expanding range of industrial solutions. This underlined the successful change 
of emphasis in recent years, away from focus on research environments towards solutions for 
industrial customers.” 
This attitude from the conglomerate was even clearer in 2015, when the annual report stated that: 
“Scalable manufacturing is a must to realize growth ambitions and [the] expected increase of 
OEM customers. Supertech pursues scalability through lean manufacturing.” This statement 
induced some skepticism from members of the firm. The engineers in R&D feared that they would 
end up producing commodities by over committing to strict processes, with one engineer stating, 
“if we become a nuts and bolts factory, then I think a lot of people won’t be here. That is not how 
we see ourselves.” However, the operations department had streamlined their operations 
drastically and had implemented what they proudly called “The 30-foot Lean Wall”. Just prior to 
and during my research period, the firm moved towards a dual focus on both developing new 
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products and trying to implement a new “mindset” of making processes and structures more 
efficient and stable. The firm was in a transitioning period from a “garage shop” or “adhocracy” 
to a firm with clear and efficient processes. This was necessary to gain larger OEMs as customers 
as they demanded efficient and dependent suppliers. However, the OEMs also demanded 
innovation and development, which the head of the R&D department described as “By God, this 
is not incremental innovation, we are still at the point where it is new technology.” The 
development in institutional logics was not simply a response to the market changing, but much 
more complex. The OEM customers existed because of the earlier scientific market, which they 
absorbed to some degree by requesting technology from this market to be developed further for 
their own uses. However, they also expressed that this technology was to be produced cost 
efficiently. For this reason, the professional logic originating in the scientific market co-existed 
with the newer market-level logic, enforced primarily by the large OEM corporations. On the field 
level, this was a peaceful and natural co-existence, as the OEMs and the owners of Supertech were 
mature firms that had institutionalized such duality. 
 
Table 3 illustrates the differences in logics and subsequent frames as inducted from the case study: 
Institutional logics Professional logics Market/Corporation17 logics 
Locus of legitimacy Success on the early 
scientific market. Demands 
of radical innovation from 
OEM customers. Demands 
from the owning 
conglomerate to go to “the 
next level”.  
The demands of efficiency 
and standardization from 
OEMs. Demands of higher 
profits from the owning 
conglomerate. 
Cognitive frame of action Development of products and 
technology, “fear of missing 
the market”. 
Increasing efficiency and 
quality, decreasing cost and 
being faster to market.  
Cognitive Frame of 
environment 
Focusing on competing 
researchers. Hunting for “the 
next big thing”. Constant 
search for new opportunities 
for their technology. Fear of 
missing the big customer or 
being usurped by new 
technology. 
Focusing on demands from 
OEMs and board regarding 
efficiency, standardization 
and lower costs. Focusing on 
improving the firm at the 
present moment. Fear of 
being illegitimate in the eyes 
of large corporations.  
Main proponent R&D 
  
Operations 
                                                 
17 Market and Corporation logics are intertwined, because corporation logics focuses on improving the firm’s 
market position. It cannot exist without the market logic 
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Table 3 
 
Adoption phases  
Having defined the logics at play and the overall story, the paper goes into more detail on the 
phases of adoption. Surprisingly, the adoption of a new set of logics and frames initially resulted 
in a useful integration, where the firm improved. The reason seemed to be the power differences; 
one logic and its frame dominated the other.  The next phase is where the power balance changes 
and the logics reach similar levels of importance; Pache & Santos (2013a) terms this change as 
going from “low hybridity” to “high hybridity”. I call this second phase “the breaking up”. The 
last phase “One-sided adoption and counter-framing”. In this phase, the competing logics are fully 
activated by the newer group of people. This creates costly framing contests.  
 
Phase one: The useful integration 
Hiring practices have been seen as a key in infusing new logics into an organization (Battilana & 
Dorado 2010). For example, when organizations hire people with competing logics, we should 
expect conflict (Battilana & Dorado 2010).  An interesting finding in my case was that the hiring 
of employees, who came from other manufacturing firms that would fit the archetypical market 
logic, did not result in immediate conflict. According to informants from both departments, the 
hiring of skilled and experienced people actually helped integrate the two departments in the 
beginning. The COO noted that there before his arrival, that operations was not well run because 
of the limited capabilities of the previous COO, which the CEO put a bit more diplomatic by 
saying that they needed a new set of skills and mindset. Operations had not been running 
smoothly, it had many RMAs (returned merchandise authorization) and errors in the production 
line. The first goal was to fix this and produce the technology efficiently, here the skill and 
knowledge from different firms was useful in accordance with professional logics, because the 
knowledge the newcomers brought in helped fix issues such as organizing production and thereby 
increasing the impact of the individual scientists in development. There was little disagreement 
between logics at this stage; both could agree that they needed to ship products on time. There 
was little discussion as it was a shared goal to fix this immediate problem. During this time, CTO 
remarked: 
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“I have to give it to operations: we are ready to scale up big time. I would dare say that the 
challenge is more between me and sales, than it is between me and operations.”   
The firm could operate with an R & D department, who shed resources to make operations work. 
The management transformed operations from being a set of small labs into a more traditional 
factory floor. The interesting thing here was that it was not met with much resistance from R & 
D, instead they seemed to promote the idea of being more efficient and being able to cater to the 
new sets of customers. To them this part of market logics was quite compatible; they wanted to 
ship their technology to customers and they wanted to reduce errors in production. The CEO noted 
about the infusion of market/corporation logics: 
“Lean has been proclaimed to be a lot of things, but it has been very well received. The best is 
that the developers in R&D say that it is very exciting, and they want to do it too. We have 
succeeded in creating an innovation culture. But it is also an innovation culture that is ready for 
change, which has always been my dream. “ 
Despite this positive development, the old logics of research and development were left untouched 
in R&D and this logic still dominated the firm. The important driver of a fruitful cooperation at 
this point was that power relations were not really affected, it was still clearly the researcher logic 
that dominated, the market logic’s nous of efficiency and standardized quality was merely 
understood as a supplement to the research and development ethos. The CEO here sensed a future 
threat: 
“Can I school them in that it is okay to make the same thing twice? That it is okay to make money. 
To make a lot of money? You would think that that is normal procedure for a business, but not for 
these guys. You are up against religion.”  
In the first phase, a new set of logics, here market/corporate, is arriving and adopted inside the 
firm. However, because the new logic was ancillary to the old, they could fit together. The reason 
for this was that the previous frame was still dominant; thus, agents using this frame dominated 
the exchange of ideas. In other words, they took elements from the new logic, which they felt 
fitted and complemented their existing frame. The professional logic and its frame dominated and 
therefore market logics elements were fitted into that framing. The firm could focus around 
introducing new products to the OEM market, which required operations and R & D to work 
together in order to introduce products with strong quality and technology. This allowed the firm 
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to succeed in their new OEM market and launch new products. However, this further increased 
the focus on the OEM market.  
The reason why the market logic frame is weaker than the profession based has a lot to with its 
newness, it was just recently that the firm changed towards a market of large corporations, hence 
the centrality of this logic was still not settled, because the firm was still unsure on its resource 
dependency towards these new corporations, as they were just starting to transact. Moreover, the 
practices of the market logic, e.g. a lean set-up takes time and training to establish. Therefore, the 
“full force” of the market logic was not activated because this activation requires that practices 
are in place, which in turn feeds the frame by making them routine (Pache & Santos, 2013a).  
  
Phase two: The breaking up 
The growing number of OEM customers changed the game and provided different pressure on 
the firm. Their largest OEM customer even intervened in Supertech and sent out their own Lean 
consultants to drill the operations unit. This installed a belief in Lean systems in the management 
of operations, or in institutional logics lingo; it made the market logic salient to them. In 2014, 
the orders dipped slightly, which allowed them to hire their own Lean consultant and go into a 
training camp. At this point, the managers in operations acquired lean certifications and joined 
“lean academies”. This created a greater influx of market logics and its frame, which really took 
shape in 2015. R & D did not really seem to realize this and did not participate in this evolution. 
As one department head described it: 
 “R & D has probably been involved [in the lean evolution], but they have not understood what is 
going on. They are saying ‘But we used to able to go around and tinker in the corners’ and 
operations are going ‘No! You are allowed to do that anymore’, so in that way you have created 
a divide”.  
The activation of market logics in operations, the infusion of Lean, made operations into “square 
Lean regime” in the eyes of many R & D people, who did not understand the need for such 
dramatic change. This created a schism in the firm, as the R & D department did not see the 
necessity to change their practices significantly, they did not perceive an institutional gap between 
their practices and the emergence of the new logic because they framed things differently.  
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The CTO, COO and quality managers all noted the difficulty in changing that mindset and getting 
the process innovation and improvement aligned across the company. The outgoing CEO noted 
about his view on lean in the R & D department “I could not implement lean, KPIs etc. even 
though we clearly needed it.” On the opposite side of “the fence”, as employees in the R & D 
group would call operations, everyone knew lean by heart and I was told that even part-time 
operators would know the value stream map from memory. The adoption of logics was very 
different in the firm, the R & D group largely continued with their usual frame and actually opened 
up for even more development new variants, in essence the opposite direction of operations who 
strove to close down on one platform and improve it. The recruitment of people in operations and 
quality managers who had knowledge of market logics and the equivalent skill set, made market 
logics available to the firm, but the full activation of these logics took time. For this reason, the 
hiring of people with different logics did not cause immediate conflict. It took more time and 
changes in the market before the employees in operations began favoring the new logics over the 
old in a dominant way. This occurred primarily because the large OEM customers directly 
influenced practices and because of the focus of Supertech’s owners on achieving scale. The 
employees in operations argued that R&D had to agree to this scheme and that theirs was the right 
way. As one engineer in operations put it, the lasting impact was “the machine that produced the 
machine,” i.e. the most important element was the processes and how Supertech made their 
products, not the products themselves. As he emphasized, the OEMs purchased the dependency 
and efficiency of Supertech’s operation just as much as they purchased the product. In order to 
achieve lean focus, operations would disregard any input not in accordance with their vision. 
Operations became siloed and focused on solving their own problems. 
The adoption of logics began with the firm becoming aware of the need for new logics, which 
was due to the demands of the OEMs who were frustrated by not getting products on time. 
However, because the employees in R&D were heavily embedded in their profession as 
researchers, all being PhDs, they did not notice the change towards a market logic, but just a new 
arena for product development. It is important to note that the market logic was not activated 
immediately because the knowledge needed to activate it was not present in the firm immediately. 
It took time for people to adopt the new logic and it took a larger focus on OEMs to justify the 
logic as legitimate and salient in use. Because there was not an immediate impact and there were 
many other pressing issues, management did not realize the adoption of the new logic until a 
conflict emerged. A department head noted the uneven development in the firm: “Huge steps 
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sound good, but it has to be done in the right tempo. It is a management issue to maintain 
harmony. I don’t think they have succeeded.” 
The increasing dependency on OEM customers and the interests of the conglomerate allowed the 
operations unit to activate their market logics more and more in practice. However, they were 
unable to convince R&D that they should change their practices. The OEMs made diverse 
demands, including a demand for radical development. Therefore, R&D believed that their frame 
was still legitimate and important. Instead of agreeing on a shared vision of how to use resources 
for both development and process improvement, a competition between the two frames arose. The 
frames became contested, and the conflict often highlighted the contradictions between the logics 
and their frames, rather than focusing on the complements as had been done previously. Thereby, 
inadvertently, a schism between operations and R&D was created. As one informant stated, 
“Operations have been very focused on that is must be Lean and Six Sigma…and R&D 
has…probably been involved, but they have not understood what is going on.”  
The adoption resulted in what informants from both R&D and operations called a “fence” around 
operations, and the term “silo thinking” became a buzzword in the organization. Instead of a fit 
between the elements, the different logics drove conflict and mismatch. A production engineer 
noted that a discussion on splitting up operations and R&D was ongoing:  
 
“There has always been a discussion in the company that maybe it would be easier and better if 
the R&D department had their own production unit, which they could control...Because 
sometimes it can be difficult to share resources with others in the company.” 
 
In this phase, the previous frame alignment begins to come apart, as the newer logic grows in 
external presence and the individuals inside the firm have time to socialize and activate their frame 
through use. Because of the change in authority, towards more equal status, the compatibility 
began to be reduced, as individuals using the newer market logic frame started to insist on its 
importance and refused to let the older profession-based frame define the firm as a whole. 
As illustrated by the quotation above, the ability to share resources was reduced in the firm due 
to this conflict. Instead of agreeing on a joint venture of new production introduction to the OEM 
market, R&D focused on developing new technology while operations focused on low cost and 
high quality. While there had previously had been a dominant frame, the newcomers had now 
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built enough confidence in their own way of doing things, so that they could challenge the existing 
framing. The reasons for the strength of the frames being evened out was that the firm became 
more and more resource dependent on the large OEM customers, hence the market logic became 
salient and legitimate, which spilled over into the daily running of the firm. Yet, importantly it 
was nearly only those, who had previously worked in other firms, who adhered to the market logic 
and used that framing, the engineers in R&D reacted opposite by trying to strengthen their frame. 
The market was diverse and complex in its demands, it was not that the profession logic was 
replaced vis-à-vis by the market logic of the OEMs, it was absorbed into the OEMs demands, as 
these demands included both radical innovation and drastic improvements of efficiency and costs. 
Ironically, these demands were not seen as complex by the OEMs, but they had direct 
consequences on the firm.  
 
Phase 3: One-sided adoption and counter-framing 
An institutional gap was opened as operations insisted that the old logic and its frame no longer 
guided action effectively. I had a conversation with an operations manager who took me back to 
the storage unit to show me a component that caused the customers a very basic problem; they 
turned it the wrong way when installing it. This could be solved by putting a sticker on both sides 
of the component. The operations manager lamented at the inability of R & D to listen and design 
such as rudimentary solution to a simple problem that annoyed the customers. Another issue was 
a product that operations had difficulty producing, R & D considered to be finished and ready to 
produce. In an interview, the responsible R & D manager described how he had ignored project 
guidelines and followed his own intuition on what needed to be done: “I’ve marked it with gray 
(stage gate model), I have not completed it. I have chosen to say f*ck it. I have not anything to do 
with it. You can do that.” 
The understanding of a finished product was not a shared one, for the operations united a finished 
product could be produced in large quantities with consistent high quality. For R & D a product 
could be only considered finished when a couple of prototypes were completed. Operations did 
not want to take responsibility for these products, and therefore simply put them on a shelf.  Either 
R & D did not get the information, or they did not understand it. Operations did not see it as their 
responsibility that some products failed, because they had not been including in designing the 
product, hence they would simply note, that R & D had borrowed their resources to R & D 
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projects, merely using operations’ resources to develop the product did not constitute a transfer in 
the mind of operations’ members.  
In contrast, R&D thought operations was unnecessarily rigid. In order to maintain flexibility with 
regard to new customer demands and other changes, documentation and strict requirements did 
not make sense to R&D as these restricted them from their core focus of developing products that 
met specific customer wants. The neglect of documentation left operations very frustrated because 
they did not know how to produce certain products and had to ask for help from R&D, who were 
at that point focused on developing something new. As the CTO declared (and which properly 
frames this issue at its core), “Developing new products is the holy grail for R&D engineers! 
That’s simply how it is!” R&D had a very strong connection to the professional logics, in which 
developing new products that created stirs at product exhibitions and which top researchers at 
high prestige universities appreciated and which drove technology in medicine forward. There 
seemed to a certain pride attached to having such customers. This was strengthened by the 
development demands that R & D faced, it was not merely that they were resistant to change, but 
that they faced some demands for more radical innovation than mature manufacturing firms 
normally do. As the new CEO, who was a laser industry veteran, stated: “We are working on 
brand new products. We are not developing or improving on an existing product, we are looking 
at newer technologies, newer laser, newer end-users, newer applications.” On the opposite side 
was the idea that continuous improvement would be the cash machine. It was a belief in 
incremental innovation, such as making small and smart improvement like putting a sticker on 
both sides of a component. This suited to the hands-on “how do we make things as efficient as 
possible” scheme of the operations unit. The schemata relating to each logic was described to me 
as operations had a focus on the factory as their end result, therefore focusing on processes and 
efficiency, while R & D focused on the product and the short-term flow of making their products 
work.  A company that had worked well together, by their own account, at a sudden point 
experienced such difficulty in co-operation, that the management acquired a competitor with the 
idea to split them up, as the CTO noted: 
“One of the dilemmas… is how to run a track with great variance and little volume and one with 
large volume. It is two opposite mindsets… My thought is that now we can split them up at two 
sites…It has been a tremendous conflict, if I am not mistaken, we will put one unit this place and 
one the other place. Then the cultures will run (separately).” 
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The developments at Supertech are interesting when compared to studies that point to mutual 
adjustment and improvements as outcomes of competing logics (Jarzabkowski, Smets, Burke & 
Spee 2013, Smets et al. 2015). At Supertech there was little mutual adjustment, and instead an 
either-or situation developed, as exemplified by the idea of splitting up the two competing 
cultures. Crucially, what the CTO suggested almost amounted to dividing the company into two 
different sites. This was repeated by a department head in R&D, who believed that it was possible 
that operations could be outsourced in the future. This appeared in the interview data as well, 
where respondents provided a black-white picture of two clashing frames. In regard to this, the 
outgoing COO remarked:  
“Is it a manufacturing company where it’s structure, so we can produce and develop products for 
production? I think, unfortunately, we are first and foremost a development company, that’s the 
focus.“  
The emergent conflict led to the COO being let go, as he was, as one informant succinctly put it; 
“an elephant in a porcelain shop”.  As operations and the old COO strived to open the institutional 
gap and show R&D the inadequacy of their practices, they challenged their “holy grail”. This was 
one of the reasons why R&D seem to become even more professions oriented. After the COO was 
fired, operations did not directly challenge, but fenced themselves in.  
Figure 3 shows the evolution as R&D reinforced their old frame and the new market logics frame 
grew in importance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
94 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Illustration of the process of counter-framing 
 
The reason was that the adoption and activation of the newer market logic frame was one-sided; 
members of R&D, who were deeply socialized into the profession logic, did not simply surrender 
theirs, instead they tried to show that it was valuable to the new market of OEM customers. They 
could do so because it was an instance of institutional complexity, the OEM market was very 
closely connected to the pre-existing scientific market; the OEM was simply an evolution from it.  
Hence, the profession logic and frame were still important, yet the two frames became 
incompatible in the firm.  
In the last phase, both informants from all levels of both units feared that the ability to introduce 
new products, which meant transferring them from R & D and into production, had been severely 
comprised. The reason was that the previous dominant frame had given way to two different 
frames based on each group’s institutional logics. Each group’s reinforcement of their own goals 
led to the focus on new product introduction as a connected set of activities was reduced. The firm 
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focused around product development and process development, but reduced its focus on new 
product introduction because the transfer ability between units was comprised. As the frames 
reached similar levels of strength it became clear that they were in fact not as compatible as 
previously believed, but were rather incompatible and costly conflicts.  
 
Consequences of incompatible frames: evaluation and interpretation-based conflicts 
The conflicts took specific forms and affected crucial tasks that related to collaborations and 
transfers between the two different units. The transfer process between R & D and operations was 
seen as a key issue in the firm. An operations manager described the process of transferring 
products as such: “They (R&D) go all up to the fence and throw it over. Then there is somebody 
on the other side [in operations] trying to catch it.” I was present in the working group discussing 
the transfer process during the team building day for the R&D group. R&D blamed operations for 
not taking transfers seriously and they argued that operations should be measured on this process. 
Operations blamed R&D for not specifying the product specifications and not involving 
operations earlier on in the development process. Because the firm kept track of projects on their 
boards, I was able to record the date and status of projects. I noted that deadlines were being 
missed and kept being extended over longer periods of time. Evaluating the data and recording 
informant statements made it clear that new product introduction was becoming compromised.  
An example of a conflict was the transfer of one product, that operations were unable to produce, 
yet unable to mark as an error in R & D systems, who viewed the product as finished and ready 
for production. This conflict took the form of misinterpretation of tasks to be performed and by 
who, which created mistrust and hold-ups where operations simply shelving products coming 
from R&D. The employees would interpret things differently according to their frames, e.g. for 
an employee working with a science-oriented frame the goal and nature of the technology seemed 
different than to an employee who used a market-based frame. This also meant assigning 
responsibilities and evaluating each other’s roles became difficult because they did not understand 
each other very well. An example was that the operations manager sent a list of 27 requirements 
to R&D, which they did not seem to understand or was willing to use, instead, R&D worked on 
their own criteria during at their teambuilding day. 
In response, operations would refuse to take responsibility for manufacturing products that they 
had not been involved in designing. When asked about the transfer process, many informants from 
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both sides of the fence would suggest that they needed to figure out what the term “transfer” meant 
to begin with. Their lack clear evaluation criteria for who did what and who had the final say. This 
led informants to state that they simply did not know what constituted a transfer or who had the 
responsibility. This was not organized but happened ad hoc.  
 Thus, the CTO feared that they would be unable to transfer a major OEM product, which would 
have dire consequences for the firm. As the CTO remarked they stood on a burning platform; they 
simply needed to fix the transfer process in order to be fast enough to market.  
There were also interpretation-based conflicts, where the different units did not have overlapping 
frames in how to interpret different elements.  
Interpretation of product maturity and time elements especially caused problems. Where 
operations considered that products should be designed for manufacturing and completely 
produceable before transfer, R & D believed that this was impossible, the technology was too 
complex. This clearly came to fore, when informants in each unit would use comparisons to 
describe the products. A production engineer in operations compared the product to computers 
and printers, and clearly believed it merely took a bit of effort to make it efficient. On the other 
hand, an R&D engineer would compare the same product to NASA or jetfighters. This led to 
interpretation-based conflicts that especially concerned product maturity and complexity. R&D 
conceived of maturity as the point at which the product was fully developed and could be 
produced, while operations thought of a mature product as one that was functional for mass 
production with low error margins. Conversely, and somewhat conflictingly, R&D saw products 
as being so complex that they could never reach such maturity, while operations perceived a lack 
of desire on the developers’ behalf to make it so, hence the different comparisons mentioned 
above. These different and conflicting interpretations lead to ongoing conflicts when the two units 
had to transfer products and responsibility. 
Another element of conflict was time. The manager of the department that stood between R&D 
and operations described the following time issues:  
“Operations is expecting to become a high-volume factory…They are like: ‘How many should we 
do? Let’s roll and do a thousand!’ where R&D are saying: ‘take it easy, we’re not done! It’s an 
OEM customer, now you have to understand that. First, we are doing a proof of concept, then we 
sell that, then we make a pilot, then we make a reliability test, then we collect data’…It is two 
very different worlds that clash. I’m quite sorry that nothing has been done about it.” 
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These differing perceptions about product time and maturity caused misunderstandings and 
haggling between units. As a result, the ability to transfer products and carry out new product 
introductions was reduced. This was manifested in employee statements, but also physically in 
products simply left on the shelf. Time to market was increased as new products took longer to 
move through the value chain due to the different forms of conflict in transactions. This threatened 
the long-term performance of the company, which was reported in interviews and strategy 
documents. These conflicts were linked to different institutionalized logics, i.e. the original logic 
of being nested in research and being a university spin-off and the newer belief of being based in 
the market and from people who had worked in large corporations. 
Table 4 provides an overview of the conflicts. 
 
Type of conflict  Evaluation-based conflict  Interpretation-based conflict  
Examples of conflict  Operations refuse to receive new 
products from R&D as they do 
not feel involved and the 
products are” not designed for 
manufacturing”. The conflict 
circles around how contribute 
with what and who has the 
overall responsibility. 
Different understandings of the 
concept of “product maturity,” 
the complexity of the product 
and how quickly it can be 
developed.  
Results:  Products lost in the gap, i.e. left 
on the shelf. 
Time to transfer was prolonged 
and complicated. 
Table 4 Overview of conflicts 
 
In conclusion, my study shows that logics may take time to be activated as frame of actions, in 
face a competing frame may be well received in the beginning as the incumbents use it to 
accomplish their goals. However, as the frames change, and we see a frame conflict, the coherence 
and collaborations inside the organization may be compromised. Not only may agents fight over 
incompatible prescriptions, but the frames of the logics themselves make it hard to collaborate, 
because they see and evaluate things differently. In this case, it slowed down and hindered 
products to flow through the organization from one unit to another.  
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Discussion 
My study aims to provide insights into how a competing logic is adopted as the cognitive frame 
it is on the micro-level, and the fallout of letting a new frame enter the organization. The paper 
thereby provides an alternative view to the literature that focuses on organizational strategies in 
how logics enter an organization, and how managers control these logics (e.g. Pache & Santos, 
2010, Smith & Besharov, 2017, Smith & Tracey, 2016). This alternative view ties into the growing 
interest in logics as frames on the micro-level that are connected to field level characteristics (Gray 
et al. 2015, Werner & Cornelissen, 2014). Here the paper provides a study of the process how 
these frames change on the micro-level in connection with macro-level changes that occur as the 
venture changes the field it operates in. The paper here illustrates that two logics may be 
peacefully settled at the field level, as literature would suggest would happen over time (Schildt 
& Perkmann, 2017). However, the same logics may be competing inside an organization that 
starts to come in contact with a new field, such as a venture during scale-up. By entering a new 
field, as the result of scale-up, the venture may not know quite how to operate. For example, in 
my case study the venture hired a large number of people tasked with professionalizing the firm. 
Managers were pressured to do this, and they thought that this was the right way forward, but in 
the longer term this move incurred a framing contest that derailed important organizational 
processes (here the collaboration between R&D and operations) and organizational performance 
(the introduction of new products).   
Table 5 sums up the current literature, the contributions of the paper and the practical implications.  
 
Topic Current Literature Theoretical 
Contributions 
Impact for 
entrepreneurial 
ventures 
Adoption of logics in a 
firm 
Logics are demands 
that the organization 
adapt to as 
prescriptions for 
behavior. 
Adoption or avoidance 
is strategic choices 
made by managers 
(Oliver, 1991, Pache 
& Santos, 2010, Smith 
& Tracey, 2016).    
Logics are adopted in 
dyadic relation 
between insiders 
transforming practices 
on the micro-level and 
external changes. 
Critically, 
managers may 
not be able to 
foresee and 
control adoption.  
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Institutional 
Complexity 
Institutional 
Complexity is 
understood as 
incompatible 
prescriptions forced 
upon an organization 
by outsiders (e.g. 
Battilana & Dorado, 
2010, Pache & Santos, 
2013b).  
Institutional 
complexity may be 
take different forms 
across time and levels. 
For example, 
competing demands 
can be institutionalized 
in a functional way in 
markets and 
organizations (Schildt 
& Perkmann, 2017, 
Smets et al. 2015), 
however organizations 
changing markets do 
not have competing 
demands 
institutionalized, hence 
they may suffer 
conflict internally as 
individuals construct 
the demands as 
incompatible.  
Ventures may 
face what the 
market sees as 
perfectly normal 
demands, e.g. 
naturally they 
have to mix 
research and lean 
operations, but 
internally this 
may be very 
complex to 
organize. The 
ventures may 
experience 
complexity very 
differently from a 
mature 
organization in 
the field.  
Organizational conflict 
and performance 
It is well known that 
logics may cause 
tensions and conflict 
(Besharov & Smith, 
2014, Pache & Santos, 
2013a, Schildt & 
Perkmann, 2017). But 
the exact nature of the 
logics and why they 
are bad for the 
organization is not 
clear.  
Competing logics’ 
frames may cause 
costly conflicts and 
reduce organizational 
performance due to 
evaluation and 
interpretation-based 
conflicts.  
Competing logics 
are crucial 
because they 
threaten 
organizational 
tasks and 
performance. 
Competing logics 
have distinct 
material 
consequences.  
Table 5 Contributions of the paper 
 
Adoption and activation of logics 
An important question is; why adoption occurs at all. Scholars have continuously argued that 
organizations should not adopt competing logics (Oliver 1991, Pache & Santos 2010), so why did 
Supertech engage in this? This study argues that the reason new logics are adopted that they may 
be complementary to begin with. Because of their newness, they do not appear as powerful, but 
as a useful alternative to the existing logic. It is a process that makes the new logic into a 
competitor, because the people who carried the new logics did not activate them with full force 
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immediately, but rather enact them in a continuous and somewhat stealthier manner. For 
Supertech this was an iterative process that relied on market and institutional forces, e.g. the influx 
of new customers, to legitimize the activation of market logics. First, the firm hired new people, 
who reinforced the focus on the market logic in time as they activated practices fitting with the 
market logic, thereby making the internal organization of the firm move in unison with the market. 
The competing logics begin as a supplement to the existing framework, and because they are not 
fully active incumbents can extract the complementary parts of the new logic without fearing 
losing authority. As this change, the new logic becomes a fully-fledged alternative and thereby a 
competing framework for how to run the firm. The conflict that this creates is thus not immediate. 
This makes it difficult for the organization to choose the right strategic response, because the 
problem unfolds over a long period of time.  
I am building and expanding on Pache & Santos’ (2013a) framework of how logics act as frames. 
Their framework posits an interesting source of conflict. Newcomers may have logics that are 
available and accessible to them because they have been trained in these logics and have used 
them in a different organization. These logics are not active in the new organization and 
newcomers need time to activate them, for example by creating practices and structures that fit 
them. Meanwhile, incumbents keep their logics intact as they strongly identify with them. As a 
result, it may be the case that a firm has two competing sub-groups, despite the field having high 
hybridity. The adoption process illuminates how organizations may end up with two competing 
sub-groups. Figure 4 illustrates the adoption process through which these sub-groups develop.  
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Figure 4 Adoption process over the different phases 
However, my paper also finds differences to the theoretical frameworks of Besharov & Smith 
(2014) and Pache & Santos (2013a). Most importantly, compatibility changes over time; logics 
are not inherently prescribing incompatible action as Besharov & Smith (2014) suggests, instead 
the power of them as frames may make them compatible or incompatible as other literature on 
framing suggests (Foss & Weber, 2016, Weber & Mayer, 2014). Also, from the findings of this 
study it does not appear to be the case that individuals hired into a new field are necessarily 
socialized into the new logic as Pache and Santos (2013a) suggest. Rather, it seems that these 
individuals instead start to enforce their own logic.  
The process by which logics are adopted as frames on the individual level brings a new perspective 
to how logics unfold within an organization, which ties into recent theoretical work on 
institutional complexity and hybrid organizations (e.g. Besharov & Smith, 2014, Gray et al. 2015, 
Pache & Santos, 2013a). For example, my paper provides some insights into the work of Besharov 
and Smith (2014) regarding multiple logics within organizations, here my paper adds a framing 
perspective that lends some dynamism to how logics can change in compatibility, similar to others 
who have used the framing perspective to explain the dynamics, amplification and conflict in and 
between frames (Gray et al. 2015). The framing construct is useful for institutional theory because 
it ties together the macro-level with the micro-level of agents’ cognition and motivations 
(Cornelissen & Werner, 2014 p. 39-40). Using this construct, the paper can provide a more 
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dynamic view on the interplay of multiple logics as well as tying together macro-level 
developments with the framing on the micro-level, where the ties in institutional theory is 
sometimes weak (Jarvis, 2017, Schilke, 2017). Here the outlined process of adoption and 
activation sheds some light on this tie and the dynamism that makes logics compatible or 
incompatible, which contributes to existing literature on multiple logics in organizations that until 
now has not had focus on the adoption process of a new logic, but more stable complexity in form 
of organizations that are inherently hybrid such as social enterprises. However, many more 
organizations may face hybrid demands (Schildt & Perkmann, 2017), so it is necessary to 
understand more about how such demands arise, how they affect the organization and how they 
should best be managed. The process I uncover in my study provides some insight and changes 
to some degree the view on institutional complexity in organizations, because many scholars 
assume that managers can control it (e.g. Battilana & Dorado, 2010, Pache & Santos, 2013b, 
Smith & Besharov, 2017). My study highlights that this may not always be the case. Hence, more 
research that focuses on the micro-level of how organizations become hybrid is needed. by 
looking more on the micro-level.  
Nature of institutional complexity on multiple levels 
An interesting observation in my study was that the institutional complexity seemed settled at the 
field level. The larger corporations who dominated the mature field seemed to have settled the 
complexity of science and the market over time, as other studies have proposed (Smets et al. 
2015). The demands for innovation, which originates in a science logic, and profits, which 
originates in a market/corporation logic, are not very surprising or uncommon. It would be 
expected that all companies would have to address these competing logics. However, for ventures 
moving from an early market to a mature market these demands take a complex form on the micro-
level because they present inherently different frames; a scientist does not have a strong focus on 
cutting cost and an operations engineer have a hard time understanding the choices of a scientist. 
Settling this complexity would likely take time (Smets et al. 2015), but also the ability to juggle 
paradoxical frames that contain both elements (Smith & Besharov, 2017). In their study of a 
hybrid organization, a Cambodian social enterprise, Smith & Besharov (2017) showed that it is 
critical that managers of the organization possess paradoxical frames that allow them to grasp the 
complexity, manage it and use it to make the organization hybrid. My study finds that this may 
be a demand made not only of managers, but also of individual employees who might be required 
to possess paradoxical frames in order to grasp complexity.   
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Costly conflicts and reduced organizational performance. 
The interest in competing logics in the organization have often focused on settlement (Reay & 
Hinings, 2009), how they may be a source of innovation (Jay, 2013), or how they may be formed 
for strategic needs (Pache & Santos, 2013b). However, few papers have analyzed whether or how 
logics can harm an organization. Merely stating that they may cause conflict seems too vague. 
While there are certainly plenty of conflicts in organizations, which of these can hurt organizations 
with regard to core functions and which may merely be annoying but not ultimately important? 
In answer to this question I draw on different literatures that share a common focus on framing. 
One literature in particular, that of institutional logics, can illuminate where frames come from 
and how they change (e.g. Gray et al. 2015, Pache & Santos, 2013a), the other literature  on 
framing conflicts can illuminate how different frames affect how members of the organizational 
collaborate and transact (e.g. Foss & Weber, 2016). The study does find that framing contests can 
arise, here the two ends of the literature provide some important knowledge when compared and 
integrated; the institutional theory (e.g. Gray et al. 2015) can be used to analyze how frames arise 
and evolve, while the other end of the literature (Foss & Weber, 2016), can be used to analyze the 
nature and consequence of the frame conflict. These findings are important for entrepreneurial 
ventures may adopt a competing logic and frame that create internal problems. This may cause 
them to fail, as some informants feared would happen to my case company. We know little on 
how entrepreneurial ventures experience and handle the challenges of competing logics 
(Desantola & Gulati 2017). Here there is a path for future research to analyze differences in 
strategies and outcomes; why do some ventures successfully accommodate competing 
institutional demands but externally and internally, and why do some fail? Here we need much 
more future research into the scale up of entrepreneurial ventures, which is quite underdeveloped 
(Desantola & Gulati, 2017).  
Organizational performance is not just important for entrepreneurial ventures; it is likely that all 
kinds of organizations are vulnerable to competing logics and costly internal conflicts. The 
approach from this study can therefore be applied to many types of organizations that have been 
popularly studied in the literature, for example, healthcare organizations have also been shaped 
by the adoption of market logics (Reay & Hinings, 2009). Yet, we know little on how this affects 
how different logics shape performance, here I propose that they might incur costs and harm 
performance because they as different frames reduce the ability to collaborate and transact inside 
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the organization. Other studies have proposed benefits (e.g. Jay, 2013), hence my findings may 
be contingent. But future research is needed to discover which factors make logics detrimental or 
beneficial to the internal workings of the organization.  
 
Limitations and future research 
This paper strives to bring the organization “back in” to the discussion in institutional theory, as 
it has been pointed to being missing in action (Greenwood et al.,2014). There is still very little 
scholarship on the micro-level in the institutional logics literature despite its potential (Jarvis 
2017, Schilke 2017). There is not much comparative research in the institutional tradition that 
looks at entrepreneurial ventures or organizational performance, so it is difficult to draw 
comparisons. Yet, as a single case study, it may be hard to generalize results from this study toto 
all kinds of entrepreneurial ventures, there may be boundary conditions, different logics at play 
and other elements at play. Future research is therefore needed to test the applicability and 
generality of the process of adoption that I find.  
Interestingly, my findings go against the literature on cross-occupational collaborations, which 
find these collaborations to be successful (Bechky 2003, Truelove & Kellogg 2016). Regarding 
cross-occupational collaborations, Truelove and Kellogg (2016) present a completely different set 
of results, as they find successful collaboration in a similar case of a maturing engineering heavy 
firm. The reason for these contradicting findings could be that, while in Truelove and Kellogg’s 
(2016) study there is conflict between two groups, one group consists of a radical flank and a 
more moderate group, which provides ground for frame negotiation. In Bechky’s (2003) study, 
differences are situated inside the organization and are less affected by the environment. This 
could lessen the complexity as the environment and organization are more stable, hence increasing 
the chance likelihood of conflict resolution and future integration. As these studies show, conflict 
may be very contingent on how different frames unfold and how they affect the organization. This 
may be due to the different locus of frames that these studies use. In my study the frames are 
derived from a macro-level logic while in the occupational literature the cognitive frames are 
group based. Whether this is why the frames work, is up to debate and future research. 
The scale-up process of entrepreneurial ventures has received a lot of attention on the practical 
front (e.g. Gulati & Desantola, 2016, Sutton & Rao, 2014), and it is an important practical problem 
because many ventures fail to scale (Guzman & Stern, 2016). Yet, research here is short. My study 
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merely points to one type of problem rooted in the arise of complex institutional demands, this 
may only be one obstacle from one literature, surely there are many others that future research 
would find, and which would shed light on the problems that ventures face. Moreover, I do not 
point to solutions here. Future research is also needed to find out how ventures successfully deal 
with the complexity and incompatible frames that I find in my study.  
  
Conclusion 
Entrepreneurial ventures deal with complex institutional environments as they grow, yet we know 
very little on how this complexity affects the ventures (Desantola & Gulati, 2017). The 
conventional wisdom has been that these ventures should hang on and maintain existing culture 
and mindsets, in order to keep growing and be successful when entering this complex 
environment. The paper challenges whether this is possible, because the “professionalization” 
process is more complex than normally imagined. There may be an “incubation period”, where 
bringing on change agents result in the smaller, positive change that the firm wants, but these 
agents evolve and empower their framework as they activate it and the field changes, as such 
firms may get more change than they bargained for.  
Therefore, it may not be possible to maintain existing culture or mindset as it becomes contested, 
so the ventures may have to do frame negotiation to reconcile the logics and arrive at a new shared 
understanding. Moreover, competing logics may decrease performance of entrepreneurial 
ventures and perhaps cause organizational deaths, yet we know very little on how these ventures 
manage the competing logics they face. There is much more research to be done on how 
institutional logics are infused into the organization, how it changes peoples’ cognitive framings 
and how founders respond to challenge from joiners as well as the environment. 
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Chapter 4 
Getting the best of both worlds: the hybridity challenge of 
entrepreneurial ventures during scale-up 
 
 
 
Abstract 
It is commonly understood that entrepreneurial ventures have to secure legitimacy and resources 
from a complex set of stakeholders in order to grow and succeed. What is not well known is how 
two different logics blend together on the micro-level to form a coherent organization. Using a 
24-month ethnographic study of a venture, this paper seeks to improve our knowledge of how 
competing logics interact in entrepreneurial ventures. I find that the venture faces a difficult 
challenge in pursuing a hybrid strategy where the organization must blend logics. Individuals may 
not see a reason to pursue hybridity, but instead seek to avoid blending their logics because they 
are motivated to pursue practices under their current logic and see the new logic as a possible 
threat. This study reorients research towards examining dynamics and tensions when combining 
logics on the micro-level. My study points to a trade-off between seeking dualistic external 
resources and legitimacy and maintaining internal order. Thereby, this study provides a counter 
point to literature that proposes that managers can pursue a hybrid strategy and control logics by 
identifying barriers on the micro-level that derail the strategy. 
 
 
Keywords: Microinstitutionalism, institutional logics, entrepreneurial ventures, hybrid strategy 
and organizations, qualitative methods, case study 
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Introduction 
Scaling up ventures is a difficult task for managers and their organizations (Desantola & Gulati, 
2017). In order to accomplish scale-up, ventures would often have to rely on legitimacy and 
resources from multiple external sources (Almandoz, 2012, Granqvist, Grodal & Wooley, 2013, 
Pontikes, 2012, Wry, Jennings & Lounsbury, 2014). Ventures, for example, often have to be 
legitimate in both the science/technology and business realms (Fischer, Lahiri & Kotha, 2016). 
To manage this complex environment, scholars have called for organizations to be “institutional 
ambidextrous” where they cater to stakeholders who represent competing logics (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011, Jarzabkowski, Smets, Burke, Bednarek & Spee, 
2013). Pursuing such ambidexterity is a “hybrid strategy” where the venture deliberately attempts 
to engage with a complex set of stakeholders, i.e. customers, owners and investors. The venture 
here strives to use different institutional logics as strategic resources (Durand, Szostak, Jourdan 
& Thornton, 2013). A challenge to pursuing this strategy is that the venture must blend logics on 
the micro-level by having individuals hybridize the logics in their daily work (Besharov & Smith, 
2014, Jarzabkowski et al. 2013). Unfortunately, we know very little about how to make such 
hybridization work. As Besharov and Smith (2014 p. 365) state, “We do not know, for example, 
why multiple logics produce internal conflict in some organizations but become seamlessly 
blended in others.” 
This paper proposes a trade-off between seeking legitimacy from a complex set of stakeholders 
and opening the organization up for complex logics that can cause conflict and derail the hybrid 
strategy.  
Curiously, the literature has continuously argued for the possibility and success of combining such 
different identities, structures and goals that reside in competing logics, thus making organizations 
hybrid (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, Pache & Santos, 2013b, Schildt & Perkmann, 2017, Smets, 
Jarzabkowski, Burke & Spee, 2015, Smith & Besharov, 2017). The main reason is that 
organizations strategically combine logics using organizational structures and practices, e.g. 
through hiring, business missions, goals and structures (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, Pache & 
Santos, 2013b, Ocasio & Radoynovska, 2016, Ramus, Vaccaro & Brusoni, 2017, Smith & 
Besharov, 2017). In short, the literature argues that competing logics can be managed by 
implementing effective structures at the organizational and field level (Smith & Tracey, 2016 p. 
457). The problem with this view is that it disregards the fact that logics are also active on the 
micro-level and have to be settled here (Jarzabkowski et al. 2013). As the quote from Besharov 
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and Smith (2014) indicates, we lack knowledge about why logics would settle or conflict on this 
level. This knowledge gap leads to my research question: “What are the micro-level barriers to 
successfully pursuing a hybrid strategy in entrepreneurial ventures and why do they emerge?” 
The problem here is that while it is clear why organizations desire hybridity; it increases their 
chance of success, this does not translate to the agents on the floor. Why would they want to be 
hybrid and blend logics? A problem, known in management literature is that these individual 
“drives”, or motivations, may not be aligned with the overall organizational goals (Gottschlag & 
Zollo, 2007, Lindenberg & Foss, 2011).  For example, agents could conflict over not only the 
existence of competing logics, but the status of them in the mix. As most research focuses on 
organizational dynamics rather than micro (i.e. individual and group) level, we know little on this 
(Ashforth & Reingen, 2014, Jarvis, 2017, Schilke, 2017, Smith & Besharov, 2017). The paper 
therefore investigates how individuals and groups experience being subjected to a complex 
environment and how they respond. 
The paper contributes by putting the spotlight on the agents in the organization and their personal 
motivation and interests, where institutional theory has tended to disregard agency (Barley, 2008, 
Cloutier & Langley, 2013, Friedland, 2017, Jarvis, 2017, Schilke, 2017). To understand 
individuals’ connection to logics, which motivate individuals to use them I draw on self-
determination theory of motivation (Ryan & Deci, 2000). Hereby, the study contributes to the 
increasing interest in how agents are embedded into logics, not just cognitively, but emotionally 
(Fan & Zietsma, 2016, Toubiana & Zietsma, 2017). Finally, the paper discovers a trade-off to the 
literature on venture legitimacy (Fisher et al. 2016, Granqvist et al. 2013, Pontikes, 2012, Wry et 
al. 2014), by finding that seeking legitimacy and resources from complex stakeholders may be 
derailed by actions of employees on the ground, who are not motivated to pursue the strategy and 
actively seek to avoid having to work hybridly. This creates harmful conflicts that are detrimental 
to the internal organization. Hence, ventures may face a trade-off; seek complex legitimacy and 
resources and face internal turmoil or seek internal stability but lack of external recognition. Here 
the paper also contributes to the growing interest in the scaling of ventures (Desantola & Gulati, 
2017, Fisher et al. 2016).  
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Theoretical framework 
Logics and hybrid organizations 
For organizations, institutional logics can appear as governance structures and rules on how to 
behave (Rao, Monin & Durand, 2003, Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012). This is a 
conceptualization that focuses on how organizations adhere to institutional structures. On the 
micro-level, scholars tend to conceptualize them as “guidelines of action”, that is frames of action 
and related practices and structures that individuals use as tools for meaning and action (Rao et 
al. 2003, Thornton et al. 2012). Recently, there has been a strong a focus on institutional 
complexity, the permanent co-existence of multiple and competing logics and the hybrid 
organizations that manage to incorporate them (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, Greenwood et al. 2011, 
Reay & Hinings, 2009).  
Contrary to what might be expected, most studies find that it is possible to combine otherwise 
competing logics (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, Jay, 2013, Pache & Santos 2013b, Smets & 
Jarzabkowski, 2013). The reasons are multiple, but there are two main tenets of explanation. The 
first explanation is that individuals become socialized into complex environments, which over 
time makes individuals familiar and accepting of the duality present in the environment (Pache & 
Santos, 2013a). Examples of this include Smets and Jarzabkowski’s (2013) study of a merger in 
a global law firm, where logics first are seen as contradicting but then are reconstructed as 
compatible due to institutional pressures. Similarly, in their study of insurance underwriting at 
Lloyd’s, Smets et al. (2015) propose that individuals learn to “institutionalize” complexity by 
managing the paradoxical tension through finding spaces to blend logics as well as places to avoid 
a contradicting logic. For this reason, the employees at Lloyd’s have been able to resolve a long 
standing institutional complexity in their everyday practices.  
The second line of explanation focuses on organizational responses to complexity (Greenwood et 
al. 2011). Battilana and Dorado (2010), in their analysis of micro-finance, point to the importance 
of hiring and socialization. For example, by hiring recent graduates organizations have “blank 
slates” who are not socialized too much into one logic or the other. Another example found by 
Pache and Santos (2013b) in their study of social enterprises is that it is strategically beneficial 
for organizations to combine logics, hence they use hybridity as a deliberate strategy. Most of 
these studies share a common characteristic – the organizations are necessarily hybrid, there is no 
way they could function without involving competing logics (e.g. social enterprises cannot be just 
pure business, they necessarily involve a social mission). However, not only social enterprises or 
116 
 
service organizations have to contend with competing logics. Schildt and Perkmann (2017, p.139) 
propose that “each and every organization” faces competing logics, which they must synthesize 
in order continue functioning. Schildt and Perkmann (2017) argue that hybrid organizations are 
not rare, but ubiquitous, and that organizations are always moving from settlement to settlement 
of different logics. While a great deal is understood about how to sustain hybridity, as the above-
mentioned studies illustrate, we do not know much about the dynamism, where an organization 
may face the need to reach a new settlement. An in-depth understanding of how individuals on 
the floor decide that their field is hybrid and that they should now mix logics in their everyday 
practices is missing. Individuals must here relinquish some of their current logic and negotiate the 
status and nature of this hybridization. For this reason, much recent theoretical contemplation has 
been directed at the micro-level (Friedland, 2017, Jarvis, 2017, Schilke 2017, Voronov & Yorks, 
2015). Yet, as an overview the literature demonstrates, an understanding and explanation of this 
level of hybrid organizations is missing. As Cloutier and Langley (2013 p. 362) state, our 
understanding of the micro-level in the case of multiple logics is very much a black-box. 
Moreover, they argue that the current institutional logics perspective lacks the conceptual tools to 
explain such actions. In the next section I outline the reasons for this and why it is critical in order 
to understand how organizations become hybrid. 
Micro-foundations of institutional logics 
From an institutional perspective, there are generally two explanations of why individuals behave 
as they do: a socialization explanation, which is most common in neo-institutional theory (see 
Meyer, 2010 for review), and a toolkit explanation (see Swidler, 1986 and Thornton et al. 2012). 
The problem with both perspectives is that they strive to explain first-person choices through 
macro-level features, i.e. by the power of a logic in a field (Pache & Santos, 2013a), or by the 
availability of logics (McPherson & Sauder, 2013, Swidler, 2001). The socialization explanation 
makes it unimportant to study organizations at all, because if agents follow logics because of the 
logics in their field, then understanding the field allows the researcher to understand individual 
action; this perspective essentially examines macro-foundations instead of micro-foundations (see 
Jepperson & Meyer, 2011 and Meyer, 2010). Some criticize this type of analysis for seeing hybrid 
organizations as merely the result of “cultural dopes” (i.e. managers) following cultural rules 
(Jarvis, 2017). The toolkit view runs into a different problem, which is the question of the 
motivation behind an action (Vaisey, 2008, 2009). In McPherson and Sauder’s (2013) excellent 
paper on drug courts, the authors show that agents may pick logics almost at random to solve their 
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goals, i.e. they pick up unexpected logics and logics that they should not be familiar with. Here, 
the issue is that the availability of logics as a toolkit does not explain their use; why, out of many 
logics available, is one in particular used? (DiMaggio, 1997, Swidler, 2001). In essence, the pure 
toolkit approach suffers from the problem of not explaining why agents have certain goals 
(Vaisey, 2008, 2009). 
Both views have recently received strong criticism in books and papers (see Levi-Martin, 2011 
and Vaisey, 2009) for explaining individual actions from macro-level features that do not account 
for what individuals want and what they choose to do. To answer these questions, the motivation 
and emotional connections to logics must be examined, not only whether certain logics are 
available or socialized (Friedland, 2017, Levi-Martin 2003, 2011). In his influential paper on field 
theory, Levi-Martin (2003 p. 37) argues that field theorists (such as institutional theorists) should 
not dread the notion of personal motivations but embrace the fact that fields are driven by 
subjective representations of what an individual considers to be good. These personal motivations 
are often conceptualized through self-determination theory (Ryan & Deci, 2000), which is 
relevant because institutional logics are used by individuals because they find them to be of worth 
and because they are satisfied by carrying out the actions relating to a particular logic (Friedland, 
2017).  In rough terms the theory separates personal motivation into two camps: intrinsic, which 
refers to whether the individual considers a task to be enjoyable and meaningful, and extrinsic, 
which refers to whether the individual can expect a reward from completing a certain task (Ryan 
& Deci, 2000).  
To sum up the gaps in the literature, the first problem is that most research on hybridity takes an 
organizational approach, asking, “What does the organization want?” (Ashforth & Reingen, 2014, 
Smith & Besharov, 2017). There are few studies that examine the micro-level (individuals and 
groups) (Schilke, 2017), and as a result there is a lack of knowledge regarding how individuals 
and groups decide what logics should govern their organization and how (Besharov & Smith, 
2014, Pache & Santos 2013a). We know little about the motivation behind why individuals in 
organizations are motivated to pursue hybridity, even though it may well be a necessary strategy 
for organizational success and survival (Schildt & Perkmann, 2017, Wry et al. 2014). This is due 
to the lack of focus on the coalface (Barley, 2008), which means that we have little knowledge 
about what individuals may do to avoid hybridization. Here, we lack understanding about how 
individuals could “play around” with logics and fit them to their needs (Binder, 2007, Zilber, 
2016).   
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These gaps are important in my research context, because if logics clash violently in 
entrepreneurial ventures during scale-up it may severely damage the venture’s ability to cater to 
investors and customers. If we do not know what organizational and individual characteristics 
drive such conflict, then our knowledge of how to make these ventures successful will be limited.  
Case study methodology and data 
 
Research context 
This study follows an entrepreneurial venture, a young and growing firm engaging in innovative 
behavior (Desantola & Gulati, 2017). The reason for this choice was that scale-up of ventures is 
an important practical problem. While start-up quality is increasing, scale-up success is decreasing 
(Guzman & Stern, 2016). Venture scale-up is also a problem that has received little attention from 
researchers (Desantola & Gulati, 2017, McMullen & Dimov, 2013). This study was conducted in 
the photonics industry, which is a rapidly growing and fast changing technological industry that 
has nearly doubled in market size between 2011 and 2020 from 350 billion euro to 615 billion 
euro according to a 2013 industry report published by the German Federal Ministry of Education 
and Research). The photonics industry is promising because it caters to development in semi-
conductors, high-speed internet cables and bio-imaging, fields that are certain to grow in the 
future. 
Data collection 
The data was captured using an inductive case study with the goal to build theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989). I have chosen an in-depth, single case study to better understand the complex relationship 
between logics (macro-level) and individuals and their actions inside the firm (micro-level).  
The data consists of internal data, such as participant observations, interviews, internal documents, 
internal employee surveys and internal project documentation and external documents, such as 
annual reports, job postings, news reports and industry reports. I visited the company frequently 
over a two-year period, especially during the first six months of the study when I visited the 
company once a week (or more) and had my own desk in the R&D department. I relied on field 
notes as well as a case study diary and photos. The interview data consists of 37 interviews, as 
well as several informal interactions and short informal interviews, primarily conducted during 
my intensive period the first six months.  
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Data overview Qualitative data Internal archival data External archival data 
 Field work: over a 
two-year long case 
study from 2015-
2017.  
 
Interviews: 37, with 
23 informants. 
Average interview 
duration: approx. 75 
minutes. Dozens of 
informal interviews 
and encounters during 
field work.  
 
Passive observations: 
approximately 150 
hours of observations 
 
Active participant 
observation on R&D 
team building day 
(approximately 8 
hours).  
Project documents:  
2,650 files, including 
presentations, 
resumes from 
meetings, internal 
memos and budget 
changes.  
 
Employee surveys 
from 2014 and 2015, 
including 40-50 
variables with a 68-
76% response rate.  
 
Internal strategy 
documents from 
2014-2017, including 
documents and 
PowerPoints from 
internal presentations 
and meetings during 
this period. 
 
Annual reports from 
2002-2017, 1441 
pages. 
 
Job postings with 
descriptions from 
2016-2017. 
 
Firm news 2015-
2017: 128 articles. 
 
Industry reports 
from: 
German Federal 
Ministry of 
Education and 
Research 2013; 
SPIE Report 2015 
 
Table 1. Data overview 
 
Interviews were recorded when possible. As they were conducted on site some took place in noisy 
production facilities and were impossible to record, in which case recording was replaced by field 
notes. Interviews were transcribed verbatim. As I became increasingly interested in the 
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motivations behind behaviors and beliefs, I focused on exploring this area in more depth. When I 
was focused more on institutional logics and the individuals’ relationship to them and their 
subsequent actions, I adjusted the interview guide to capture these elements.  
According to grounded methods (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), I sampled informants across the 
organization both vertically as well as horizontally. A particular strength of my data is the internal 
archival data, which includes years of strategy documents, internal presentations, and all the 
documents and files relating to a five-year product development project. This data includes over 
2,500 documents and files, and due to this quantity, I relied on only a sample of this information, 
paying special attention to presentations of stage-gate meetings to analyze the collaboration and 
changes that occurred when a product changed hands between units. 
I used the narrative lens to support grounded theory coding, especially with regard to finding and 
working with some overarching themes, which grounded theory has a tendency to overlook 
(Langley, 1999). One of the first steps in my data analysis was developing a case story to function 
as the foundation of the analysis. 
Data analysis 
The goal of the data analysis was to map the relationships that arise between concepts when a firm 
pursues a hybrid strategy in an institutionally complex environment, with a particular focus on the 
interplay on the micro-level as a result hereof. I relied on grounded theory and its mode of 
grounding concepts (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, Suddaby, 2006). The first step in my data analysis 
was writing down a case story to secure a timeline and thick description of the case. I then revisited 
the data again to complement the developing story, thereby going back between my overlying 
narrative, the data and theory to secure accuracy and focus on the theoretical elements I sought to 
develop. I relied on the “Gioia methodology”, where the different sets of data were used to 
triangulate the emerging findings during constant comparison (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2012). 
The interviews were openly line coded and continuously cross-coded with each other and the 
theory in order to find relationships between themes (Gioia et al. 2012, Suddaby, 2006). As 
coherent and stable codes emerged through the grouping of the open coding, I changed the focus 
in order to theoretically saturate the codes through second and third order coding. I determined 
that I reached categorical saturation when the codes became constant across a wide sample of 
informants and data. The coding process resulted in the data structure presented in the next 
section.  
121 
 
I chose the logics approach, because informants would continuously talk about their different 
mindsets with one originating in academia and one from the industry. This theoretical stream 
emerged from the data and initial coding, not from a research question. Because this paper takes 
a micro-level approach, I rely on the micro-level conceptualization of logics, which sees these 
more as guidelines of action that agents can elaborate and “play around with” (Binder, 2007, 
Zilber, 2016).  
To capture and ground the institutional logics, I relied on Reay and Jones’ (2016) pattern matching 
method and inspiration from Pache and Santos’ (2013b) method of capturing logics on multiple 
levels. To find field-level logics, I used external archival data and especially interviews with the 
managers who described interaction with customers, investors and other stakeholders. Annual 
reports from the parent conglomerate served as an excellent representation of these stakeholders’ 
demands and the changes in them. For example, the 2008 annual report highlight the excellent 
Intellectual Property base of the case company, whereas the 2015 report called for a stronger focus 
on lean manufacturing and scalability in order to appeal to the large corporations that comprised 
the OEM customer segment. This change, from focusing on the possibility of creating new patents 
through research to capitalizing on it to make profits, was noted as a change in logics.  
To capture these logics in practice, I conducted observations and in-depth interviews with 
employees on the floor, talking about their everyday work and personal history. For example, 
informants could be seen as adhering to a professional researcher logic if they cared about 
publishing and gaining reputation in their field and to a market logic if they cared more about 
increasing the profits of the firm through streamlining and cost reduction. Looking at inter-
institutional system, such beliefs neatly fit the ideal-types of a professional/science logic and a 
market/corporate logic (Thornton et al. 2012). Observing how individuals placed themselves in 
groups and subsequently tied their behavior to their experience either in science or in corporations, 
I was able to match informants’ statements with logics as per Reay and Jones’s (2016) method. 
The data analysis went through three stages after the formulation of the case story and the overall 
framework of institutional logics. The first analysis focused on the individual responses to this 
hybrid environment where the firm was supposed to be strong in both science and business. The 
reason for this focus was that I found surprisingly little blending of logics despite the demand 
from the environment and the desire from the management for hybridity. A common theme was 
the lack of motivation to find a common ground. Informants in operations would accuse R&D of 
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“talking the talk, but not walking the walk” with regard to becoming an industrial company, while 
R&D saw operations as unnecessarily rigid. To understand these different perspectives, I adjusted 
my interview guide to focus on the resistance towards blending logics, i.e. finding common 
ground, and I therefore began to ask about each group’s and individual’s motivations to determine 
why they were not pursuing a hybrid solution.  This second phase was captured especially by in-
depth interviews where I asked about informants’ personal history and motivations. There are 
some scholars who doubt the possibility of capturing these interests of informants (e.g. 
Boxenbaum, 2014, Vaisey, 2013). While I agree with the issues they raise, I believe that there are 
some interview techniques available to enable this (Pugh, 2013), especially the use of longer and 
more in-depth interviews and spending a longer period of time in the field. Hence, I chose to re-
interview some informants over time and observe their work and changes in their practices to try 
to capture these elements. I also used survey questions from self-determination theory in my 
interviews (e.g. Amabile, Hill, Hennessey & Tighe, 1994), as a way to test the creditability of this 
theory in this context.  
The third stage of data analysis focused on how individuals and groups avoided hybridity. Here, 
I looked at how the groups implemented structures, as each group would adopt structures and 
processes from different institutional logics. For example, engineers in R&D would use the NASA 
handbook of systems engineering, which I see as using cultural elements from a science logic, 
while the operations unit would adopt in ideas and processes from larger companies nearby, such 
as lean processes and quality management systems. In addition to this, the groups would also play 
around and re-arrange structures and processes. For example, many members in R&D altered the 
lean board system that management had tried to implement, while operations members would find 
or make their own enterprise resource planning and documentation management systems.  
 In Table 2 I present the core empirical findings of this study with representative quotes. In my 
findings section, I elaborate and analyze these findings in depth. 
My data structure is inspired by the “Gioia methodology” (Gioia, Corley & Hamilton, 2012). I 
use a variation utilized by Tracey, Phillips and Jarvis (2011), which is relevant because this study 
similarly focuses on how institutional logics are used to create organizational forms as well as on 
micro-level dynamics.  
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Data Structure 
 
  
Figure 1 Data structure 
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First order categories and second order themes Representative data 
Overarching dimension: Positive framing of one’s 
own logics, but negative framing of the other 
 
 
 
1. There are two different perspectives in each 
group 
 
A. The R&D group focuses heavily on radical 
development only, disliking the business 
orientation. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Operations is heavily influenced by the 
market 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Each group knows each other’s perspective but 
does not like it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A1 . “I don’t think…that we have 
become [a leading company in 
industry], because we are super at 
business processes and operating 
efficient. That’s not why we are here. 
We are not good at that. We are not 
here either, because we are good at 
marketing… We are not top salesmen, 
who can sell whatever we can find in 
the corners. That’s not we are here 
either. Why are we here? One of the 
reasons is that we have a unique 
technology that nobody else has.”  
 (Technology Manager, R & D).   
 
 
A2. “We are still an R & D focused 
firm, we develop markets. And we will 
stay so forever because we can 
produce with a small operations team 
and a high revenue” (CEO 1) 
 
B1. ”What matters to me is that we 
have customer first focus, it does not 
matter what kind of product it is, but 
we to have an organization that is 
capable of that.” (COO) 
 
B2. “Customers buy is not just the 
“box”, it is our ability to produce 
high quality. It is the “machine that 
makes the machine”. (Operations 
engineer) 
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C. R&D dislikes, or fears, the business 
orientation, seeing it as dangerous. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D. Operations mistrusts the R&D view and fears it 
will harm the company 
 
C1. ”Can I train R&D into believing 
that it is okay to make the same thing 
over and over again? That it is okay 
to make money?. That it is okay to 
make a lot of money? That it is really 
good to make the same thing for two 
customers and demand payment from 
both places? You would think that is 
very normal business, but not for 
these people. Here it is religion 
[against making money and for 
research]” (CEO 1) 
 
 
C2. “If we become a ‘nuts and bolts’ 
factory, then I think a lot of people 
won’t be here. That’s not how we see 
ourselves.” (Department head, Fiber 
Management)  
 
D1. “How do we qualify our products, 
when we do not have a standard 
operating procedure If I wanted to do 
a cost reduction, I need to have it. But 
R&D does not have the will. Yeah, 
they are saying they want processes. 
But they don’t want to follow them 
and they want to write their own. So is 
it ‘talk the talk, but not walk the 
walk’? (COO) 
 
D2.  “To put it bluntly, then 
everything we do is processes. From 
the time we meet in till we go home. 
So, to look at a process-diagram and 
go “yeah, that is not really about me, 
I do not have to do it”. That’s a sign 
that something is wrong with the 
culture… We lack a culture, where 
people are aware that they are 
carrying out processes.” (Production 
development engineer) 
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Overarching dimension: individuals are motivated 
by practices tied to each logic, hence they have 
negative feelings about the other 
 
 
3. Intrinsic motivation tied to goals in each logic 
 
E. The scientists are motivated by development 
and freedom, not short term solutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F.  Production engineers are more motivated 
towards order and structure 
 
 
 
 
 
4. Extrinsic motivation facilitated by each logic 
 
 
G. The scientists are motivated by getting 
attention from their peers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H. Production engineers are motivated by salary 
and customer satisfaction 
 
 
 
 
 
E1. “What I find motivating is to 
create a brand-new product, that you 
develop a new product.” (R&D 
technology lead) 
 
E2. “I am saying that we are driven 
100% by customers. It is a pure 
commercial pull. And that is okay. But 
it must be limited in extent. We have a 
hard time driving things that are more 
than one year into the future. I think 
we are much too shortsighted about 
what we have to win in the next 
quarter.” (Technology manager, 
R&D) 
 
F1. “What I am motivated about is 
building the ‘machine that makes the 
machine,’ not just the box [the 
product].” (Operations engineer) 
 
F2. “I don’t have a schedule, I don’t 
have a sheet with the standard terms 
of delivery. I want to say…It’s just not 
a ‘nice’ freedom to have!” 
(Production lead)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
G1. The scientists care about winning 
awards, such as the Prism Award, the 
“photonics Oscar,” and receiving 
recognition from their peers 
(observation and data from press 
releases) 
 
G2. The scientists in R&D work with 
academics, publish in peer-reviewed 
journals and maintain Google Scholar 
profiles (observation) 
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 H1. “For the production personnel 
salary matters more than it does for 
the R&D personnel. They hunger for 
the ‘calling’ and are probably not as 
interested in the salary, whereas the 
salary means more for the operations 
employees.” (Production lead) 
 
H2. “When we look at it from a raw 
operations perspective, we can be 
pretty proud of how things have to 
look. It is an exhibition window to 
orient ourselves and to show future 
customers. But it does not help that 
we are throwing in R&D goods left 
and right completely randomly, 
because then are back at the lab stage 
again.” (Operations manager) 
Overarching dimension: avoiding hybridity by 
strengthening existing logic and changing 
structures and processes to avoid the other 
 
5. Importing practices from each logic 
 
 
 
I. Scientists in R&D adopt processes from the 
science field, e.g. NASA 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
J.  Production engineers adopt processes from 
corporations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I1. Engineers use the NASA Systems 
Engineering Handbook (internal 
archival data) 
 
I2.  “I ran into a concept called 
systems engineering. That’s a while 
ago now. I have been following that 
some time now. I think I is very 
interesting. It is like a systematic way 
of doing product development, where 
you make sure that things happen in 
the right way at the right time.” 
(Engineer, R&D)  
 
J1. Operations relies on a lean system 
from a large, nearby pharmaceutical 
company (observation at firm and at 
the pharmaceutical company) 
 
J2. “For the business it is life or death 
to create standards, quality and 
performance measurements. We need 
to create the same product over and 
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6. Each group resists the practices of and being 
affected by the other group 
 
 
 
 
 
K. R&D changes structure and neglects 
processes that do not fit with their logic 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
L.  Operations “fence” themselves in to protect 
their structure and processes  
 
over again…But it is a huge challenge 
to get that “quality mindset”. We in 
quality live and die for quality, but 
this mindset is lacking overall in the 
company. It is a huge challenge” 
(Quality manager  2).” 
 
 
 
 
K1. “So I started to put my own stamp 
on what I have been told to do, 
because in the meantime the quality 
manager left the company, so now it is 
up to what do I feel make sense?” 
(R&D project manager) 
 
K2. R&D personnel changes the 
boards to fit individual needs, 
eventually they abandon the use of 
them (Observation) 
 
L1. “So the operations manager runs 
it and he is doing a good job. But he is 
putting up a fence, which is debatable, 
but management has okay’ed it. So if 
you come and meddle with the fence, 
then he [operations manager] comes 
and growls at you. Inside his own 
square his is operating really well. It 
just does not fit in.” (Department 
head, manufacturing engineering)   
 
 
L2. “R&D does not want to become 
an industrial firm, they do not want 
processes and structures...They are 
not efficient. They come in here and 
misuse our resources because they do 
not plan ahead.” (Department head, 
operations).” 
Table 2 Representative quotes for data structure 
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Case narrative: pursuing a hybrid strategy at Supertech 
It has become widely known that entrepreneurial ventures must pursue legitimacy and resources 
externally in order to survive and thrive (Fisher et al. 2016, Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). When 
ventures change phases, such as changing from conception to commercialization or from 
commercialization to a growth phase, they face multiple logics that may be competing (Fisher et 
al. 2016). Here, ventures must balance being legitimate in science, which indicates future value, 
with legitimacy as a corporation, which indicates that they can produce value in the present (Fisher 
et al. 2016). In order to do this, ventures must pursue a hybrid strategy. 
My case serves as a revelatory case that illustrates the internal mechanisms of pursuing a hybrid 
strategy, where most other literature looks at the external mechanisms (Almandoz, 2012, 
Granqvist et al. 2013, Wry et al. 2014). Furthermore, it sheds light on the issues that ventures face 
when scaling up, which have thus far lacked empirical backing (Desantola & Gulati, 2017, 
McMullen & Dimov, 2013), despite being a systemic problem for many ventures (Guzman & 
Stern, 2016).  
The company, which I refer to using the pseudonym “Supertech,”18 began as a research and 
development site for promising technology in the specific area of photonics. Its products were 
based on technology spun out of basic university research and it was funded by a large 
conglomerate, dubbed “BIG” in this study. Supertech’s main customers were researchers who 
sought out the newest technology in order to develop new technical knowledge and find novel 
applications for optical laser technology. As the different associated R&D firms began to develop 
photonics technologies that had wider applications, they were merged into one firm, “BIG 
Supertech.” The conglomerate BIG invested heavily in the firm’s IP base to build the future 
potential of the firm. In order to be profitable, Supertech moved from pure product development, 
focused on an innovative market of researchers, towards an original equipment manufacturer 
(OEM) market of large corporations, taking the applied science to a mainstream market. This 
change was the result of Supertech’s ability to devise dominant technologies and products, for 
which researchers then found applications, which aroused the interest of OEMs. The OEMs liked 
the technology and its possible applications, yet demanded that the technology become more 
profitable and that Supertech become better at making a standardized product. In the span of 18 
                                                 
18 Both the owning conglomerate and the company are anonymized to protect the informants’ privacy.  
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years, from 1999-2017, the firm changed and grew from 5 engineers tinkering with lasers to 
include 300 people. In the research phase (2015-2017), the firm expanded from 120 to 300 people.  
In 2015 the firm changed its strategy to be more commercialization driven, reflected in the change 
in CEOs. 
The COO described this change as follows:  
“We went from being a small company to a bigger one and this just changes expectations from 
your customers. Before, you could produce some crap, but scientific customers liked it, because 
it just was what they needed – for the next 20 hours they needed it—to…Now, we need to ship a 
product that clears 10,000 hours and has field service capability and has a built in self-test. This 
is where we are going.” 
In contrast, the new CEO stated: 
“We are working on brand new products. We are not developing or improving on an existing 
product, we are looking at newer technologies, newer laser, newer end-users, newer applications. 
That’s what we are good at. So, it’s very different from manufacturing something that has been 
on the market for 20 years.” 
A sense of this hybrid strategy was apparent in the annual reports, internal strategy documents 
and external data. For example, documents showed that the firm sought both basic research 
support from the European Union, while also targeting their technology and products to large 
corporations. In the 2017 annual report the firm was shown to have passed 50 million euro revenue 
mark, and the report discussed how it would improve its lean operations to continue to expand on 
this revenue growth. However, the report also noted that fundamental R&D was necessary to 
avoid being replaced by newer technology. This meant that the firm had to internally blend these 
ideas – the lean operations required that R&D develop products for manufacturing, while R&D 
depended on operations being able to translate their ideas into products quickly. 
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Findings 
Previous research has suggested that in institutionally complex organizations individuals are 
likely to be socialized into both logics present within the firm, thereby making competing logics 
functional in daily work (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, Pache & Santos, 2013a, Smets & 
Jarzabskowski 2013). However, my data does not support this. In contrast, my findings suggest 
that individuals can devise frames that keep them embedded in their “core” logic. Moreover, my 
data reveals that this is due to a motivation to maintain an existing logic, which individuals and 
groups achieve by manipulating structures and practices. 
 
Positive framing of one’s own logics, but negative framing of the other 
Framing in R&D 
The core element of the R&D frame was that they were in business because of science and because 
they had developed leading technology through their own brilliance and co-creation with superior 
lead users at prestigious universities. The former CEO explained: ”We went to MIT, to Caltech, 
to Stanford, to Harvard and to Germany. To all the leading universities. They are always on the 
look-out for the newest new stuff…Then you get them to adopt the technology and play around 
with it, for us this is a ‘bingo’. They are like rock stars, they have followers.”  
When the firm started to pursue a hybrid strategy where commercialization plays a big role, they 
were aware of it. But they were afraid that the commercialization would take over and Supertech 
would become a “nuts and bolts factory” as one described. Another informant in R&D 
emphasized that Supertech’s core competency simply was not lean manufacturing or sales, it was 
their R&D competency, and that this needed to be reiterated as their core competency. He feared 
that commercialization would result in short term development would lead the firm into trouble 
in the future.  
When faced with the demand to secure the commercialization R&D would emphasize the role of 
science and development to secure a commercial product, because commercialization included 
radical development as well, and not just involved in producing more of the same product. The 
department head of R&D explained: 
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“Right here and now, one of the great focus points in R&D is to go from having a product that 
has a lifespan and overall reliability that is appropriate for scientific customers to one that is 
good for industrial customers who want to use it 24/7. That's really a lot of research and 
development because we know we have components that simply do not have the lifetime to do it 
[be used at this intensity]…There we clearly have something that is fundamentally difficult to 
develop.” 
Many R&D personnel did not like the business orientation of commercialization. The previous 
CEO had had serious problems in convincing the R&D employees that selling the same thing 
twice was positive and that it was acceptable to make money this way. While R&D accepted that 
they had to have efficient operations, they did not really want to be involved in this process. As 
one operations managers stated, it was very difficult to get people to transfer from R&D to 
operations, but very easy to get individuals to transfer in the other direction. Another employee in 
operations noted: “When you are talking manufacturing, you need people with that gene. You 
cannot just take R&D engineers and put them down here. They will grow unhappy, and fast. It is 
not what they want.” 
R&D held the framing that their logic of science and its practice of very loosely organized work 
was necessary in order to be agile and develop radical new technology that would secure 
commercialization through being frontrunning technologies. For this reason, R&D feared that 
being too business oriented would turn the firm into a commodity producer, which they found 
both dull and negative in the long term. The issue was simply not how R&D saw themselves, as 
one informant in R&D said. This negative framing of corporation and market logics did lead to 
some employees in R&D simply leaving for smaller firms in order to continue working on basic 
research in a kind of “garage” set-up. 
Framing in operations 
As a part of their scale-up, Supertech had hired a lot of new people, especially in operations, who 
were tasked with transforming the firm from a couple of research sites to a professional, high tech 
manufacturing company. These people were brought because the large OEM customers demanded 
more standardized quality and delivery, one going so far to send out its own team of lean 
consultants to drill the company. This led the previous CEO to hire new people into operations 
from mostly larger and more mature firms with the mandate to drive Supertech in this direction.  
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These newcomers brought with them a different mindset. To them, improving processes and 
making the firm into an efficient machine was the key objective. The managers of the operations 
unit had a clear focus on reducing waste, which took the shape of lean artifacts such as QDIP 
(Quality, Delivery, Inventory and Productivity) boards, Kanban boards and Kaizen. Their core 
goal was making Supertech into a true industrial firm. The COO explained why this was 
important: 
“The few engineers I have are used to continuous improvement. It might be a waste sometimes, 
but the value they create is huge and the savings in the future will be significant…this is how we 
bring the money home” 
Making continuous improvements and getting processes formalized and clarified was seen as 
crucial. A production engineer used a metaphor of having “a small train set,” where R&D, 
engineering and operations were each one cart that needed to be “fitted together and pulled in the 
same direction.” 
Employees in operations seemed quite proud of their achievements, as one operations manager 
demonstrated when he discussed the lay-out of the production floor of which he had been the chief 
designer. Before, there had been a set of labs spread across the floor, but he had torn them down 
and created a fluent layout, that had lasted several years, which was rare. Because of this, he and 
others were a bit afraid of R&D throwing their projects into the mix and threatening the order 
operations had built. When asked whether this was necessary, the department head argued that he 
had vast experience working with R&D people in other firms, and here they would be much better 
at getting things “right,” as he called it. He felt that R&D often misused operations’ resources and 
hindered their work towards becoming an industrial firm. An example of this was described by an 
operations engineer who faced the problem of an R&D engineer creating his own serial number 
and traceability system, despite operations already having an existing system. The operations 
engineer lamented that this pushed them back to “A1” in the excel sheet, and continued: “If he 
had had his own business completely isolated from everything else then he would have designed 
a brilliant product and a brilliant system.” Of course, the problem was that the engineer did not 
have his own isolated business. 
The framing that operations worked with was that they would develop Supertech into a high-tech 
industrial firm and create an extremely efficient operations system – and that they would have 
more authority. They did not appreciate the “Gyro Gearloose” type R&D employees hindering 
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their achievement of this goal. When these goals did not materialize they were quite disappointed 
and saddened. The COO stated: 
“Is it a manufacturing company where there is structure, so we can produce and develop products 
for production? I think, unfortunately, we are first and foremost a development company, that’s 
the focus.” 
They did not feel that R&D understood the need for streamlining because R&D personnel all 
came from the “same basement at the technical university” as a production engineer stated. 
In conclusion, I saw two very different framings of the logics. Not only did employees adhere to 
one logic, they framed their own logic as positive and necessary for the business and the other as 
a threat that could jeopardize the company, either by pushing it into a commodity trap or by 
keeping it from the efficient enough and legitimate in the eyes of the large OEM corporations who 
demanded order. Interestingly, as my quotes illustrate, each group was aware of the logic of the 
other. They were as such socialized into each logic because both logics were so present as 
practices that each group performed, R&D using scientific practices in their labs and in operations 
using lean practices. Yet, each group developed a positive and negative frame of each logic, which 
is unexpected as seen from a socialization perspective and given they were very close in their 
everyday activities. This first finding is surprising given that scholars have continuously shown 
that socialization and tight integration should result in agreement and the finding of common 
ground (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, Bechky, 2003, Smets & Jarzabkowski, 2013, Smets et al. 
2015, Truelove & Kellogg, 2016). However, I find a dualistic framing in which individuals 
actively frame the logic they currently hold as more positive and the other in a negative light 
Hence we see a more active framing than simply a top-down one. Table 4 illustrates the 
differences in framing.  
Predominant logic Professional/Science logics Market/Corporate logics 
Logics of action Develop new technology 
through agile, creative and 
circular practices with little 
formalization. 
Refine and improve practices 
so that they can be repeated 
many times to reduce costs 
and increase consistent 
quality. 
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Overall goal  Improve the firm’s position 
by developing the best 
technology. 
 
Increase the firm’s profits 
and size by making it more 
efficient and commercial.  
Threat and fear Do not miss the market and 
be overtaken by new 
technology. 
 
Fear of not being ahead and 
respected in one’s field.  
 
Do not appear incompetent in 
the eyes of large OEM 
customers.   
 
Fear of not being seen as 
legitimate by corporations; 
being embarrassed by low 
quality products. 
 
Desired organizational 
identity 
A technology firm in a 
commercial industry. 
 
Development is the “holy 
grail.” 
 
A manufacturing firm in a 
high-tech industry. 
 
Developing efficient 
processes is the way forward.  
 
Framing of the other logic The market/corporation logic 
is too shortsighted and 
focuses on profits in the next 
quarter rather than long-term 
development. The practices 
tied to it, e.g. lean, 
formalization and 
bureaucracy are unwanted 
because they hinder agile 
development. The logic and 
its practices could harm the 
company.  
The science logic and its 
loose way of working with 
little formalization is simply 
not tenable for an industrial 
firm. How do we sell to large 
corporations if we do not 
have an ISO certificate or 
have processes that they 
recognize? The science logic 
and its practices therefore 
threaten the firm and the goal 
of transforming it into a 
commercial, industrial player.  
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Locus of legitimacy and 
origin of ideas on how to run 
the firm 
Academia. The basic research 
conducted is the reason large 
corporations are now 
interested in Supertech. The 
technology is still in need of 
radical development. To do 
this, the firm must be 
organized to facilitate 
research.  
 
Corporations. The firm needs 
to copy practices from other 
corporations to be perceived 
as legitimate in their eyes.  
Main proponent R&D  Operations 
Table 4. The different perspectives 
 
Motivations to frame a logic 
A crucial element was that informants were aware of both perspectives. As one employee in R&D 
stated: “I know the perspective that I have is just one of many, and it is not necessarily the right 
one. I know that the employees in operations have a different one, and that is naturally a 
challenge.” 
In addition, there were a few individuals who “crossed over” from one logic to another. For 
example, one production engineer who now saw himself as a “hardcore lean guy” had begun his 
career as an associate professor in lasers and atomic physics. This was interesting because they 
were clearly aware of each logic and the practices, so it was not because they were cognitively 
embedded and could not see beyond “taken-for-granted” ways of doing things. Individuals had 
the discretion to choose, for example they could cross over from science to corporation or vice 
versa but they rarely choose to do so. This led me focus on how individuals attached themselves 
to their chosen logic. 
Intrinsic motivation for each group 
Many informants in R&D discussed technology and making it “succeed,” a sentiment that the 
CTO also expressed: “What turns people on… is when you have designed something and are 
seeing it succeed. There is a great professional satisfaction in that.”  
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To the researchers in R&D the technology was the “holy grail” (as described by the CTO), and 
some of the R&D personnel had spent decades working on this technology. One leading employee 
in R&D described his story: he had been interested in photonics technology since he was a student, 
and he joined the company because he believed that Supertech could take photonics further than 
the university. He was part of the company because he wanted to make it succeed, to test how far 
photonics could go. Innovation in photonics was a shared passion or calling for many of the 
engineers in R&D. A binding motivation was to develop something from the ground up, which 
for them meant that the company “had to as flexible as possible,” and growing and becoming 
rigid was “a dangerous development,” as stated by a manager in R&D. Rather than a blind focus 
on being researchers, the R&D employees knew and recognized that the firm would have to be 
more commercial in the future, but this was a development that they feared. Seen in the statement 
of one informant who claimed: “if we become a nuts and bolt factory, then I think a lot of people 
won’t be here.” Making the same thing over and over again was not seen as particularly 
interesting, what drove the R&D employees was creating new things.  
Developing wholly new products required great freedom, which I saw evidence of in how 
employees would organize their work. R&D took a very lenient approach with nearly no structure, 
as they believed structure limited their development abilities and restricted the “agility” needed 
to respond to market changes. Therefore, changing their way of working was a very sensitive 
subject. As one quality manager noted when discussing his work towards such change: 
“We need to change the structure a little. Not that we need a ‘new world,’ but we must change to 
some degree. But this is a big change in R&D’s mindset, when you have been used to being able 
to work freely, almost without control. And it is a challenge. It is not just to hit people over the 
head, then it will not work.” 
On the opposite side, employees in operations had a quite different intrinsic motivation. As one 
project manager described it, he wanted to build the machine (the factory) that built the machine 
(the product). This meant a focus on making people work together as a unit and increasing 
efficiency and reducing waste. In an interview, the operations manager described how he played 
an important role in setting the team and designing the set-up; he used a football analogy to cast 
himself as the coach who made others play better together. He was very proud that his set-up had 
been very long lasting and successful. For operations, the ability to professionalize the firm gave 
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them great “self-respect.” They also liked more structure and clear processes. As one informant 
stated:  
“I like clear boxes rather than undefined ones…I feel much better with clear guidelines and 
structures than I do with riding with my gut-feeling.” 
This clearly separated the operations unit from R&D employees who detested structures and 
documentation. Operations employees wanted these structures and did not like too much freedom, 
as this could lead to a situation where they would have to devise a solution that would be 
scrutinized by customers. Motivations were very much tied to the practices associated with each 
logic, i.e. the freer and more “innovative” way of working in science versus the more rigid 
practices from corporation logic, for example lean operations. The individuals had personal 
preferences regarding these practices, which explained some of their framing of the logics. 
Extrinsic motivation for each group 
I noted that many scientists in R&D still published in journals and maintained a Google Scholar 
profile. This led me to believe that they still desired recognition from their peers, rather than just 
generating firm profits. They also were keen on the Prism Award, which is seen as the “Oscar” in 
the photonics industry. Winning such awards for scientific prowess was important to them, as 
gaining recognition from peers is important in a professional logic and improves one’s status. 
However, corporation/market logics do not recognize these achievements unless they can be 
linked to profits. Hence, it would be unlikely that the scientists in R&D would get the such 
recognition from a corporate/market perspective. Similarly, R&D members did not particularly 
care about the salary and bonus perspective nested in a corporate logic.  
In contrast, operations would receive more recognition from the corporation logic, as reducing 
waste and increasing profits is something that is important to the company and a market-oriented 
perspective. These individuals also cared more about salaries and bonuses, because did not feel 
they had a “scientific calling.” One production engineer stated that salary mattered more to him 
and noted about R&D: “A bonus just appears in the bank account. It does not say what for. What 
R&D wants is public recognition”.  
Operations wanted recognition for their skills as managers, who could run a business. Not getting 
this recognition from R&D, annoyed employees in operations. As the COO stated: 
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“There is a lack of recognition from a group of people who have not worked in other areas or 
other industries. My group of people have worked in different industries and in different 
companies, so we understand more.” 
In other words, operations wanted recognition from a corporation logic, where being able to 
manage, reduce waste and increase efficiency are key skills. Not getting that because of a 
pervading science logic left them baffled, as they had been used to working under a corporate 
logic. Therefore, they worked towards introducing the corporation logic, where their skills would 
receive higher approval.  
This had consequences for the structures of the firm, because individuals and groups had the 
discretion and power to manipulate these structures and could disrupt the firm from the bottom 
up. R&D focused on keeping their loose structures and ridding themselves of documentation and 
processes, which they deemed to hinder them. In contrast, operations “boxed” themselves in even 
more with strict processes and structures. For the firm, this created serious problems because the 
technology was so complex that if R&D worked flexibly and agilely without formal structures or 
documentation, the problems associated with the products meant that operations could not and 
would not produce them. Because the firm was very tightly knit together and pursued a hybrid 
strategy, this posed serious problems. 
Disruption of the organization bottom up: building fences and manipulating structures 
Initially, Supertech shifted towards a more corporate logic internally as a response to larger OEM 
customers. This caused the firm to change its practices, expressed as follows by the former CEO:  
“We have invested heavily in lean. Lean training for everyone. And not operations lean, company 
lean…We have had every single employee back in school…It is an investment that kicks a’s.” 
The new COO was tasked with orchestrating this shift towards a corporate/market logic, and the 
CEO stated that he would get the “hot potato” of changing the organization, including R&D. In 
the beginning R&D did buy into some elements, such as a resource board, that prioritized 
resources for projects, hence formalizing this structure. R&D chose to do this primarily because 
it helped them improve their development projects and allowed them to measure personal impact 
as projects were given more measurements. Such complementary elements of the market logic, 
here the formalization of resources and more control over projects, were not resisted. As a result, 
the first period between 2013-2015 was quite successful, and informants reported that relations 
between operations and R&D improved. The successful transitioning from a scientific market to 
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an OEM market, however, put operations under more and more pressure to deliver and maintain 
their successful transformation of the firm from a research site to a manufacturing company. They 
therefore insisted that R&D formalize more of their practices and provide more assistance in 
making operations successful – in other words that R&D relinquish of some of their science logic.  
In 2016, the COO described the change he was going to make across the firm despite the likely 
R&D resistance: 
“The R&D people don’t want to. They say they do not have time for things [that are] not R&D. 
But you cannot do that as a company. You have to look at quality control and to secure quality, 
that is the way to secure the future, we need that customer attention, but at the moment we do not 
have it.” 
Operations believed that the formal structures they had implemented in their unit, in the form of 
Kanban and QDIP boards and strict value stream maps, should be extended to R&D as well, and 
that R&D should use more of their resources to make these structures successful. However, 
employees in the R&D department did not want to implement such structures, as they did not 
want to become a “nuts and bolts factory instead they loosened up and played around with the 
formal structures and practices. For example, the boards that had been designed for them by a 
consultant, and which were supposed to bring the company together in one flow, were disrupted 
and played around with by employees who fitted them to their needs. Each employee in R&D 
would create his own way of using the board, hence disrupting the idea of order. In contrast, the 
boards in operations were completely rigid in structure and “design-locked.” Here, I observed 
clear differences in each unit’s practices and beliefs: one flexible and “agile,” one very structured 
and rigid.  
I noticed that the projects and information on the boards in operations and R&D were not the 
same, they simply did not communicate the same way. Instead of aligning themselves with the 
development in operations, R&D focused on development projects that they called “must-win.” 
These projects were important to the entire company, but R&D took hold of them and made 
them their own, which they could as they were in charge of developing and designing them. As 
a result, other employees felt excluded because they did not know what was going on. The COO 
was not pleased and accused the R&D unit for running their own show: 
“I generally think you should move away from the R&D driven projects, to a more holistic 
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where we have R&D, finance and operations together. If we are going to make a business then 
we must work together, we cannot do it on our own.” 
R&D did not buy into the overall organizational goal of “company lean” as set out by the CEO in 
the beginning. The reasons for this were quite clear, and one project manager in R&D described 
in his thoughts on these practices: 
“I haven’t done it. I have chosen to say ‘f’ck it,’ I do not have anything to do with it, so I have 
chosen to do my own thing, you can do that.” 
The resistance from R&D was one of the factors that led to the CEO to being let go in mid-2015. 
The resistance was so strong that the CEO stated:  
 
“I could not implement lean [in the R&D department] … even though we clearly needed it.” 
Simply put, the implementation of lean was not seen as legitimate in the eyes of R&D. Similarly, 
the idea that the firm should be completely agile was considered illegitimate by the operations 
department, who refused to be influenced by this logic. This created a schism in the firm where 
each group fenced themselves in. Struggles set in as operations strived to create their own 
structures while R&D simultaneously tried to carve out a piece on the operations floor where they 
could tinker. The operations management saw this as an offensive move and as R&D trying to 
build their own structure.  
Another illustration of this schism and resulting conflict was seen when I participated in a team 
building day that was arranged by and only for the R&D department. Here they discussed some 
of the problems in the firm, for example how collaborations between the units should work, which 
structures and rules should be in place and so forth. However, since no-one from operations was 
present this discussion naturally got a bit one-sided. They also listed their ideas for improvement 
and sent them to the rest of the company, including the COO who was not pleased: “You don’t 
see resource utilization [among R&D], you don’t see effectivization. Perhaps they are not 
pressured in their own projects…I want to mention this [note] from the Engineering Day (the 
event for the R&D department), their suggestions were regular events, monthly social 
activities…”   
Clearly, having one unit of the firm doing their own teambuilding while discussion company-wide 
issues, signaled a division between units. 
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However, the COO’s worries were not to end, on the contrary the new CEO was a photonics 
industry veteran, technology focused and oriented towards inorganic growth, not fixing internal 
problems. A half year after the CEO succession the COO was let go and not replaced. Without a 
leader in the management team, the operations group “fenced” themselves in according to 
themselves and to the R&D department. This was very strange and dysfunctional given the strong 
interdependencies, for example the splicing of the crucial laser fibers was very finely balanced 
and this dysfunctional behavior meant that it was nearly a daily question of whether this splicing 
would work.  Therefore, delicate re-engineering was often needed. The schism did not help that 
as collaboration suffered, as one operations manager described it: 
“They (R&D) all go up to the fence [the operations unit] and throw it [the product] over. Then 
there is somebody on the other side [in operations] trying to catch it.” 
In order to protect themselves from having R&D products that would hamper their streamlining, 
operations would reject ownership of products coming in. Operations could do so because of the 
external demands, for example they had to secure an ISO certificate to continue selling to the 
OEM customers, hence operations could use external demands as legitimacy and avoid the 
demands that R&D demanded of them, despite R&D being the now reinvigorated after the CEO 
succession. Despite, this organizational change in power, operations could point to external 
stakeholders to bolster their control over products in their unit, for example by enforcing ISO 
demands. These demands provided legitimacy and resources to build their own practices and 
structures, for example by using ISO systems and other quality management systems from other 
firms, operations could legitimately enforce their way of working as a legitimate approach; it was 
what customers demanded and what more mature firms would do.  
At this point around 2016, power had shifted back to R&D, with the firing of the COO. However, 
interestingly the focus on the OEM market was even stronger, yet the science logics were 
maintained inside the firm as R&D solidified their authority with a management team more in 
their favor. It was now operations seeking to close of their premises in order to make sure that 
their practices were not to compromised. Members of operations, and especially their manager, 
would secure a lean strategy, which was accepted by management as it was part of the overall 
strategy. On the other side, R&D would argue that development was necessary to be legitimate in 
high tech. R&D would argue that there was a fundamental need for radical development. A 
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technology manager explained their strategy: “We put out something unique, where the 
salesperson can say on parameter X, our product is so much better. And nobody else can do that.”  
R&D would therefore rely on flexibility and their own personal ingenuity individually and in 
small groups to solve this difficult development. Here they would graft in ideas from other 
research heavy organizations, for example systems engineering from the NASA handbook was 
used as one way of organizing their work. On the other hand, the operations unit would tighten 
up their structures and processes, because they needed to keep the ISO certificate that legitimized 
them as suppliers to large corporations. They would therefore graft in ideas from the large 
corporations, e.g. the lean management and product life cycle systems. The outcome of the hybrid 
strategy was that each group could pursue one end of it; R&D would focus on scientific 
development and avoid corporation logics, while operations would focus on corporate logic items 
such as lean and ISO certificates. The logics were not really blended, instead a struggle between 
sub-groups emerged and kept smoldering. This led the CTO to comment that they stood on a 
“burning platform” from which they had to jump. He stated: “We have to set up a culture that is 
organized and that works. Otherwise, it is the same as closing shop”.   
Figure 2 illustrates the relations between the concepts. Management exposed the firm to 
complexity by pursuing a hybrid strategy. The interplay between different motivations, framings 
and the resulting use of practices and structures resulted in barriers to the hybrid strategy, that 
created barriers to the hybrid strategy and forced the firm unto a burning platform. Interestingly, 
there was calls for management to do more and convince the employees to follow the strategy.  
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Figure 2 Relationship between concepts and creation of barrier 
Management recognized this issue, as the CTO remarked: 
“There is a job to be done here; how do we align the management’s wishes with the employees? 
It has something to do with strategy and vision… how do we make that trickle down, so that they 
can see themselves in it?” 
In the end of my study, the incompatibility was still there with employees having learned to live 
with the daily frustration. Instead of resolving it and reaching a settlement that would pave the 
way for a shared culture, employees instead dug down and tried to avoid contact. It seemed as if 
the incompatibility was institutionalized in the firm, which could threaten the future success of 
the firm. 
Discussion 
My study points to a weakness in the current discussion on organizations pursuing a hybrid 
strategy, namely the role of individuals on the floor. Much of the current literature have focused 
on the role of management, who is seen as the key players in making the organization hybrid 
through strategizing and use of formal structures and processes (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, Ramus 
et al. 2017, Smith & Besharov, 2017). Here whether the individuals on the floor wants to become 
hybrid has not received that much focus. Here my study points to the bottom-up process is 
important in pursuing a hybrid strategy, as individuals may actively try to avoid blending their 
logics. 
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Here my shows a opposite tendency than previous studies, not only may employees on the ground 
skillfully pick-up and combine logics, they may also deliberately manipulate structures, rules and 
goals to avoid hybrid practices. Employees may fight over which logic should rule the 
organization or defend their own turf by “fencing themselves in”. This undermines the 
organization’s pursuit of a hybrid strategy where employees blend their logics. Thereby, the paper 
opens up for some new discussions in the literature on institutional complexity and hybrid 
organizations. 
Active framing by individuals.  
This study suggests that individuals make up their own minds in regard to institutional complexity 
as they can frame logics in a positive or negative way. Interestingly, they were aware of both 
logics, so the reason for choosing a logic was not cognitive embeddedness, inability of seeing 
beyond existing prescriptions. If it was so, the informants would not know of both perspectives 
and I would not have seen individuals “crossing over” from one logic to another, which was the 
case in a few examples. The socialization explanation where individuals are socially constructed 
by the logic and come to take it for granted as argued by Meyer (2010) and Pache & Santos 
(2013a) therefore does not seem fitting, because even when the different people were socialized 
into a new logic, e.g. R&D members into the corporation logic or operations members into the 
science logic, by their daily interaction and work in a complex field, they did not become 
identified with that logic as suggested (Pache & Santos, 2013a), instead they created positive and 
negative frames of each. Whereas most institutional theory sees individuals as passive receivers 
of frames from logics (Pache & Santos, 2013a, Thornton et al. 2012), in my study they do not act 
as passive receivers but actively frame different logics themselves more akin to how framing 
works in social movement theory (Benford & Snow, 2000). Here the individuals play an active 
role in creating collective frames of action, they are not just receiving information from 
institutional logics.  In my study, each group created such frames of action, for example R&D 
created the frame of having to be agile and do radical development. In their frame, they condensed 
the market into one certain aspect. Operations did a similar thing by condensing their perspective 
to focus on continuous improvement. This is interesting because current literature presumes that 
individuals will become familiar with both logics as they spend time in a hybrid field or 
organization (Pache & Santos, 2013a).  
This finding that individuals were aware of both perspectives but created a positive and negative 
frame of each changes the role of individuals; they may not be “cultural dopes”, who act as if 
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guided by a higher power (Garfinkel, 1964, Jarvis, 2017). Instead, they may quite actively frame 
their logic in a more positive light. For example, in my study each unit just focused on their own 
logic, even though they knew that both logics were in play, they just framed their own as the most 
important one. Here my study provides some insights into the literature that looks on how 
individuals may resist external pressure (e.g. Schilke, 2017) and how organizations face issues 
when both logics are internally represented (e.g. Pache & Santos, 2010).  
Motivation to use logics 
The reasons behind the activity and agency here were that agent were motivated by the practices 
that each logic contained. R&D employees by the freedom and focus on developing new ideas 
granted to them by the science logic. Employees in operations were motivated by the ability to set 
up a well-oiled team, a “machine that made the machine”, which the practices in the corporation 
logic facilitated. In contrast, employees in R&D were much more motivated by the personal 
reputation gained in a science logic, such as posting on Google Scholar, and they did not really 
care about money or promotions, which the operations employees did care about.  
My study connects to the ideas of scholars who have focused increasingly on attachment and 
emotions in relation to institutional logics (e.g. Fan & Zietsma, 2016, Toubiana & Zietsma, 
2017). However, because this is a new development, the reasons why individuals become 
emotionally invested in logics is not well understood. Here looking at how individuals are 
motivated by practices residing in an institutional logic may provide some explanation why they 
care about it and why they would change or on the other hand frame another logic in a negative 
light. My study uses the term of motivations instead of emotions. A reason for choosing self-
determination theory is that is has the advantage of being clearer compared to the concept of 
“emotions”19. Secondly, the use of motivations allows for a more bottom-up approach, where 
individuals use logics to serve their interest, rather than being “socially conditioned” by 
emotions (Toubiana & Zietsma, 2018, p.429). Thereby, the term fits better with the notion of 
embedded agency as supposed to the strong socialization program currently residing in the use 
of emotions.  
 
                                                 
19 To illustrate this, Wikipedia defines emotion as “any conscious experience” and continues; “there is no consensus 
on a definition”. This naturally limits the use ability and clarity of using the term. We all know what emotions 
mean, but apparently, we also know them to mean different things.  
147 
 
My study also points out some weaknesses in the toolkit approach to institutional logics, because 
it is unlikely that individuals can switch completely free as some studies suggest (e.g. McPherson 
& Sauder, 2013). Swidler (2008, p. 615) admits that toolkits are not just exchangeable according 
to situation, but that individuals grow attached to a toolkit as they learn to use it and deploy, which 
takes time and skill to learn.  
Another point in the literature that my study contributes to is how individuals may reframe 
changes in the field. Here Kyratsis, Atun, Phillips, Tracey & George (2017) produces some 
interesting insights into how physicians reframed their work in response to a change in 
institutional logics.  Kyratsis et al. (2017) show that the physicians related the new institutional 
logic to enduring values in medicine, which could be interpreted as they tried to find intrinsic 
motivation to the new logic and its practices. Another strategy was trying to find new narrative 
that made the physicians respectable in the eyes of others and improve their changes of positive 
external validation, which is related to extrinsic motivation. The reason why self-determination 
theory is useful is that it is an individual level theory, meaning researchers can focus intensely on 
the first-person explanations for action, which is needed in order to explain social action (Levi-
Martin, 2011). Moreover, while the focus on professional identity can be extremely useful, 
especially in the case where the professional identity is deeply historical and tied to an institution, 
such as medicine. But in other cases, the professional identities may not that powerful as a well-
known and historical profession as medicine is. Professions without these well-known historical 
characteristics probably have unclear and less powerful professional identities because the social 
group is not clear and membership of it does not produce the same recognition as medicine.  
Here motivation theory could be used instead to understand the attachment and use of logics from 
an individual point of view. In a relevant finding to this, Kyratsis et al. (2017) shows a reframing 
of identity and what individuals find motivating, the informants in their study simply changed 
their views according to a greater societal change. This indicates that motivation to use logics is 
not set in stone but may be changed through identity work (Kyratsis et al. 2017, Tracey, 2016).  
The use of formal structures, practices and processes.  
Formal structures play an important role in securing that competing logics function and even 
becomes a driver of organizational innovation and performance. For example, Smith & Besharov 
(2017) show that formal structures, such as goals and roles associated with business missions, 
play an important role as “guardrails” in securing hybridity. However, an important finding of this 
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study is that leaders may not possess full discretion over such structures, indeed agents on the 
floor may use logics as external demands, for example the need to get certifications or approval, 
to affect the structures, thereby bypassing the managers. This took place over a couple of stages. 
First the old CEO tried to implement “company lean” and hired a new COO to do so, and they did 
have some success in implementing a set of new structures across the organization. However, the 
buy in differed vastly, operations bought in and continued to expand in this line of thought. But 
employees in R&D did “what made sense to them” and tampered with the idea of the organization 
being lean, therefore changing or avoiding this strategy altogether. Later on, in the cycle as the 
power changed, it was operations’ turn to “fence themselves in” and lock down on their way of 
doing things, leaving the firm in dynamic tension. This finding is important because it challenges 
the notion that organizations become hybrid by the action of managers and organizational 
structures (Battilana & Dorado, 2010, Pache & Santos 2013b, Ramus et al. 2017, Smith & 
Besharov, 2017). My study suggests that in certain organizations, the individuals on the floor can 
themselves come up with ways the company should run and be put together based on institutional 
logics. Here they graft in ideas from other organizations and institutions, for example they take 
models and structures from other organizations or from academia. Thereby, several cultures can 
arise in the organization as members and groups use external material to build the organizational 
structures and cultures. Moreover, employees may also re-arrange old ones to fit external changes, 
retooling their skills and beliefs to a new context, here exemplified by the R&D group who kept 
arguing for radical innovation, hence legitimizing loose and agile structures instead of more 
corporation like ones. Here we see that logics are not solely top-down but can be used by 
individuals bottom-up as they play around and re-arrange them (Binder 2007, Zilber, 2016). 
Therefore, simply setting out an organizational identity top-down by using formal structures such 
as hiring, organizational strategy, business missions as seen in other studies (Battilana & Dorado, 
2010, Pache & Santos, 2013b, Smith & Besharov, 2017), may be not be enough. The reason my 
study points to, is that this does not affect the motivations that agents have to frame logics and 
use them in practice, hence when left own their own when the managers focus on the external 
stakeholders, they may disrupt the strategy by changing structures and processes to fit what they 
want from the logics, which may exclude blending them. Here my study provides some new 
insights into hybridity and reorients the literature away from leaders of the organization to the 
common members of the organization.   
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Pursuing hybrid strategies in ventures 
It is widely acknowledged that ventures can benefit from pursuing legitimacy from multiple, and 
sometimes complex stakeholders (Almandoz, 2012, Desantola & Gulati, 2017).  Several studies 
have focused on the outside presentation of these ventures. For example, Wry et al. (2014)  find 
that being hybrid increases access to resources. However, a problem not focused on is the internal 
organization, where these ventures may face the problem that they do not have a bureaucracy with 
strong managerial control and they have employees with highly specialized skills who require 
(and demand) freedom to act. Hence, a clear problem is what these employees want and how you 
manage them. There is a lack of focus on the micro-foundations of hybridity, because most studies 
examine how organizations gain legitimacy from the outside, not as much on how individuals and 
groups respond to competing logics (Besharov & Smith, 2014, Pache & Santos, 2013a). In my 
study the managers spend a lot of time engaging with external stakeholders and they set up a 
hybrid strategy of pursuing science and business simultaneously, hence according to other studies 
suggesting such action (e.g. Pache & Santos, 2013a, Smith & Besharov, 2017), they did several 
things right, yet a functional hybrid organization did not emerge as a result. An important 
difference here is the various levels; as Jarzabkowski et al. (2013) points out, being a successful 
hybrid, what they call “institutional ambidexterous”, relies on the micro-level, the daily 
interaction of people and their work, not just the managers. Just focusing on the top level limits 
the literature on hybrid organizations to a narrow focus on managers and the organizational level, 
similarly to the focus that has limited the ambidexterity literature (Jarzabkowski et al. 2013).  
Here my study points to a problem or a trade-off when pursuing hybrid strategies, which is that 
individuals in the firm can draw on either one with legitimacy and they can derail the hybrid 
strategy internally. This leaves an important task of making employees buy in to the hybrid 
strategy – in other words face a task of persuasion and reframing. Here some studies have looked 
into persuasion and making people change their logics through frame and identity work (Tracey, 
2016). Here there could also be links to the resistance to change and change management 
literature. I am not drawing on that, because the individuals were not the typical routine seeking 
and rigid individuals described in this literature (see Oreg, 2003), but openminded, creative and 
forward-looking individuals with PhDs. They were not resistant to change, they loved trying new 
things in their work, that they feared a change was not necessarily to do with change itself, but 
the nature of it. However, others may find use for it, studying resistance to change and change 
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management may still prove fruitful in future research, similar to the recent draw on paradox 
literature (e.g. Smith & Besharov, 2017). 
Table 4 summarizes the contributions and new questions that this paper provides to the body of 
existing literature 
 
Phenomenon Current Research Contributions New Questions 
Individual frame 
logics positively and 
negatively 
Current research 
proposes that either 
individuals are 
socialized into logics 
and come to follow 
them as taken-for-
granted rules (Meyer, 
2010, Pache & 
Santos, 2013a). 
Or, they can pick 
them up as tools at 
almost random with 
no cost (McPherson 
& Sauder, 2013).  
 
This phenomenon 
goes against some of 
the literature, because 
it gives the 
individuals more 
agency and a 
different kind of 
framing. Instead of 
being passive 
recipients, 
individuals may 
actively frame 
complex logics, they 
can be fully aware of 
several logics, yet 
focus one that they 
care most about as 
positive and the other 
as negative. 
In my study, I point 
to motivation as the 
key driver in why 
individuals see 
logics as they do. 
But others may have 
other explanations 
such as identifying 
with the logic they 
are embedded in 
(Fan & Zietsma, 
2016). This view 
needs some 
clarification: is this 
identification 
conscious or 
unconscious 
(Voronov &Yorks, 
2015)?  
Emotions and 
motivations to use 
logics, blending them 
or change them. 
Individuals may 
create a new logic if 
they have positive 
social emotions 
towards each other 
(Fan & Zietsma, 
2016). They may also 
be very emotionally 
invested in logics 
(Toubiana & 
Zietsma, 2017, 
Voronov & Yorks, 
2015).  
I find that agents may 
have motivations to 
use logics. This take 
the form of intrinsic 
motivation, the 
individuals find joy 
in fulfilling practices 
relating to a logic, 
and extrinsic 
motivation, the 
individuals gain from 
external sources, such 
as professional 
recognition or 
managerial power 
and salary.  
How do 
organizations 
convince employees 
to change their 
stripes or create a 
joint motivation to 
follow a hybrid 
strategy or mission? 
 
Can they change this 
through socialization 
or perhaps through 
symbolic 
management (Glaser 
et al. 2016)? 
Formation of hybrid 
organizations,  
Organizations can 
become hybrid by 
managerial or 
 Individuals may 
“copy culture” from 
organizations and 
There may be 
different outcomes 
of hybrid fields and 
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organizational 
decisions of hiring, 
socialization and use 
of strategic decisions 
and business 
missions. 
Managers control the 
formation. (Battilana 
& Dorado, 2010, 
Pache & Santos, 
Ramus et al. 2017, 
2013b, Smith & 
Besharov, 2017) 
institutions, as here 
with science and 
industry. But they 
may also play around 
and change structures 
to avoid hybrid 
practices, for 
example by using 
formal structures, 
here rules and 
processes, to avoid 
blends.  
Thereby, two 
competing logics can 
co-exist, however in 
a dysfunctional 
manner that threatens 
the idea behind the 
organization’s hybrid 
strategy.   
 
organizations. In 
some individuals 
may align 
themselves and in 
others conflict.  
If it is not enough for 
managers to set out a 
hybrid strategy, but 
they also must 
persuade their 
employees to blend 
logics in everyday 
practices, then how 
is that 
accomplished? 
Perhaps future 
research needs to 
look at identity work 
and reframing as 
methods of 
persuasion (Kyratsis 
et al. 2017, Tracey, 
2016)? 
Table 6 Contributions and new directions for future research 
 
Conclusion 
This paper was motivated by the lack of understanding of the barriers that entrepreneurial ventures 
face when they scale up. (Desantola & Gulati, 2017). Here I point to a challenge in using and 
securing a hybridity strategy, which may increase firm success in regard to external stakeholders 
(Granqvist et al. 2013, Wry et al. 2014), but which may cause internal conflict that it quite durable.  
What my study shows is a dualism between an imprinted research logic and a change towards 
formalization to follow the rising demand of the market logic. While most research has focused 
on organizational level responses to these demands, they have had less focus on the crucial 
element of how the organization becomes functional in everyday practices between employees. 
This is a problem, because the entrepreneurial organization is flat and reliant on autonomous, 
skilled individuals who may not be alike in their motivation and interests. A reliance that may be 
a crucial point in securing hybridity, as these individuals can disrupt and change the structures to 
152 
 
their wants often utilizing the external demands as lever. My study is naturally limited as a single 
case study into one type of organization, much more research is needed to understand the 
challenges such organizations face and the contemplations of individuals, which we are only 
beginning to understand (Jarvis, 2017, Schilke, 2017). As our economies grow more stagnant, 
with fewer entrepreneurial ventures succeed in becoming large companies that disrupt and 
improve the status quo, research looking in how venture scale and the barriers here is crucial 
(Desantola & Gulati, 2017, Guzman & Stern, 2016).  
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Chapter 5 
Seeing institutional change as a strategic opportunity: linking 
managerial decisions with institutional logics 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Organizational responses to institutional change are a matter of growing concern. Yet, little is 
known on whether the decision makers, who conjure up the responses, differ in how they frame 
the change. This paper argues that decision makers differ in how they come to frame institutional 
change. Managers may see the change as a strategic opportunity, leading them into action, or as 
more undesirable, hence making them less active. This difference is dependent on whether the 
organization has previously had a central and embedded position in a field or been on the 
periphery on the field and/or bridging to other fields. Because different positions in a field creates 
different representational and information processing schemata, decision makers frame change 
differently. This framing shapes the responses that decision makers conjure up. This paper 
contributes to this field of study by framing responses to organizational change in a micro-
foundational model that integrates institutional logics and managerial decision-making. I end the 
paper with a discussion about the possibility of integrating perspectives from institutional logics 
with the behavioral theory of the firm using this model.  
Keywords: Decision Making, Embeddedness, Institutional Logics, Cognitive Schemata and 
Frames, Micro-foundations of responses to institutional change 
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Introduction 
Organizations, and the actors inhabiting them, are not atoms separated from society, but are 
entities embedded in a myriad of relationships, institutions and historical contingencies. 
Therefore, the organization’s environment is riddled with turmoil, with rapid institutional changes 
and logics that compete as relations, markets, institutions and societies change (Greenwood, 
Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta & Lounsbury, 2011). Institutional change is therefore crucial for the 
organization to respond to and a core phenomenon for researchers to understand, yet the concept 
is burdened with a bewildering set of conflicting theoretical and empirical claims (Micelotta, 
Lounsbury & Greenwood, 2017). This paper attempts to contribute to the discussion around 
institutional change by linking an institutional logics perspective of decision making to that of the 
cognitive processes of managers, broadly known as the behavioral theory of the firm (BTF). This 
is achieved by constructing a theory of how institutional logics affect decision makers in the firm 
and then discussing how this can be incorporated into a micro-foundational model of 
organizational responses to institutional change. 
One practical observation is that some organizations respond better to change than others. 
Interestingly, some firms are adept at navigating the tides of cultural, political and societal 
changes, which enables their success. For example, Nike and Adidas seem to have fruitfully 
embraced CSR in combination with profit seeking, Nike by employing a closed loop supply chain 
and Adidas by creating their Parley shoes, which are made from ocean waste in collaboration with 
strong anti-corporation NGOs such as Sea Shepherd. Meanwhile, H&M is consistently in the 
media for transgressing norms when they burn unused clothes or commit perceived racial 
offenses. Nike, Adidas and H&M are quite similar corporations, i.e. they produce similar products 
(including running shoes and clothes), and they produce them in the same places. So why do they 
differ in their ability to use institutional change and complexity as a strategic opportunity? 
There are generally two dominant schools of thought explaining this difference. The first is that 
Nike and Adidas had managers with higher cognitive capabilities (Peteraf & Helfat 2015). These 
managers are thought to have had “superior mental associative processes”, which made them 
capable of seeing new opportunities (Gavetti 2012, Helfat & Peteraf 2015 p. 833). This first view 
is clearly the most dominant research stream in the strategic management literature (Powell, 
Lovallo & Fox 2011). There is, however, a second explanation, which is that CSR is a result of 
institutionalized behavior (Bromley & Meyer 2015, DiMaggio & Powell 1983). In new 
institutionalism, it is argued that organizations must be congruent with their institutional 
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environment, which is often defined as cultural-cognitive norms and values that shape taken-for-
granted beliefs. As such, CSR is simply a rationalized myth that organizations adhere to without 
deliberation (Bromley & Meyer 2015). This second view is the most popular in organizational 
sociology (Meyer 2010).  
However, in order to understand decision-making, we must take both structures and cognitive 
limitations and proclivities into account (Ocasio, 1997, Simon, 1947). While Simon (1947) argued 
for the consideration of both structures and cognitive limitations, it is fair to say that cognitive 
limitations have received the most attention (Powell, Lovallo & Fox, 2011). Although the concept 
of bounded rationality has become ubiquitous, this idea is quite limited because it only refers to 
cognitive limitations, whereas a full understanding of psychological micro-foundations also 
would include structural effects (Powell et al. 2011, Simon 1947). Here, we see a core problem in 
the literature, namely that the notion of agency and structures are often not connected (Micelotta 
et al. 2017). Separating into two distinct views, leaves them bare in explaining real life events, 
because the cognitive theory becomes under-socialized with little explanatory power besides 
internal cognitive processes (Granovetter, 1985) while the other becomes over-socialized with an 
unrealistic appreciation of structure and too little agency (Heugens & Landers, 2009). 
This paper therefore seeks to link structural and agentic explanations of organizational responses 
to institutional change. The core idea is to apply micro-foundations of institutional logics to the 
concept of organizational responses (Thornton, Ocasio & Lounsbury, 2012), and by doing so bring 
institutional logics into contact with the BTF in order to connect the two blades of Simon’s scissor 
of decision-making: structures, such as institutional logics, and cognitive proclivities, such as 
cognitive limitations and biases. The core argument of this paper states that when individuals 
work in an organization that is central and embedded in a field, they learn a firm set of 
representational and information processing schemata (what Swidler (1986, 2008) calls a cultural 
toolkit) of how to act in that field. Because these schemata are preconscious (what Kahneman 
(2003) popularized as “system 1” thinking), people rely on them automatically. Therefore, despite 
that a field changes in the institutional logics governing it, individuals may not embrace change 
because the change does not fit with their schemata, which are resistant to change despite having 
reached the end of their usefulness (Seo & Creed, 2002). Here, I argue that working in different 
organizations creates different contingencies regarding how individuals frame and respond to 
institutional change. Members in embedded and central organizations have invested in a specific 
set of schemata that is resistant to change. Hence, the managers in these organizations are more 
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inclined to try to maintain the status quo. Organizations on the periphery or who bridge fields 
filter a more diverse set of schemata down to their members. These members are therefore less 
cognitively constrained and more unencumbered (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006, Sherer, 2017). 
Therefore, these members are more likely to see change as a strategic opportunity and thereby 
embrace the change with an offensive response.  
By building this argument I demonstrate a stronger and clearer link between institutions and their 
logics at the macro-level and in individual decision-making. By making this link more salient, I 
can connect the sociological perspective, which dominates the institutional logics perspective, 
with the psychological perspective, which prevails in the BTF. Thereby, I strive to link the macro-
determinants that institutional logics focuses on with the micro-determinants that the BTF focuses 
on. This improves our understanding of organizational responses to institutional change because 
it enables the connection of macro-determinants, such as the characteristics of institutional fields, 
with micro-determinants, such as the characteristics of individuals and groups, resulting in a more 
holistic explanation. 
The paper with theoretical review, where I outline the institutional logics perspective on culture 
and cognition and organizational responses to institutional change. I then compare this perspective 
with the BTF to demonstrate how the two perspectives can complement each other in 
understanding organizational responses to institutional change. I then build my arguments and 
propositions on how organizations and decision makers differ in their responses to institutional 
change. Finally, I offer a discussion on what this entails for the micro-foundations of institutional 
logics. This discussion circles around the proposed idea that institutional logics and BTF could 
mutually benefit one another, especially in the manner they explore managerial framings and 
decision-making (Gavetti, Greve Levinthal & Ocasio 2012). This paper contributes to the 
discussion on organizational responses to institutional change. I argue that we need both 
approaches to take into consideration how individuals are shaped by macro-level logics as well as 
individual characteristics and group-level processes, which is necessary to create a more holistic 
understanding of organizational responses to institutional change. 
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Theoretical review 
 
The institutional logics perspective on cognition 
The crux of the institutional logics perspective (ILP) is avoiding both an under-socialized view, 
where individuals are not shaped in anyway by structural elements, as well as an over-socialized 
view, where individuals are fully formed by structural elements. Instead, ILP promotes an 
embedded agency approach, where agents can form own action but are given tools and some 
constraint by their environment (Granovetter, 1985, Swidler, 1986, Thornton et al. 2012). This 
perspective argues that we have purposeful agents, but also agents who cannot perform 
meaningful actions without drawing on cultural phenomena. Not only is this perspective gaining 
traction in sociology (Cerulo, 2010, DiMaggio, 1997, Vaisey, 2008), it is also coming to the 
attention of scholars in strategy, who need behavioral foundations that are not solely reduced to 
the cognitive level and include structural explanations (Powell et al. 2011). 
   
Thornton et al. (2012 p.80) propose a view of human behavior from an institutional logics 
perspective, stating: “Our model of human behavior views social actors as embedded in social, 
cultural, and political structures and as guided by cognitively bounded identities and goals.” This 
statement forms the concept of bounded intentionality (Thornton et al. 2012). Intentionality is 
defined as the power of our minds to be about something, to represent something and stand for 
something (Searle 1995). As such, the term “bounded intentionality” refers to a constraint on the 
ability to imagine state of affairs in a particular way.  
 
Agents are embedded in social networks and structures. This helps agents form schemata, as they 
use (and sometimes) internalize norms, values, beliefs and practices. These systems help them 
form social identities, goals and schemata that can be seen as a cultural toolkit (Swidler 1986, 
Thornton et al. 2012). These toolkits both enable and limit action depending on their availability 
and presence to individuals. For example, Swidler (1986) argues that youth living in a slum have 
a hard time using middle class values to achieve higher social status because these values are 
simply not available. This is not a question of social programming, but rather simply being unable 
to act according to norms because these norms are unknown. This is an example of bounded 
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intentionality, where the subject is unable to imagine a different way of doing things and therefore 
cannot escape the current state of affairs.  
 
It may be difficult to escape the slum, not because one is socialized into accepting the slum as a 
given and there therefore do not consider alternatives, an argument made by socialization 
proponents (e.g. Meyer, 2010), but because someone growing up in the slum does not have the 
toolkit to succeed outside. This does not mean that someone is determined to stay in the slum, 
but that it takes create effort to obtain a different cultural toolkit and break out. Here bounded 
intentionality is somewhat similar to how Kahneman (2003) view bounded rationality; we are 
bounded to certain beliefs and cognitive processing mechanisms, but we can escape them giving 
time, space and training.  
 
Bounded intentionality takes the form of internalized dispositions consisting of schemata that 
prioritize particular stimuli and disregard other, thereby shaping perceptions, beliefs and actions 
(DiMaggio 1997). Schemata are both representations of knowledge and information processing 
mechanisms (DiMaggio 1997). The array of schemata the individual has at his or her disposal is 
what bounds the individual’s cognitive and practical understanding of the world. As Scott (2003 
p.885) states, “Their meaning is mediated by frames: ‘interpretive schema that simplifies and 
condenses the ‘world out there’ by punctuating and encoding objects, situations, events, 
experiences, and sequences of action.” The framing resulting from schemata is important because 
it may stop people from seeing the ability to change institutions or recognizing that institutions 
are changing (Scott 2003, Werner & Cornelissen 2014). It is important to note that this framing is 
cognitive and is a proclivity for seeing things in a certain way; it is not an active framing through 
the use of metaphors. Framing can be dynamic or stable based on two determinants; cognitive 
personality traits, such as openness, makes one more open to re-framing things, and second, an 
individual’s position in a field or network also matters.  
When people are embedded in a network and social position, they internalize the schemata of that 
field, i.e., they gain a “feel of the game”. People draw on this “feel” to define and solve tasks 
without using conscious and deliberate cognition (DiMaggio 1997). Therefore, the form of 
institutional cognition is often defined by this automatic drawing on built-up schemata in the form 
of habits or routines. This “feel” is difficult to divorce from bias, as it solidified into norms that 
are taken for granted (Scott 2003).  
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Schemata is similar to Kahneman-Tversky’s research program on heuristics and biases, except 
the schemata is the result of structures, not lack of cognitive processing power. Schemata can 
therefore be seen as representing the structural blade of Simon’s scissor, whereas heuristics and 
biases represent the cognitive side. Schemata and heuristics/biases work the same way – they limit 
how much information we take in, how we use it and thereby how we think and act (DiMaggio 
1997, Kahneman 2003). Ocasio (1997) and later Thornton et al. (2012) build on Simon’s theory 
by proposing that institutional logics are the structures that shape our attention, which in turn 
shapes our decision-making and actions. In this way, institutional logics create a consistency of 
action, values and norms, which the individual internalizes as schemata that then create frames 
and enforce the consistency of logics (Thornton et al. 2012). The stability of frames is dependent 
their previous success, and when agents have successfully learned to navigate their environment, 
they are disinclined to abandon their frames (Swidler 2008). 
Organizations play a role in how institutional logics shape attention and schemata. Organizations 
filter logics to their members (Pache & Santos 2013a). In comparison to an organization that is 
more de-coupled from institutional logic, members in organizations that are tightly bound to a 
logic develop schemata that are more consistent with that logic. In line with this, Greenwood and 
Suddaby (2006) propose that organizations that bridge fields are more likely to decouple 
themselves from existing prescriptions and instead act as entrepreneurs who create their own 
prescriptions.  
To sum up my short walkthrough of the current view of cognition in institutional logics is the idea 
that Thornton et al. (2012) put forward to explain the relation between macro-level structures and 
individual behavior: logics shape attention. The degree to which logics shape attention is 
dependent on organizational position. The shaping of attention affects decision-making and 
action, which in turn produces schemata. Sets of schemata becomes frames, hence logics become 
guidelines of micro-level. Strong schemata take the shape of taken-for-granted ways of thinking 
about things (Scott, 2003, Werner & Cornelissen, 2014), which reduces an individual’s ability to 
recognize and legitimize new opportunities (Gavetti, 2012). 
The view on organizational responses to institutional change 
In her seminal paper, Oliver (1991) argued that organizations not only act isomorphic to 
institutional processes but also choose strategic responses to institutional processes and change. 
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Here the notions are that organizations may acquiesce, compromise, avoid or manipulate the 
demands from the environment20 (Oliver 1991, Pache & Santos, 2010). 
Recently, this school of thought has focused on one particular form of change – the rise of a 
competing logic that makes a field institutionally complex (Pache & Santos, 2010, Raiijmakers, 
Vermeulen, Meeus & Zietsma,  2015). Institutional change is a complex research area with 
multiple definitions (Micelotta et al. 2017). This paper does not focus on the nature of change, but 
rather examines the macro-to-micro link (instead of the macro-to-macro link) in the case of 
change. Therefore, this paper works with a simple definition of institutional change and defines 
this as occurring when a dominant logic is either replaced (displacement) or challenged by a new 
logic (institutional complexity).  
Contingencies explored in the literature on organizational responses to date have focused on the 
power of outside pressure, such as whether regulative pressure is strong or weak, whether the field 
is united or fragmented, whether pressure is diffuse or clear or whether the organization is in a 
central position where it is caught in the “spotlight” of external stakeholders (Greenwood et al. 
2011, Raaijmakers et al. 2015). These contingencies are inherently institutionalist in the way that 
the mechanisms of individual and organizational action are determined by institutional forces 
(Agassi 1975). This excludes micro-foundational aspects that focus on individuals as the basis for 
social explanations (Abell, Felin & Foss 2014, Coleman 1990, Felin, Foss & Ployhart 2015, Levi-
Martin, 2011, Thornton et al. 2012). The problem with the current view that institutional pressures 
and advantages drive responses, is that unless decision makers are perfectly rational (or irrational 
for that matter), how they see macro-level changes affects their responses. This is essentially the 
idea of behavioral economics program, which in rough term states that individuals may not choose 
a perfectly rational decision in a market because of limited cognitive powers. In other words, 
individuals may not see the opportunities or advantages due to cognitive characteristics. This 
perspective is what the literature on organizational responses is lacking. Without a micro-
foundational view of the differences in individuals, researchers are either working with perfectly 
rational “supermen” or perfectly stupid cultural dopes (Jarvis, 2017, Suddaby, 2010). 
Recently, some institutionalists have embraced micro-foundations. For example, Thornton et al. 
(2012) explicitly argues in favor of considering cognitive elements of individuals and groups. 
Here, the authors take a stance towards framing through the before-mentioned toolkit approach. 
                                                 
20 See Pache & Santos (2010) for a more detailed overview of the strategies.  
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This changes the view of organizational responses to institutional change because it becomes not 
as much about following norms or complying with institutional demands, but rather about how 
institutional forces shape beliefs and decision-making.  
The literature has moved in the direction of framing institutional change and complexity as 
strategic opportunities that can be exploited (Ocasio & Radoynovska 2016). Ocasio and 
Radoynovska (2016) propose that firms may change their governance structures and business 
models depending on whether they frame the change, here in the form of the rise of institutional 
complexity, as a beneficial strategic opportunity or a problem. Comparably, Bertels and Lawrence 
(2016) note that it is individual agents who experience the complex logics and conjure up 
responses. In their study of schools, Bertels and Lawrence (2016) discovered that the sensemaking 
of the people in charge affected the overall organizational response. If leaders did not perceive 
the complexity as significant, they would re-interpret the complexity as being unimportant and 
unworthy of response. That it is the framing by individuals that affects decisions leads to a new 
question: How do individuals come to operate with certain frames and how do they differ? Here, 
Pache and Santos’ (2013a) argument that organizations “filter” a frame to their members is 
notable. This idea connects to organizational position in that if an organization is central, i.e. elite 
status in the field (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006), and is embedded, i.e. if it has a long history in 
the field, then it socializes its members to develop a frame that fits that field (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006, Pache & Santos, 2013a). A firm like Boeing, for example, would be considered 
both central and embedded in the field of aviation, and thus elite. In contrast, other organizations 
may be at the periphery of their field (Greenwood et al. 2011). These organizations may be not as 
entrenched in institutional relationships and demands, which, while allowing greater flexibility, 
may lead to being advantaged by existing arrangements (Greenwood et al. 2011). The 
dissatisfaction with being disadvantaged may lead organizations to perform “boundary bridging” 
and enter new fields to compete here or to bring in elements that change their” home” field 
(Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). 
While it is well known that central organizations, as result of being advantaged, have less reason 
to conduct institutional entrepreneurship, it is also proposed that they would be less prone to see 
opportunities for such entrepreneurship or in other ways respond positively to change (Greenwood 
et al. 2011, Greeenwood & Suddaby, 2006). In contrast, organizations on the fringe of a field 
would be more exposed to institutional contradictions because the organization comes into contact 
with other fields (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). Despite these conjectures, how managers come 
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to understand and frame the contradictions they are exposed to, such as the displacement of an 
existing arrangement or a new competing set of ideas entering the arena, is not well understood. 
The notion of the framing of opportunities and managerial decisions brings the ILP closer to the 
literature of BTF literature (Gavetti et al. 2012). In a recent review of the literature, Gavetti et al. 
(2012) note that there are complements between institutional logics literature and BTF. BTF 
explains the micro-determinants of decisions on both the individual and group level in the firm, 
while institutional logics are macro-determinants that explain how the environment affects 
decision-making. Despite this review by Gavetti et al., these links have not been fully explored.  
Comparison between institutional logics and BTF 
Table 1 summarizes the differences and similarities between institutional logics and the BTF. The 
purpose of this comparison is to identify elements where the two theories already converge and 
to find future areas where they can complement each other. 
 
Table 1 Comparison between institutional logics and BTF 
Explanatory factor Convergent 
assumptions 
Institutional logics Behavioral theory of 
the firm 
Cognition of 
individuals 
Decision makers will 
select among 
available 
organizational moves 
depending on where 
they place attention. 
 
Attention and 
cognition are limited 
resources. 
Decision makers’ 
attention and 
decision-making 
ability is shaped and 
constrained by 
structural factors.  
 
Decision makers may 
be blind to 
opportunities due to 
lack of access to the 
right cultural toolkit 
or a cognitive sunk 
cost fallacy. 
Decision makers’ 
attention and 
decision-making 
ability are subject to 
limited processing 
power and biases. 
Organizational 
environment 
The organizational 
environment is often 
very complex and 
dynamic. Responding 
to this environment 
encompasses both 
adaptive, but mostly 
routine responses.  
 
The environment 
consists of socially 
constructed structures 
of culture, politics 
and social networks. 
Decision makers’ 
tools and cognition 
are shaped by this 
social construction. 
The environment is a 
task environment 
consisting of 
information where 
decision makers 
apply different search 
strategies.  
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The organization acts 
as filter on the 
environment.  
Decision-making Decision makers in 
firms pursue profit 
maximization.  
 
Decision makers are 
embedded in 
networks and 
coalitions. There may 
be conflicts between 
different groups 
seeking different 
goals that must be 
resolved for the 
organization to 
function. 
Decisions are aimed 
at extracting 
resources and 
legitimacy from the 
environment.  
 
Decision-making is 
shaped by the 
cognitive and social 
embeddedness of 
decision makers, 
which incurs 
“bounded 
intentionality”.  
Decision makers seek 
the nearest satisfying 
decision due to 
cognitive limitations 
and biases. Adaption 
to the environment 
encompasses 
“organizational 
foolishness” in the 
form of slack, 
managerial 
incentives, symbolic 
action, ambiguity and 
loose coupling.  
Organizational 
Strategies 
Organizations (firms) 
have to adapt to their 
changing 
environments.  
 
Decision makers try 
to find the best 
possible strategy to 
accomplish this.  
 
Coalitions, intra-
organizational 
conflicts and 
organizational 
structures affect these 
decisions.  
Organizational 
strategies to respond 
to the environment 
are constrained by 
the environment in 
the form the strength 
of institutional 
pressures.  
Firm strategies are 
constrained by the 
decision makers’ 
search reach. 
Decision makers rely 
on cognitive abilities 
to extend their search 
area, for example by 
using associative 
thinking. 
 
Cognition of individuals 
The BTF’s main assumption about individuals is that they are cognitively limited (Cyert & March, 
1963, Gavetti et al. 2012, Simon, 1947). These limitations are reflected in biases and heuristics 
that individuals use to understand their environment and make decisions. These heuristics and 
biases can result in different framings. For example, the anchoring bias or representative heuristic 
can frame situations and decisions in a certain way (Kahneman, 2003). 
The ILP makes the same assumptions about individuals’ cognitive capabilities, but the perspective 
strives to connect these psychological assumptions with sociological perspectives so as to make 
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the asocial theory of cognitive proclivities and limitations into a social theory that ties into the 
institutional level (Thornton et al. 2012). While Thornton et al. (2012) retain the psychological 
assumptions of BTF, they do not expand on these but rather focus on the sociological perspectives 
outlined in the previous section on the ILP’s view on cognition. It is especially these macro-
determinants of organizational attention that could be incorporated into BTF (Gavetti et al. 2012, 
p. 16).  
Organizational Environment 
One important obstacle to accomplishing such a linkage between macro- and micro-determinants 
is the differences between cultural, political and social structures outside of the organization and 
information processing inside the organization. Behavioral theory of the firm solves this issue by 
reducing the environment to an information landscape where decision makers search for the right 
information and possible solutions (Gavetti, 2012). In contrast, ILP considers the environment to 
not solely consist of information, tasks and solutions, but also to extend to social relations, norms, 
values and identities that are preconscious. An important development in sociology has been to 
link the cultural perspective with the cognitive perspective (Cerulo, 2010, DiMaggio, 1997). This 
cognitive development in sociology could allow the ILP to integrate more with BTF, as the 
obstacle of linking external cultural elements with the internal information processing of 
individuals is overcome. 
Decision-making 
A contribution of BTF is that decision-making in organizations is not perfectly rational, but rather 
is bounded, satisficing and shaped by political processes within the firm (Cyert & March, 1963, 
Gavetti, Levinthal & Ocasio, 2007, Simon, 1947). This contribution focuses on the micro-level of 
the firm, considering the individual’s cognition and interactions between people. In contrast, ILP 
focuses on the macro-level elements that determine decision-making, which in extreme treatments 
reduces individual decisions to non-choice; they have to accommodate institutional pressures 
(Oliver, 1991).  In less extreme versions, decisions are directed towards obtaining legitimacy and 
resources from the environment, which differentiates the ILP from the BTF; in ILP the 
environment asserts itself on decision makers by pushing certain values, norms and practices to 
the forefront, whereas in BTF, decision makers search the environment.  
Organizational strategies 
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A crucial difference in how each perspective conceptualizes constraints on firm strategy, how they 
adapt to the environment. For ILP the constraints are mostly related to the environment, it is how 
strong the institutional pressures are, which depends on the fragmentation of the field and the 
organizational position (Greenwood et al. 2011). For BTF the constraints are internal. In essence, 
decision makers may not identify the best strategy because it is cognitively distant to them 
(Gavetti, 2012).  
 
To conclude my theoretical review, I outline and elaborate on the ILP view on cognition and how 
it relates to the literature on organizational responses to institutional change, mostly with regard 
to the shift towards institutional complexity. The basic argument is that decision makers’ 
information processing and framing of such a shift or change is limited by bounded intentionality, 
which may vary depending on which organization the decision makers belong to. This view differs 
from the traditional institutional view that promotes a non-choice framework (Oliver, 1991, 
Raiijmakers et al. 2015). The ILP view on cognition may integrate with BTF as both perspectives 
have several convergent assumptions as the ILP moves to the micro-level. Here especially, the 
connection between macro- and micro-level determinants, essentially how institutional 
environments affects the processes inside the firm, is promising (Gavetti et al. 2012). To facilitate 
such connection, it is necessary to connect cultural elements, the structural blade of Simon’s 
scissor, with the information processing of individuals, the cognitive blade of Simon’s scissor. 
Moreover, it is crucial to establish how different organizational positions incurs variances in 
responses, otherwise the institutional environment cannot explain variances in strategies of firms 
in the same field. By developing the cultural-cognitive link of ILP further, and proposing such 
variances, we can provide a varied theory of how the institutional environment, as macro-
determinants, shape attention and schemata, that provides the mental maps and search landscapes 
that BTF operates in. Hence, the link becomes clearer and we can find a role of both ILP and BTF 
in explaining organizational responses to institutional change in greater depth.  
The effect of previous organizational position on managerial decision-making 
My primary theoretical argument is that organizational position filters logics to its decision 
makers to varying degrees, which in turn shapes how they frame change and how they act. 
Organizational position is simplified into two opposites on a spectrum. Organizations can either 
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be central and embedded, what Greenwood and Suddaby (2006) call “elite”, or they can be 
peripheral and/or boundary bridging. 
I offer four propositions, for each of which my argument takes two forms: a theoretical backstory 
and a deductive line of reasoning. 
Theoretical backstory for proposition 1 
Organizations are considered legitimate when they adhere to the audience’s precognition of how 
they should behave (Hannan, Polós & Carroll 2007). When successful, the organization embeds 
itself more into the field and, in good cases, it becomes a central actor. High status in a field is the 
positive side of embeddedness and centrality, a firm becomes recognized as high status in a field, 
because it fits the exact prototype that the audience expects of an organization in that particular 
field (Hannan et al. 2007). Banks are a classic example of high status organizations. Big banks 
often reside in impressive buildings, the reason for this being that people must trust banks, as 
nobody would entrust their money to a bank that seemed short of cash, so banks must project 
stability and prestige. Legitimate entry can be very costly. Outsiders often have to pay homage to 
insiders in order to be allowed entrance. Outsiders have to defer to the logic(s) of the field and 
show they are able to follow the “rules” (Jourdan, Durand & Thornton 2017). There are two key 
outcomes of this. First, managers create schemata that fit their field as people gain a “feel of the 
game” and starts to rely on automatic cognition in adhering to the values and rules of the field 
(DiMaggio 1997). Managers, who have made their firms into central players in a field, become 
attached to the decisions and actions that made them successful. Miller (1994) finds that after 
experiencing success, managers show a greater tendency to draw on the past and do less deliberate 
information processing. This tendency is reinforced by CEOs and key decision makers being 
flattered by others due to their status (Westphal & Zajac 2013). It is in spirit the hot-hand fallacy, 
where previous success leads to a belief that current practices will also be successful in the future. 
Second, in order to become a manager in these firms, one has to fit into a social network that 
promotes such schemata. This leads to some form of inbreeding, where managers have to identify 
with the arrangement in order to be deemed legitimate. Examples of this include firms hiring top 
managers based on a particular education and long tenure within the firm (Burgelman & Grove 
1996). This is seen with German car manufacturers, such as Mercedes-Benz. They traditionally 
hire top managers from within the company who hold technical degrees. Another example is 
Boeing, which has a similar tradition with regard to hiring. Evaluating a list of CEOs in these 
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firms, it would be surprising to find someone who has not 1) been with the company for many 
years or 2) come from a close competitor. This argument is further backed by research, for 
example, Zhu and Westphal (2014) discovered that even if CEOs were prohibited from hiring 
people very similar to themselves, they would hire people who had worked with a CEO similar to 
them, in other words they used similar CEOs as proxies for themselves.  
This illustrates that managers have to fit specific categories to gain legitimacy (Hannan et al. 
2007). Organizations with embedded networks where people are recruited from within resemble 
a kind of private party. For this reason, people with short tenure in the relevant organization or 
field are less likely to obtain powerful positions. These are the people, who otherwise are most 
likely to carry out institutional entrepreneurship (Battilana 2006). Companies like Mercedes-Benz 
and Boeing are “pure” members in their field, therefore “the zone legitimacy”, i.e. ways you can 
act, is clearly defined (Hannan et al. 2007, Zuckerman 1999). The organization’s position in a 
field acts as a filter to its members (Pache & Santos 2013a), a filter that takes form of available 
networks and knowledge (Pache & Santos 2013a). Because of the clearer zone of legitimacy in 
embedded and central organization, the filtering is clearer and the logic takes a more a salient 
demeanor, which makes members of the organization identify with it (Pache & Santos 2013a).  
Scholars have argued for a “paradox of embeddedness”, where individuals and organizations are 
so embedded into a field that they are impervious to knowledge outside their network and to 
exogenous shocks (Seo & Creed, 2002, Uzzi, 1997). But such embeddedness also creates a 
conform and strong set of schemata that individuals obtain from being in such a closed network. 
They become cognitively constrained to conventional wisdom (Sherer, 2017).  
Deductive Line of reasoning:  
1) Central and embedded organizations face stricter institutional pressure but are also 
advantaged by the current arrangements (Greenwood et al. 2011). Given their advantages, 
these organizations become successful because they adhere to rules and therefore gain 
legitimacy and resources.   
2) The success that follows centrality and embeddedness leads managers to build schemata 
that lay out ways to replicate the success (Bingham & Kahl 2014). Managers, who have 
been successful, will rely more on the schemata they have obtained as they look to the past 
and reduce conscious information processing (Miller, 1994). A feedback mechanism takes 
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place where playing by the rules and being advantaged by the system, leads managers to 
internalize the successful behaviors and ideas that has led to this advantage.  
3) In order to reinforce existing ideas, CEOs and managers tend to hire people into their 
management group who are similar to themselves and who will support their ideas (Zhu 
& Westphal 2014). On a micro-level, managers therefore have the same problem of 
embeddedness as firms; they insulate themselves from information outside their network 
(Uzzi, 1997).  
Based on this, I propose:  
Proposition 1: The higher the embeddedness and centrality of an organization, the higher the 
conformity and coupling of managerial schemata to its specific field.  
Theoretical backstory for proposition 2 
Agents that are truly embedded are not supposed to be able to imagine, desire or realize any 
alternative ways of doing things, because the embeddedness into institutional arrangements define 
and conform their cognition and interests (Hardy & Maguire 2008). In contrast, organizations on 
the periphery of their field are less embedded in current arrangements and are more exposed to 
contradictions as they come into contact with other fields (Greenwood et al. 2011, Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006).  
Organizations on the periphery may span across their field and into another. In some rare cases, 
even organizations at the center of mature fields may be subjected to contradictions and begin to 
bridge to a new field, which enables them to create new organizational forms (Greenwood & 
Suddaby, 2006).  
Greenwood & Suddaby (2006) uses a study of big accountancy firms to illustrate this. These firms 
were increasingly asked by clients to offer multidisciplinary services, as they grew larger and 
more multinational. As a result, the Big Four accountancy firms started to offer consulting 
services. Thus, they bridged from the accountancy field to a consultancy field. Greenwood & 
Suddaby’s (2006) story is that stakeholders wanted firms that linked accountancy with 
consultancy, as they felt these services were related and would gain from being connected. 
Therefore, they pushed the big four accountancy firms to assume this position. The big four 
acquiesced and integrated consultancy services. Boundary bridging organizations work with 
different stakeholders that have diverse demands that create different experiences. The 
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organization now works in two or more fields. The organization becomes multi-logical as a result 
(Greenwood & Suddaby 2006). When the organizational position is bridging the individuals will 
work under different logics. As the organizational position includes different logics, the 
organization is presented with different schemata and tools attached to these logics. People in such 
organizations have different networks that are not embedded into one logic and its field. However, 
boundary bridging is not a necessity for being exposed to new ideas and institutional 
contradictions. Being on the margin of a field can lead important players to have different and 
unencumbered views, as individuals in such organizations are less cognitively constrained than 
industry insiders (Sherer, 2017). 
Being on the periphery of a field and/or bridging boundaries with a different field has two 
important results: 1) the networks inside the firm become more open and diverse and 2) the 
original logic is not filtered as purely as in anthe embedded organization, because the organization 
broadens what is filtered through. Because of this, people in the organization must be able to 
switch between logics (Jarzabkowski et al. 2013), which makes for a more dynamic organization. 
Deductive line of reasoning 
1) Organizations that are on the periphery are less cognitively constrained than embedded 
and central organizations and are more exposed to ideas from other fields (Greenwood et 
al. 2011, Sherer, 2017). Organizations that bridge into other fields meet new customer and 
demands which incurs them to produce a new set of schemata (Bingham & Eisenhardt, 
2014). Therefore, being peripheral and/or boundary bridging reduces the tight adherence 
to conventional wisdom and opens organizations to outside ideas (Sherer, 2017, Uzzi, 
1997). 
2) Managers in peripheral and boundary bridging organizations are less enforced to hire other 
managers who are similar to them. They are also incentivized to hire managers who can 
fit the adjacent field they are close to or already operating in. 
3) As being on the periphery increases the diversity of networks (Uzzi, 1997), it is more 
likely that outsiders with new ideas will meet insiders and exchange these new ideas 
(Sherer 2017).   
Therefore, I propose:  
Proposition 2:  The more peripheral and/or boundary bridging the organization is, the more 
diverse the managerial schemata will be. 
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Seeing institutional change as a strategic opportunity 
Scholars have argued for a “paradox of embeddedness”, where embeddedness (and centrality) 
leads to increased success, until a point where the embeddedness insulates organizations from 
exogenous shocks outside their network (Seo & Creed, 2002, Uzzi, 1997). Yet, this “paradox” 
lacks some explanatory power; what happens when the whole field changes? Will the organization 
that has been embedded and central be as open to such change as an organization on the periphery? 
I will argue that because being embedded in a field creates different representational and 
information processing schemata than those resulting from being in peripheral organization, the 
framing of institutional change in embedded organizations will likewise differ.  
Theoretical Backstory for proposition 3 
How organizations apprehend institutional change is not as much defined by limits in information 
processing capability, as it is limited by embeddedness.  
Being in an organization where the status quo is highly valued blocks how willing people are to 
apprehend change (Voronov & Yorks 2015). As Granovetter (1985) points out people are shaped 
by previous interactions with people and value close social relations, therefore breaking with close 
social norms have emotional consequences, which Voronov & Yorks (2015) also point out. 
Accordingly, people deeply ingrained into a field, where the organizational culture is tightly 
coupled to it, may come to it as a natural state of affairs, despite it being the result of cultural 
choices and processes. When institutional change arises, it presents itself as new practices and 
worldviews and the organization may face demands to use them, but a key notion is that they also 
might decouple and not respond at all or window dress (Bromley & Powell 2012). CSR policies 
and their actual effects are an example of this behavior. The organization shaped by its historical 
habits may not be moved be outside demands nor the infusion of new practices into its field. If 
the organization perceive its current operations as fully functioning, there would be little room for 
apprehension to novel ideas (Siggelkow 2001). The reason is that the bounds to decision making 
here are historical and cultural (Oliver, 1997).   The more embedded and central the organization 
has been in the past the stronger its organizational culture is aimed at reproducing that success. 
Burgelman & Grove state in their paper on strategic inflection points: “Corporate strategy reflects 
top management's beliefs about the basis of success of the firm. Top managers usually rise through 
the ranks and are deeply influenced by their perception of what made the company 
successful.”(Burgelman & Grove 1996 p.15)  In heavily embedded and central organizations, 
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managers have achieved success by carrying out actions fitting the logic of the field. They develop 
schemata that fit the field and which deeply influence their view on what is valuable for the 
organization. These schemata act as a cultural toolkit, which despite changes in the environment 
may stay intact (Swidler, 1986, 2008). Oliver (1997) argues that the sunk cost connected with 
these toolkits is cognitive. In other words, the more one learns to be successful in a field by 
internalizing schemata, the higher the sunk cost one faces when changing these beliefs. It is well 
known that people tend to hold on to sunk costs, and when managers have learned schemata and 
have come to automatically rely on them, they will be disinclined to abandon them for new belief 
systems. Building on Oliver’s (1997) analysis, this implies that managers adhere to “taken-for-
granted” rules instead of perceiving interesting new way of doing things, not because these ways 
are seen as “taken for granted” but because of the mental and emotional detriments to changing 
them.  
Deductive line of reasoning: 
In this regard, I propose:  
1) Managers in an embedded and central organization have to abandon their set of schemata 
(or cultural toolkits) to see a change as an opportunity. However, abandoning such learned 
skills and habits is difficult and undesirable (Swidler, 2008). Here, managers may face a 
cognitive sunk cost fallacy (Oliver, 1997). 
2) Managers face punishment by their close network if they change their views and these are 
not shared by their network (Voronov & Yorks 2015). 
3) The more managers conform to their schemata, the more change originating from other 
fields is cognitively distant to them (Gavetti 2012). 
Therefore, I propose  
Proposition 3:  Previous heavy embeddedness and centrality is negatively related to managers 
seeing institutional change as a beneficial strategic opportunity. 
Theoretical backstory for proposition 4 
Reversibly, the organization that bridges its field would have to operate and familiarize itself with 
other logics, thus opening the organization for alternatives (Greenwood & Suddaby 2006). In 
Greenwood & Suddaby’s (2006) study of accounting firms, the firms that bridged to other fields 
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were able to perceive and instigate a change in their own field.  They did so be taking in the new 
elements and training their employees in the new logic.  
Greenwood et al (2011) propose that organizations that bridge fields may be reflexively aware of 
new demands coming in and have greater discretion in their choices. The reflexivity is created by 
networks that are more diverse, variances in practices and incentives to change.   The boundary 
bridging organization would also have an advantage even if it were unfamiliar with the new logic 
entering the field because it would have experience switching modes and working multi-logically 
(Jarzabkowski et al. 2013). By bridging and working with multiple logics, a boundary bridging 
organization has already had to debate how to combine different elements. In addition, it is more 
likely to have entrepreneurial spirits who can mobilize power to shake up things. Because the 
managers in boundary bridging organizations would tend to be more diverse and have more 
diverse lines of thought, these managers would be more likely to see change as a beneficial 
strategic opportunity. This is especially true, because the boundary bridging organization are 
ranked lower than specialized incumbents (Zuckerman 1999), and this increases their incentive to 
utilize environmental changes compared to a highly central, and therefore more highly ranked 
organization.   
Deductive line of reasoning: 
1) The more diverse managerial schemata mean that opportunities from other fields are likely 
to be less cognitively distant. Moreover, the when the set of schemata are diverse and not 
tied to previous success, the habits are not as embedded in people.  
2) The management group in a boundary bridging organization is more diverse and does not 
face an internal group mechanism that makes adhere to one logic. Indeed, they are more 
likely to meet outsiders who present them with new ideas that re-frame change as strategic 
opportunities (Sherer 2017).  
3) The boundary bridging organization are not likely to be central either of the fields they 
bridge, hence managers may see an opportunity to unseat an incumbent. 
 Following, I propose:  
Proposition 4: Previous boundary bridging is positively related to managers seeing institutional 
change as a beneficial strategic opportunity. 
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Managers, who see institutional change as a strategic opportunity are more likely to enact changes 
such as altering their business model to fit the change (Ocasio & Radoynovska 2016). In contrast, 
decision makers who frame institutional change as undesirable and a threat to their success and 
status are more likely to either ignore changes or create defensive strategies (Oliver 1991). As 
Kahneman-Tversky’s seminal research program demonstrated (Kahneman 2003), framing greatly 
affects how decisions are made, if a situation is framed as a “losing game”, people change the 
decisions they make compared to when the same situation is presented as a “winning game”. 
Kahneman-Tversky also demonstrated that, people use their framings to simulate events 
(Kahneman & Tversky 1982). People are biased towards easy scenarios, i.e. scenarios in which 
they can imagine themselves, and biased against what they consider “bizarre” scenarios. 
Therefore, the framing of institutional change is important as to whether decision makers make 
the best possible decision. When managers see institutional change as a strategic opportunity, 
managers frame it as a possible scenario with probable desirable outcomes, it is more likely that 
people can think out a proper response, compared to managers who frame it as bizarre, and thus 
costlier in cognitive and emotional resources. Hence, avoidance or dismissal of new logics coming 
in, thereby simply negating the existence of change, may be a result of framing, not a strategic 
choice.  
Using a simplified spectrum, where the central organization is the embedded (or tightly coupled) 
one to a logic and the boundary bridging is a more flexible one. I propose that the position affects 
this framing, because managers develop different cognitive mechanisms, schemata, across the 
spectrum. At the heart, managers who have been successful or operate in central organizations, 
wants things to continue the way they are. Contrarily, managers in less central and more bridging 
organizations would be less tied to an existing paradigm. Scholars have predominately argued that 
logics appear more or less saliently, however they neglect that it is not necessarily as much 
saliency as framing of it that matters. Institutional change may be very salient, but also seen as a 
threat to existing harmony, hence driving negative and defensive responses, such as avoidance or 
defiance. Contrarily, seeing it as possibility may lead to offensive responses such as embracing 
new demands for first mover advantage or acting as an institutional entrepreneur in one’s field.  
This leads to another set of deductive reasoning for the last couple of propositions: 
Deductive line of reasoning: 
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1) Managers in embedded and central organizations are less likely to frame changes as a 
strategic opportunity and more likely to see them a threat because they face higher 
cognitive costs in changing their schemata. In comparison, managers in peripheral and 
boundary bridging organizations face lower cognitive costs. 
2) Having a negative frame for a change, for example seeing it as undesirable for one’s 
current arrangements or very different from the status quo, reduces one’s ability to 
comprehend the change and provide an active response (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). 
Conversely, finding change more desirable enables one to conjure up active responses 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1982).  
3) If one have a negative framing one is more prone to choose a defensive response to 
maintain status quo, whereas a positive framing makes one more prone to chose an 
offensive response to facilitate the change of status quo.  
Therefore, I have two final propositions: 
Proposition 5a: Seeing institutional change not as an opportunity, but as a threat increases the 
likelihood of negative and defensive responses. 
Proposition 5b: Seeing institutional change as a strategic opportunity increases the likelihood of 
positive and offensive responses.  
Figure 1 simply illustrates the causal relationship. The important consideration here is that 
organizational position is a moderator here, not a mediator of institutional pressures as in other 
models (Greenwood et al. 2011).  
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Figure 1 Illustration of the relationship 
Discussion 
The important change here is where Greenwood et al. (2011 p.342) argue that position can leave 
organizations (i.e. its managers) unaware of change, this model proposes that organizational 
position moderates the information and information processing that managers do, because the 
schemata obtained functions as representations and processors of information, which shape the 
responses. Thus, the propositions the paper makes and the mechanisms it outlines, change the 
organizational position from a mediator, a determinant of organizational responses, to an 
influencer, a moderator. This simple model thereby fits into an overall micro-foundational scheme 
were individuals play a bigger role than in other institutional paradigms (Thornton et al. 2012). In 
my discussion, I will analyze how the connections made in the propositions fit together with 
assumptions from BTF.  
 
Linking ILP and BTF through a micro-foundational perspective.  
In my propositions I connect institutional logics as external rules, norms, values, identities and 
practices to internal schemata. This allows for a link to BTF. I do not seek to expand upon BTF 
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but by developing ILP from the macro to the micro level (from logics to schemata and framing), 
I can link it to the micro-level that BTF commonly works on.  
In BTF it is assumed that managers have “mental maps” that influence both the information they 
perceive and how they process it21 (Siggelkow, 2001 p. 839).  The term “mental maps” is simply 
more popular way to say schemata, and these two concepts refer to the same thing. Where these 
maps derive from is not well developed in BTF because they are not a result of individual 
characteristics or solely micro-level interactions within the firm. Nobody is born a corporate 
strategist, nor can we understand how people interpret and respond to macro-level changes by 
only examining elements at the micro-level (Coleman, 1990). We therefore need macro-
determinants to understand where these mental maps come from (Gavetti et al. 2012). I argue that 
they are institutional, that we learn mental maps of beliefs and actions because we operate in 
institutionalized fields when we are employed in organizations. I strive to link macro-determinants 
(logics and fields) with micro-determinants (individual cognition and group-level interaction). I 
use Coleman’s popular bathtub model to illustrate this (Coleman, 1990).  
 
                                                 
21 Other scholars have used terms such as “opportunity box”. March (1991) calls them individual beliefs.  
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Figure 2. Illustration of the micro-foundational relationships and possible integration of BTF 
ideas 
In this model, I follow my propositions that suggest that organizational position acts as a 
moderator on the schemata of managers22. This is what Hedstrom and Swedberg (1998) term the 
“situational mechanism” or the “belief forming mechanism”. This mechanism forms beliefs, 
frames and modes of action, which in institutional logics literature is accomplished by shaping 
and providing schemata to individual agents. Here, this paper contributes by pointing to a variance 
in these schemata. The organizational position moderates this relationship in the macro-micro 
model – it does not mediate because individuals can be influenced by logics outside of their 
organizations, and therefore the organizational position is conceptualized as a moderator.  
In the figure above, managerial decision-making refers more to BTF and the work on managerial 
decision making, which is often in teams. In this model, this managerial decision-making is 
shaped by the framing of institutional change. The connection between the second and third box 
is the action formation mechanism (Hedstrom & Swedberg 1998). Managerial decision-making 
is affected by social and institutional constraints, not only cognitive ones. These institutional 
constraints to some degree shape thinking in the management group, however, it does not 
determine as other elements are at play. While the schemata produce a frame, the stability and 
strength of the frame is moderated by cognitive elements, for example if a person has a higher IQ 
or higher associative capability, then this person would be more likely to reflect over the situation. 
Similarly, a personality trait such as openness may make a person that is otherwise strongly 
embedded into a field willing to change.   
Therefore, while institutions shape the frames so that some possibilities and opportunities are 
more cognitively distant than others, this effect is moderated by specific cognitive processes, such 
as associative ability (Gavetti 2012). For this reason, some agents are able to see beyond existing 
prescriptions and break with existing frames (Thornton et al 2012).  BTF scholars refer to the 
cognitive capabilities as “micro-determinants”. In my model, both macro and micro determinants 
can vary and thus moderate the result. The next mechanism is the transformation mechanism, 
where individual decisions aggregate to an organizational outcome (Hedstrom & Swedberg 1998). 
This mechanism is essentially the result of an interaction effect between structural conditions, 
                                                 
22 This is if we look at the macro-to-micro link up. If we just look at two organizations in the same field (thereby 
using logics as a control, not a changing variable), then organizational position is the main independent variable.  
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such as coupling to logics, and cognitive conditions, such as openness and ability to create new 
associations. In table 1 I outlined the convergence and divergence between ILP and BTF. In table 
2 I will outline how my paper contributes to more integration.  
Explanatory 
Factor 
Problem for 
institutional 
logics 
Problem for 
BTF 
Contribution of 
this paper 
Integration 
possibility 
Cognition of 
individuals 
How are 
individuals 
cognitively 
different? By 
putting most of 
the weight on 
institutional 
explanations, we 
may “black-
box” 
individuals. This 
means that 
scholars do not 
look at how 
individuals vary 
in cognitive 
characteristics, 
for example 
schemata and 
frames.  
Where does 
individual 
beliefs and 
mental maps 
come from? And 
how do 
individuals 
differ in how 
they perceive 
information? 
Cognition of 
individuals vary 
according to 
what kind of 
organization 
they are in. The 
more embedded 
and central 
organization 
they are in the 
more sturdy and 
encumbered are 
their schemata. 
BTF could use 
the theory of 
how mental 
maps, i.e. 
schemata, are 
developed and 
how they vary.  
 
The ILP could 
use theory on 
how individuals 
differ in 
cognitive 
capabilities to 
form strategies, 
for example how 
individuals vary 
in associative 
and search 
capabilities.  
Organizational 
environment 
The 
organizational 
environment, 
such as the 
nature of 
institutional 
pressures, 
account for most 
of the variation 
in how 
organizations 
behave.  
 
The literature 
sometimes 
makes the 
environment so 
powerful and 
encompassing 
that individual 
The 
organizational 
environment is a 
passive reservoir 
of information 
and possible 
strategies.  
 
The literature 
has a tendency 
to put all the 
explanatory 
power on 
individual 
cognitive 
capabilities and 
political 
pressures. 
The paper 
argues for a 
middle position. 
The environment 
does actively 
shape how 
individuals think 
in their 
respective 
organizations.  
 
The environment 
shapes the 
“opportunity 
box” wherein 
decision makers 
identify strategic 
opportunities.  
But the paper 
also leaves room 
For BTF 
working with 
macro 
determinants 
from ILP could 
complement 
their internal 
determinants of 
organizational 
attention and 
action.  
 
 
For ILP the 
ability to link 
from macro to 
micro would 
allow to draw on 
these internal 
determinants 
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decisions do not 
matter.  
for variance in 
cognitive 
capabilities and 
political 
processes in the 
firm.  
from BTF, 
thereby finding 
more 
explanatory 
power in 
understanding 
organizational 
responses to 
institutional 
change and 
complexity. 
Decision making The literature is 
not strongly 
developed on the 
micro-level of 
decision making. 
First of because 
the notions of 
these micro-
foundations are 
new and just 
gaining ground. 
Secondly, the 
theory has a 
tendency to 
swing between 
rational 
strategizing and 
non-choice 
behavior. The 
view on decision 
making lacks 
balance between 
these extremes.  
The literature 
has a tendency 
towards 
reductionism, 
for example 
reducing 
managerial 
decision to 
cognitive 
capabilities of 
the managers in 
question.  
While group 
mechanisms do 
play a large role, 
going beyond an 
information 
processing 
environment is 
not well 
developed. The 
decision makers 
become 
conceptualized 
as acting in a 
neutral and 
sterile 
environment. 
For example, 
how morals and 
norms reflect in 
decision making 
is lacking.  
The paper 
conceptualizes 
decision makers 
as imperfectly 
rational. They 
are shaped by 
the environment. 
Their cognitive 
frames, the top 
management 
team and their 
network is 
shaped by 
varying degrees 
of 
embeddedness. 
 
Thereby, the 
paper takes the 
micro-
foundations 
perspective from 
ILP and fleshes 
it out more and 
introduces 
contingencies. 
Working with 
the notion that 
top management 
teams and 
networks are 
shaped by 
outside forces 
introduces a new 
perspective to 
understanding 
group dynamics 
in BTF. 
 
 
Organizational 
Strategies 
Organizational 
strategies are 
either driven by 
organizational 
Organizational 
strategies are 
most driven by 
the micro-level. 
The ability to 
choose and 
organizational 
response is 
How 
organizational 
strategies are 
shaped both by 
185 
 
environment or 
rational 
strategizing.  
affected by 
previous 
position.  
institutional 
factors, 
moderated by 
organizational 
position, but 
also by micro-
level 
mechanisms.  
Table 2 Links between ILP and BTF 
To exemplify how this link between ILP and BTF, that I am suggesting, may be working, I will 
turn to recent works on the micro-foundations of behavioral strategy. In his 2013 paper, Greve 
argues that there are four main behavioral strategies; a momentum, feedback, inferential and 
anticipatory. These strategies exist on a spectrum from momentum, which is lowest in rationality, 
to anticipatory, which is highest in rationality (Greve, 2013). The choice between a strategy that 
is low or high in rationality rests on the decision makers’ ability to manage mental processes, for 
example how proactive managers are able to be in shaping new opportunities and how plastic they 
are in seeking “strange” opportunities (Gavetti, 2012). Gavetti (2012) argues that choosing a low 
rationality strategy is the result of a limited “opportunity box”, which is constrained by the scope 
of cognitive processes in managers. The danger of this BTF perspective is that it may reduce 
organizational ability to act dynamically in changing environments to managerial cognitive 
abilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2015). In contrast, this paper argues that an organization’s 
embeddedness in its field matters, as this shapes the bounded intentionality of managers and in 
effect limits the “opportunity box” they work within. This does not ignore BTF. The ability to 
break out of this box or see beyond current recipes is likely to be affected by managers’ ability to 
see, shape and associate towards other opportunities.  
 
Why integration of ILP and BTF? 
There are two reasons for linking ILP and BTF. First, they share similar ideas of cognition, the 
core tenet being that there are limits to what individuals see as possible courses of action ILP calls 
it bounded intentionality, which is shaped by schemata, while the BTF calls it mental maps or 
opportunity boxes, which is shaped by cognitive limitations. Essentially, these two theories are 
referring to a different blade of Simon’s scissor. If we believe Simon to be right, that both 
structures as well as cognitive limitations and proclivities play a role in decision-making, then we 
stand to gain from combining these two perspectives. The second reason is that essentially few 
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academics, and people in general for that matter, believe that social phenomena can be explained 
by solely cognitive factors or cultural factors but a combination of these two elements. This is 
also seen in behavioral strategy, where Powell et al. (2011) precisely argue for a combination. 
Unfortunately, a combination of both structural and cognitive elements seems rare.  
In recent years, management research seems to have embraced a very reductionist view of 
decision-making. For example, Helfat & Peteraf (2015) argue that dynamic capabilities can be 
reduced to managerial cognitive capabilities. Gavetti (2012 p. 270) argues that firm failure to 
compete for opportunities rest on behavioral (mental process) failures of their manager: 
“Behavioral failures can be viewed in terms of limits to strategic leaders’ abilities to manage and 
overcome such mental impediments.” For example, Laureiro-Martinez, Brusoni, Canessa & Zollo 
(2015) look at fMRI images to analyze how persons shift between exploration and exploitation. 
On its own there is nothing wrong with these studies, but if this becomes the dominant (and 
possibly only) trend, then we risk reducing firm differences to a matter of IQ differences in 
managers. To this author, this would be a case of “greedy reductionism” (Pinker, 2002), here on 
the part of strategic management research. On the other hand, sociologists’ (including institutional 
scholars) reduction of decision making, or more precisely the removal of decision making, 
represents a contrasting side of greedy reductionism.  Vaisey (2008 p. 605) offers a provoking 
analysis of this tendency, according to which we risk reducing culture to a “Skinnerian Model” of 
behaviorism, in which individuals and their choices are the product of cultural materials and forces 
(see Meyer, 2010 for this view). This model makes it wholly unnecessary to examine micro-
foundations, individuals and groups (Jepperson & Meyer, 2011). Neither of these extreme views 
are desirable. A more realistic perspective is that, while cognitive abilities and proclivities in 
individuals matter, institutions and their surrounding logics are relevant for consideration as well. 
The perspective I am striving for argues that institutional logics shape decision makers but also 
leave room for micro-level mechanisms, such as cognitive capabilities and group dynamics. I do 
not contribute by developing these micro-level mechanisms further, as other papers have done, 
but rather by attempting to make room for them in the ILP. 
Contributions 
The paper makes contributions to our understanding of organizational responses to institutional 
changes by developing the macro-micro link and putting in the variance of organizational position. 
This allows us to understand these responses from both angles and avoids taking an exclusively 
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macro-level view. Moreover, I connect ideas from BTF and ILP that allows the bridging of 
perspectives between macro- and micro-concerns, which in future could be used by studies that 
seek to combine approaches. Finally, this paper presents some managerial implications relating to 
the differences in having top management teams with schemata that are strong and tightly 
connected to one field versus having management teams with diverse schemata. 
Contributions to the study of organizational responses to institutional change and 
complexity 
There is a rich and sizable body of literature on how organizations respond to (or strategize) 
institutional change and complexity (Micelotta et al. 2017, Oliver, 1991, Pache & Santos, 2010, 
Voronov & Yorks, 2015). One of the main shortfalls of this literature, however, is that it is weak 
with regard to the macro-micro link and the variance between individuals. As Suddaby (2010 p. 
15) notes, institutional theory tends to vacillate between assuming passive cultural dopes and 
rational, over-active “supermen”. I argue that this is problematic because by only focusing on 
macro-level explanations the same problem arises as was seen in neoclassical economics before 
the behavioral revolution – the need to work with a perfectly rational actor in order to aggregate 
micro-level behavior to macro-level outcomes23. Now, institutional theory usually has a non-
choice actor that isomorphs to the environment (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). In her work, Oliver (1991) changed this figure to a more rational actor, and combined with 
DiMaggio’s work on institutional entrepreneurship (1988, 1991) the literature developed into a 
sort of “hero story” about individuals and organizations where individuals are attributed 
remarkable capacity to act and change institutions at their discretion (Micelotta et al. 2017). To 
solve this, we need to have variance on the micro-level, where individuals and organizations can 
differ. Otherwise, we would only have macro-to-macro level explanations with either dopes or 
heroes carrying out these changes. The development of the macro-micro link in this paper could 
be used for future research that seeks to understand how individuals and organizations respond 
differently to institutional change and complexity. Moreover, it could be used to improve our 
understanding of the paradox of embeddedness and the paradox of “peripheralness” (Sherer, 
2017).  
                                                 
23 Some saw this as a strength of economic theory because the rational actor models allowed for a strong link 
between individual choices and macro level outcomes. James Coleman is probably the most known proponent of 
this view (Coleman, 1990).  
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Contributions the micro-foundations of Institutional Logics and linking with Behavioral 
Theory of the firm 
This paper seeks to expand on the micro-foundations outlined by Thornton et al. (2012). A 
common problem in institutional theory (and logics) has been the lack of strong micro-foundations 
(Jarvis, 2017, Schilke, 2017, Thornton et al. 2012, Voronov & Yorks, 2015). Here the paper 
contributes by exploring the link between logics and schemata, which has been mentioned in other 
work (Seo & Creed, 2002, Thornton et al. 2012), but which is not fully developed. The 
mechanisms I set out are supposed to be testable and could improve our understanding of the 
interplay between logics and organizational decision making. 
The relationship I am suggesting helps understand why logics both can constrain and enable 
action. Here I argue that action in the form of strategic responses depend on the framing of 
institutional change as either a strategic opportunity or more a threat to an existing arrangement 
that one prefers. Logics may therefore constrain some people and some organizations, while other 
people and organizations are not as cognitively constrained. Here the paper connects with the 
institutional entrepreneurship and institutional work literature (e.g. Battilana 2006, Lawrence & 
Suddaby 2006), but this paper adds a distinct cognitive dimension that the literature on responses 
have not operationalized clearly. Moreover, the paper contributes to the literature on 
organizational responses to institutional change, through this micro-foundational view that 
includes psychological mechanisms.  
These psychological mechanisms allow for a connection to BTF, seen in how ILP can explain the 
origin of managers’ mental maps and opportunity boxes because it utilizes a cultural dimension 
with macro-determinants. This allows us to understand the differences in managers’ capacities to 
find and chose opportunities that goes beyond considering only their cognitive abilities, thereby 
allowing for more holistic view of managerial decision making as envisioned by Gavetti et al. 
(2012). Future work in BTF could use the ideas in this paper to complement their micro-level 
analysis by including institutional logics and organizational position as a variable.  
Managerial Implications 
When considering institutional framing, there are some important managerial implications. As 
several scholars have noted, institutional change and complexity is in essence also opportunity, it 
is the breakdown of old structures, which opens up gap that can be exploited by the opportunistic 
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and open-minded organization. How the change and/or complexity is framed could have 
significant impact on the success and survival of the firm. This framing is very much dependent 
on the constellation of managers and the schemata they have obtained. Managers’ immersion into 
different fields is crucial for them to be able to frame change as opportunities (Shepherd, 
McMullen & Ocasio 2016). Therefore, if a top management team has little diversity, but only 
people with similar background, then the managers may focus on incrementally building on 
existing schemata, rather than seeing radical new opportunities (Shepherd et al. 2016).  A problem 
that Westphal & Zajac (2013) point to is that often CEOs and managers rely on an inside network 
that conforms their thinking. Thereby, taken for granted representations and ways to perceive 
information may be institutionalized in a top management team that has a great degree of 
homophily. Here, my paper points out some managerial implications on how management teams 
may grow conform. It is important to note that this conformity is not solely negative. In fact, it 
may create competitive advantage due to specialization in a profitable field.  Managers who 
develop conformal schemata gain the advantage that they can operate smoothly and successfully 
in their field without large costs on their deliberate cognition. In addition, by having managers 
with a high internal fit of how they think, competitors may find themselves unable to replicate 
such consistency (Siggelkow, 2001). The danger is that when the environment changes, this 
consistent fit of schemata is too narrow to realize it leading to detrimental performance 
(Siggelkow, 2001). Thus, being central and embedded, while leading to success in the current 
arrangements, may disable managers in exploiting change and complexity happening in the future.  
Conclusion 
Ultimately, this paper argues the simple premise that a manager’s relationship to culture and 
institutions matters for how they perceive changes in their environment. Returning to my initial 
question of why Nike and Adidas have chosen rather radical business models focusing on 
sustainability. While it is likely that they do have managers with an impressive set of cognitive 
capabilities, part of the explanation may also lie in that they framed their business differently. 
They were not tied to taken for granted ways of action but could break out of the hurtful dichotomy 
of profits versus CSR and find a third way. The framing of opportunities and decision making of 
managers is likely to be in part a cultural process, unless one believes top-level managers to be 
born with business plans fully formed in their minds. It is also a cognitive process, unless one 
believes that people are blank slates without any cognitive proclivities and characteristics of their 
own. If these assumptions seem realistic, it is clear that we need new schools of thought and 
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models that encourage a mix of culture and cognition. This paper hopes to provoke research in 
this direction.  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusion 
 
This thesis strives to shed light on the scale-up phase of entrepreneurial ventures. Here the thesis 
relied on a venture scaling up in the complex industry of photonics. Relying on an institutional 
logics’ framework the thesis shows that ventures face a major problem as they come to work in 
an institutional complex environment that shapes them. This is a problem because rarely do 
managers and employees know how to behave, what the right strategy is, and how to think about 
the organization’s identity. While the thesis does not produce a set of “fixes” to this problem, I do 
believe that knowing about and understanding the internal organizational problems will help 
ventures to scale.  
The thesis consists of four papers. In the first paper (Chapter 2) I review the institutional logics 
literature in order to outline the theoretical tools I am working with, their strengths and weaknesses 
and where future research, including my own, could contribute to further this perspective. By 
looking through all the papers using institutional logics that have been published in top 
management journals, I discovered that studies tend to focus mostly on the field level and on 
particular types of organizations, such as service firms and social enterprises. I therefore argue 
that the institutional logics perspective needs to look at a wider sample of organizations, it could 
look more at organizational characteristics, interact with different theories and strive to build more 
holistic micro-foundations. Thus, the paper proposes future research directions, which include the 
directions I am taking in the empirical papers. 
In the second paper (Chapter 3), I look at the process of how a venture adopts a logic and the 
consequence on organizational processes and outcomes. The study shows that the adoption 
process is difficult to control and that the interplay between logics changes over time, making it 
difficult for managers to predict and control the fallout. The paper indicates that the process of 
adopting a new logic may cause framing contests when different members and units collaborate 
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on tasks, for example employees working with a science logic have a different frame than 
employees working with a corporation logic.  
The third paper (Chapter 4), takes the findings from the second paper further and focuses on a 
different period in the case. This paper changes the focus from the adoption process and takes a 
look at how the venture decided to pursue a hybrid strategy, for example by trying to secure 
funding for projects as a science-based venture catering to EU research projects while also trying 
to cater to large corporations as a commercial venture.  Here, the paper points to a trade-off 
between getting resources and legitimacy from a different set of external stakeholders and 
maintaining internal coherence, as competing logics become salient as a result of the strategy. 
Thereby, employees could legitimize different actions and beliefs according to what logic they 
were most motivated to follow. For this reason, groups adhering to each logic and wanting to go 
in different directions emerged and hindered the successful fulfillment of the hybrid strategy.  
The fourth paper (Chapter 5) takes a look beyond ventures and focuses on how organizations 
respond to institutional change and complexity from a decision-making perspective that links 
macro and micro determinants of decision making. While this paper differentiates from the 
empirical papers by being conceptual and not looking specifically on ventures, it is very relevant 
to understanding the decision making in ventures as they scale. The core argument here is that 
having been central in one field makes it harder to fathom change and act accordingly. For 
example, if a venture has been central in the scientific community, perhaps it is a spin-off, then 
fathoming the institutional change and complexity arising when changes make the field more 
market and corporate oriented, is really difficult. The reasons are simple; the decision makers in 
charge of understanding this change and the opportunities within, are not likely to have experience 
in dealing with corporations and the demands of the mature market, they are more likely to be 
scientists in it for the science. Research has backed this, for example in Powell & Sandholtz’ 
(2012) study of science ventures, and the same in Pahnke et al.’s (2015) study of how it matters 
which type of VC that invests in a company. Naturally, it is also notions that stick to a wider array 
of organizations, for example elite organizations that are tied to a specific field are likely to 
develop cognitive bounds as a result.  
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Theoretical implications  
 
I have repeatedly stated the argument that we need a better understanding of institutional logics 
on the micro-level. We need to understand them in daily interactions and be able to translate them 
into actual ideas and actions in order to use and understand them. A good theory should allow us 
to do so. A recurring issue with institutional logics, or at least one critics often raise, is that they 
are abstract and not tied to everyday situations (Greenwood et al. 2014). Here the empirical papers 
strive to show that logics are a) frames that people use to understand what to do and why and b) 
they are different set of practices that follows the framing. Here the thesis strives to give a better 
account of how the logics play out at on the ground. 
I focus especially on the competition between logics in framing action and which practices and 
structures should be used in an organization. Here, each paper contributes with new knowledge.  
Chapter two, the review paper, shows the strengths and weaknesses of the literature and where it 
could be improved. Chapter 3, the second paper, investigates the adoption process and shows the 
iterative process between micro-level activation of frames and the macro-level empowerment of 
the new frame, as well as the consequence of this change for the firm.  
Chapter 4, the third paper, follows the rise of the dual frames by looking at how this is tied into a 
hybrid strategy. This paper follows the second one in time where the firm has adopted the logic 
and is now pursuing a hybrid strategy. This paper seeks to explain why and how logics compete 
and are not settled into a hybrid order that allows the firm to successfully pursue a hybrid strategy. 
Here the paper points to a crucial trade-off; when managers decide to get resources and legitimacy 
from competing sources, they open their organization to competing inputs, for example one from 
science and one from corporations, then the firm is susceptible to conflict between the two sub-
groups inside that represents each view. Thus, the firm faces a trade-off in getting resources from 
multiple sources and having an unruly organization, where the members can seek legitimation for 
different action and graft in ideas on how to do organize and do things, in my case they grafted in 
ideas from science and corporations. Thereby, the paper takes an influential idea, that ventures 
should pursue legitimacy and resources from multiple stakeholders (Fisher et al. 2016), and points 
to a problem; employees may not have the same desire to pursue such strategy, in fact they may 
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use the opportunity to focus on the element they like and actively try to avoid becoming hybrid in 
their work. Hence, there is a job for leaders of the firm not just to cater to external stakeholders 
but to also secure support for the strategy on the home front.  
Chapter 5, the final paper, contributes to looking at organizational responses to institutional 
complexity and applying a micro-foundations perspective that ties institutional logics ideas to that 
of the Behavioral Theory of the Firm. The paper argues that logics create a set of schemata, what 
we would popularly call a “mental map”, that shape how managers frame institutional change as 
either an opportunity or a threat. This macro-micro outline in the paper allows for a link to 
behavioral theory, as they have focused on how managers operate with such a mental map. Hence, 
the link is that institutional logics provide you with a map on how to operate (the socially 
constructed assumptions, beliefs and rules that individuals use to produce their reality), the paper 
here argues that the strength of these maps differ, some people are more tied to their assumptions 
and beliefs if they have been very successful in using them and have been using them exclusively 
for a long time. But importantly, I propose that if we take behavioral theories into account, 
cognitive traits matter as well; for example, some people are more open to new ideas than others, 
and this may shape how they respond to institutional change too.  
 
Table 1 shortly outlines the contributions. 
Paper Existing Literature Contributions 
Chapter 2, “Institutional 
logics as an organization and 
management theory” 
Institutional logics have a 
pre-dominant focus on the 
macro-level and on a certain 
type of organization. 
The perspective could be 
enriched by studies of a 
wider sample of 
organizations, connections 
with other theories and more 
developed micro-foundations. 
Chapter 3, “Adoption of 
Logics in Entrepreneurial 
ventures; how logics are 
brought in, activated and 
conflict in the organization” 
Focus on organizations that 
work in inherently hybrid 
fields, such as social 
enterprise. 
How the change from a 
singular to a hybrid field 
affects the organization as it 
adopts a new logic. 
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Chapter 4, “Getting the best 
of both worlds: the hybridity 
challenge of entrepreneurial 
ventures”  
Accepted idea that ventures 
should pursue legitimacy 
from different stakeholders 
(Fisher et al. 2016, Wry et al. 
2014) 
Pursuing a hybrid strategy 
may benefit the organization 
for its stakeholders but 
facilitate conflict internally, 
as members are not motivated 
to follow the strategy.  
Chapter 5, “Seeing 
Institutional Change as an 
opportunity; linking 
managerial decision making 
and institutional logics” 
The literature has 
predominantly focused on 
how the institutional field 
and the organizations role in 
it, forces it do acquiesce to 
demands or creates 
opportunity to avoid 
(Greenwood et al. 2011, 
Pache & Santos, 2010). 
It is not only the “force” of 
the field that matters, but 
embeddedness. Managers in 
embedded organizations not 
only may face stronger 
demands, but they are also 
shaped by the history; they 
come to take the status quo 
for granted and as desirable, 
hence they frame change as 
negative.  
Table 1 List of contributions 
 
Practical implications 
 
The thesis points to a crucial problem in scaling ventures that the literature has not given much 
attention; that operating in institutional complex environments not only provides challenges for 
managers in catering to these external demands, but also provides ammunition for conflict 
internally.  
While the thesis does not provide any direct tool that managers can apply to solve the problem, it 
provides insight on the process and the elements that create the conflict. An issue, I have found is 
the lack of attention to the problem; managers are more focused on the market and “crossing the 
chasm”, rather than the internal organization.  
202 
 
Hence, for scaling an increased focused on the internal organization is needed as it may face 
challenges that can cause break-up. A likely practical implication is that managers need to change 
the organizational design and manage the culture to make sure the organization successfully 
scales. The scaling up is not just more of the same for the organization, but an overall change, as 
Edith Penrose once wrote: a growing organization is like a caterpillar and a mature one is like a 
butterfly (Penrose, 1959). To get to this the leaders of the organization must organize a bricolage 
of the new people and inputs from the environment to create a scaling organization.  
 
Future research and concluding remarks 
The thesis is limited as a single case study, much more research into scaling is naturally needed 
to understand and facilitate a solution of this practical and societal important issue.  
I chose an institutional logics approach as it fitted with the data, but naturally many other 
approaches, macro and micro, are relevant and needed. However, in order to continue applying 
the institutional approach, as in popular in looking at ventures (Desantola & Gulati, 2017, Fisher 
et al. 2016), the perspective needs to encompass a more micro-level approach that allows for 
organizational differences and management strategies (Greenwood et al. 2014).  
The hope of this thesis is to sow opportunities for future research to dig into the problem of scaling 
ventures and to apply an institutional lens that spans across levels to find the problems that happen 
in the everyday life on the factory floor of a scaling venture and how these problems tie into 
overall changes in the organization and in its environment.  
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